OCGA § 9-11-50. See Premium Distributing Co. v. National Distributing Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 667 ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). 2.
Rule 6.3 does not conflict with OCGA § 9-11-56, since it does not "[require] that litigants seek a hearing or waive it, [nor does it invest] the trial court with discretion to deny to parties a right granted by statute." Premium Distrib. Co. v. Nat. Distrib. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 669 ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). "The obvious purpose of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment is to provide counsel with an opportunity to persuade the court and to provide the court with an opportunity to interrogate counsel."
Appellant contends, in essence, that absent an expansion of the record, appellee's second motion for summary judgment was no more than a renewal of the previously denied motion and the trial court was without authority to consider and to grant it. "After a review of statutory and case authority, we conclude that it is within the discretion of a trial judge to consider a renewed motion for summary judgment even without an expansion of the record." Premium Dist. Co. v. Nat. Dist. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 667 (1) ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). It is clear from the record that appellant expressly waived the "notice" requirement of Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c) as to the renewed motion.
"As the record stands in this case, judgment for [Murray] is demanded, [Garnett] make[s] no claim that there would have been any addition to the record or that [additional time to respond to the supplemental brief] would have changed the state of the record in any way." Premium Distrib. Co. v. National Distrib. Co., 157 Ga.App. 666, 670 (2) ( 278 SE2d 468) (1981). This rule provides:
Furthermore, Rule 6.3 does not thwart the obvious purpose of a hearing in summary judgment, which is to provide counsel with an opportunity to persuade the court and to provide the court with an opportunity to interrogate counsel. Premium Distr. Co. v. Nat. Distr. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 669 ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). Sentry Ins. v. Echols, 174 Ga. App. 541 ( 330 S.E.2d 725) (1985).
We do not view this as one of those cases where summary judgment is so clearly mandated that appellants can show no harm in the court's failure to follow the proper procedure. Premium Distributing Co. v. Nat. Distributing Co., 157 Ga. App. 666 ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). The nunc pro tunc order does not cure the lack of notice of hearing and opportunity to respond because the case was already on appeal when the order was entered.
However, "[i]t is axiomatic in Georgia appellate law that an appellant, to secure a reversal, must show not only error but harm." Premium Distrib. Co. v. Nat. Distrib. Co. , 157 Ga. App. 666, 670 (2), 278 S.E.2d 468 (1981). Cleveland concedes that "she had admitted many times under oath that there were times when she did not pay contractors for faulty work."
Dixon v. Midland Ins. Co., 168 Ga. App. 319, 320 (2) ( 309 SE2d 147) (1983). See Premium Distrib. Co. v. Nat. Distrib. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 667 (1) ( 278 SE2d 468) (1981) ("it is within the discretion of a trial judge to consider a renewed motion for summary judgment even without an expansion of the record"). 3.
[Cit.] [Plaintiff] having shown no harm in being denied a hearing on the motion, no reversal is required. Premium Dist. Co. v. Nat. Dist. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 670 (2) ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981)." Christensen v. State, 219 Ga. App. 10, 12 (4) ( 464 S.E.2d 14) (1995).
When the denial is affirmed on appeal, however, it establishes as the law of the case that the movant is not entitled, on the basis of the record as it then existed, to summary judgment. Premium Distrib. Co. v. Nat. Distrib. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 667-668(1) ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). See OCGA § 9-11-60(h); compare T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. S. Carolina Nat. Bank, 203 Ga. App. 605, 606(2) ( 417 S.E.2d 336) (1992) (renewed motion not barred because denial of original motion not appealed). It is well established that when a ruling is appealed, the appealing party must raise all available grounds.