Opinion
No. CV 01-0276254S
February 4, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO COMPEL
This memorandum addresses the scope of response required under Practice Book § 13-23(a) when a party must rely on information from a third party to answer a request for admission as to authenticity of a document. For the following reasons, the court holds that although the rule requires a party to whom such a request is directed to make a reasonable inquiry of others, on the facts of this case, the party need not, in answering the request, rely on information provided by others if the party itself lacks first hand knowledge of the information, had no control or input into preparation of the document, and lacks sworn testimony or other reliable means for crediting the information provided by others.
Defendant Dalco Electric, Inc., has filed the pending motion to compel seeking an order that the plaintiff "appropriately respond" to Dalco's Second Request to Admit dated December 3, 2003. In that Request to Admit, Dalco sought an admission that a copy of particular document not generated by the plaintiff "was a true, accurate and complete copy of the intervening Plaintiff's First Report of Injury, dated March 16, 2000." Plaintiff's reply, dated January 4, 2004, responded that "Plaintiff can neither admit nor deny this factual allegation inasmuch the Plaintiff did not prepare the document nor had the Plaintiff any input or involvement into the preparation of said document as best as the Plaintiff can recall." Defendant's motion to compel asserts that this reply is inadequate because it did not aver that plaintiff had made a reasonable inquiry before responding.
Practice Book § 13-23, captioned "Answers and Objections to Requests for Admission," provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Each matter of which an admission is requested is admitted unless . . . the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney . . . An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless such party states that he or she has made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him or her is insufficient to enable an admission or denial.
In opposing the motion to compel, plaintiff argues that since he neither generated the particular document nor participated in its creation, he lacks the knowledge to admit or deny the document. He also asserts that he should not be forced to accept representations as to the document's authenticity from others whose interests may be adverse to his. Here the document in question appears, on its face, to have been generated by plaintiff's employer, the intervening plaintiff, which has asserted a workers' compensation lien over proceeds of the action. The document contains factual assertions averse to plaintiff's theory of recovery against defendant.
Under P.B. § 13-23(a), "it is an inadequate response to state that the requests for information . . . cannot be complied with because they are not within a party's personal knowledge." Vitolo v. Enterprise Leasing Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 93-3550525, 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 481 (August 20, 1996, Corradino, J.) (Memorandum of Decision on Plaintiff's Request for Admissions). This case presents the question, however, as to the extent of the inquiry that must be made to third parties when answering requests of admission. Although this court is not aware of any Connecticut cases directly answering that question, the Connecticut rule is modeled on Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and this court can thus look for guidance to federal authorities addressing the issue.
Under the federal rules,
What constitutes "reasonable inquiry" and what material is" readily obtainable" depends upon the facts of each case. See T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Fund, Inc. v. Oppenheimer Co., 174 F.R.D. 38, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Under certain circumstances, parties may be required to inquire of third parties to properly respond to requests to admit. See, e.g., In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litigation, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5009, Nos. 82 Civ. 5253, 87 Civ. 8982 (MBM), 1990 WL 657537, [*5] at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1990) (plaintiff must consult non-parties' counsel to confirm data derived from figures in documents produced by non-party, where plaintiff and non-party had parallel interests and had been closely cooperating in conducting discovery in two related cases); Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 91 F.R.D. 590, 593-94 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (if, without extraordinary expense or effort, defendant may be able to respond to requests based upon information secured from co-defendants and their counsel, such efforts must be made).
Generally, however, a reasonable inquiry is limited to review and inquiry of those persons and documents that are within the responding party's control.
Hanley v. Como Inn, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7130 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 25, 2003). The above is an appropriate description of a party's duty to respond under our rule as well.
Defendant is correct that plaintiff's response, by failing to state that he had made a reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable an admission or denial, does not comply with the requirements of Practice Book § 13-23(a). The motion to compel is therefore granted, in accordance with this decision.
BY THE COURT
STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT