We now examine whether this fact was sufficient to support the State's defense that the Court of Claims had sole jurisdiction over such a property dispute. Sovereign immunity in Illinois exists pursuant to statute and mandates that the State or a department of the State cannot be a defendant in an action brought directly in the circuit court. (705 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1992); President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, Springfield (1994), 271 Ill.App.3d 1048, 1054, 208 Ill.Dec. 376, 649 N.E.2d 432.) Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act states:
In October 1994, the appellate court affirmed. See President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1048 (1994). The hotel ventures' request for rehearing in the appellate court was denied on May 5, 1995.
The party seeking disqualification bears the burden of establishing that the present and former representations are substantially related. Hannan v. Watt, 147 Ill. App.3d 456, 464 (1986). If a substantial relationship between the two matters is not shown, then no breach of the duty of confidentiality will be found. President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, Springfield, 271 Ill. App.3d 1048 (1994). Attorney disqualification is a drastic measure because it destroys the attorney-client relationship by prohibiting a party from representation by counsel of his or her choosing.
The characterization of an action depends upon the factual underpinnings of the case and the law necessary to arrive at a conclusion. President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, 271 Ill. App.3d 1048, 1057 (1995). A review of both complaints reveals that the thrust of the amended claim remained a claim for damages for breach of contract.
Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the supervisor would be acting within the scope of his duties by making truthful statements of the general type alleged. Cf. President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, Springfield, 271 Ill. App.3d 1048, 1057, 649 N.E.2d 432, 438-39 (1994) (focusing on whether individual defendant had authority to take general type of action giving rise to contract claim, not whether action violated contract). However, this rule — that a suit against a state employee constitutes a suit against the state when a judgment for a plaintiff could control the state's actions — is not without limits.
Section 30.1 of the Illinois Public Accounting Act delineates a narrow scope for accountants' liability to third parties. See Robin v. Falbo, No. 91 C 2894, 1992 WL 188429 at 8-9 (N.D.Ill. July 24, 1992); Endo v. Albertine, 812 F. Supp. 1479, 1495 (N.D.Ill. 1993); President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, Springfield; 271 Ill. App.3d 1048, 1055, 208 Ill.Dec. 376, 382, 649 N.E.2d 432, 438 (1st Dist. 1994). It provides that, with only two exceptions, "[n]o person, partnership or corporation licensed or authorized to practice [public accountancy] under this Act . . . shall be liable to persons not in privity of contract . . . for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions, decisions or other conduct in connection with professional services performed. . . ." 225 ILCS 450/30.1. The first exception to the privity requirement permits liability for "such acts, Omissions, decisions or conduct that constitute fraud or intentional misrepresentations.
"If a judgment for plaintiff could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability, the action is effectively against the State and is barred by sovereign immunity." President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, Springfield, 271 Ill.App.3d 1048, 1054-55 (1994). All three of the criteria for defendant's invocation of its sovereign immunity are met in this case.
Accordingly, we now turn to plaintiffs' contention that the language of the Human Rights Act indicates the legislature's intent to waive the State's immunity to claims brought under that statute. ¶ 21 The doctrine of sovereign immunity exists in Illinois pursuant to the Immunity Act, which mandates that the State or a department of the State cannot be a defendant in an action brought directly in the circuit court, except where the State has expressly consented to be sued. 745 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2010); President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, Springfield, 271 Ill.App.3d 1048, 1054, 208 Ill.Dec. 376, 649 N.E.2d 432, 437 (1994). The Immunity Act states that, except for a few enumerated exclusions, “the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2010).
705 ILCS 505/8(b) (West 2006). The prohibition against making the State a party to a suit founded upon a contract entered into between a plaintiff and the State cannot be evaded by making an agent of the State the defendant when the real claim is against the State. President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, Springfield, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1054, 649 N.E.2d 432 (1995). However, an action filed in the circuit court against a State official in her official capacity is not subject to dismissal on jurisdictional grounds if the complaint alleges that the official is enforcing an unconstitutional law or acting in violation of law and thus acting beyond her authority. Smith, 113 Ill. 2d at 131-32.
The record in this case contains no evidence establishing a substantial relationship between Brown's civil matter and defendant's criminal prosecution. In President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, Springfield, 271 Ill.App.3d 1048, 1060, 208 Ill.Dec. 376, 649 N.E.2d 432 (1994), the appellate court explained: