Premium Dist. Co. v. National Dist. Co.

33 Citing cases

  1. Akins v. Couch

    271 Ga. 276 (Ga. 1999)   Cited 21 times
    Holding jury issue existed on whether buyers’ claim for rescission of a contract to purchase house was barred by their failure to exercise due diligence in inspecting health department records for sewer clearance letter

    OCGA § 9-11-50. See Premium Distributing Co. v. National Distributing Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 667 ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). 2.

  2. Spikes v. Citizens State Bank

    179 Ga. App. 479 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 16 times

    Rule 6.3 does not conflict with OCGA § 9-11-56, since it does not "[require] that litigants seek a hearing or waive it, [nor does it invest] the trial court with discretion to deny to parties a right granted by statute." Premium Distrib. Co. v. Nat. Distrib. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 669 ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). "The obvious purpose of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment is to provide counsel with an opportunity to persuade the court and to provide the court with an opportunity to interrogate counsel."

  3. Telligman v. Monumental Properties, Inc.

    161 Ga. App. 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 49 times
    In Telligman, we found that the corrective measures taken by defendant, including maintenance crews which were present "manually chipping away ice, spreading salt and roping off hazardous areas," authorized a finding that defendant had at least constructive knowledge of the invisible patch of ice at its business entrance.

    Appellant contends, in essence, that absent an expansion of the record, appellee's second motion for summary judgment was no more than a renewal of the previously denied motion and the trial court was without authority to consider and to grant it. "After a review of statutory and case authority, we conclude that it is within the discretion of a trial judge to consider a renewed motion for summary judgment even without an expansion of the record." Premium Dist. Co. v. Nat. Dist. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 667 (1) ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). It is clear from the record that appellant expressly waived the "notice" requirement of Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c) as to the renewed motion.

  4. Garnett v. Murray

    281 Ga. 506 (Ga. 2006)   Cited 5 times

    "As the record stands in this case, judgment for [Murray] is demanded, [Garnett] make[s] no claim that there would have been any addition to the record or that [additional time to respond to the supplemental brief] would have changed the state of the record in any way." Premium Distrib. Co. v. National Distrib. Co., 157 Ga.App. 666, 670 (2) ( 278 SE2d 468) (1981). This rule provides:

  5. Kelley v. First Franklin Financial Corporation

    256 Ga. 622 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 21 times
    In Kelley v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., 256 Ga. 622, 623 (351 S.E.2d 443), it was held that OCGA § 9-11-56 "contemplates but does not mandate a hearing," and that Rule 6.3 of the Uniform Rules of the Superior Courts (Rules), see 257 Ga. 829, and the statute work consistently.

    Furthermore, Rule 6.3 does not thwart the obvious purpose of a hearing in summary judgment, which is to provide counsel with an opportunity to persuade the court and to provide the court with an opportunity to interrogate counsel. Premium Distr. Co. v. Nat. Distr. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 669 ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). Sentry Ins. v. Echols, 174 Ga. App. 541 ( 330 S.E.2d 725) (1985).

  6. Leverich v. Roddenberry Farms, Inc.

    253 Ga. 414 (Ga. 1984)   Cited 7 times

    We do not view this as one of those cases where summary judgment is so clearly mandated that appellants can show no harm in the court's failure to follow the proper procedure. Premium Distributing Co. v. Nat. Distributing Co., 157 Ga. App. 666 ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). The nunc pro tunc order does not cure the lack of notice of hearing and opportunity to respond because the case was already on appeal when the order was entered.

  7. Cleveland v. Sentinel Ins. Co.

    354 Ga. App. 795 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 6 times
    Reviewing a trial court's ruling on the exclusion of expert opinion for abuse of discretion

    However, "[i]t is axiomatic in Georgia appellate law that an appellant, to secure a reversal, must show not only error but harm." Premium Distrib. Co. v. Nat. Distrib. Co. , 157 Ga. App. 666, 670 (2), 278 S.E.2d 468 (1981). Cleveland concedes that "she had admitted many times under oath that there were times when she did not pay contractors for faulty work."

  8. Morrison v. Morrison

    299 Ga. App. 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 5 times

    Dixon v. Midland Ins. Co., 168 Ga. App. 319, 320 (2) ( 309 SE2d 147) (1983). See Premium Distrib. Co. v. Nat. Distrib. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 667 (1) ( 278 SE2d 468) (1981) ("it is within the discretion of a trial judge to consider a renewed motion for summary judgment even without an expansion of the record"). 3.

  9. Howard v. State

    226 Ga. App. 543 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that a similar tolling provision for periods of infancy or disability apply to the ante litem notice provision of OCGA § 50-21-26 because it operates as a statute of limitation

    [Cit.] [Plaintiff] having shown no harm in being denied a hearing on the motion, no reversal is required. Premium Dist. Co. v. Nat. Dist. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 670 (2) ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981)." Christensen v. State, 219 Ga. App. 10, 12 (4) ( 464 S.E.2d 14) (1995).

  10. Wm. Goldberg Co. v. Cohen

    219 Ga. App. 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that summary judgment on claim for attorneys' fees, under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, was properly denied when other claims remained pending

    When the denial is affirmed on appeal, however, it establishes as the law of the case that the movant is not entitled, on the basis of the record as it then existed, to summary judgment. Premium Distrib. Co. v. Nat. Distrib. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 667-668(1) ( 278 S.E.2d 468) (1981). See OCGA § 9-11-60(h); compare T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. S. Carolina Nat. Bank, 203 Ga. App. 605, 606(2) ( 417 S.E.2d 336) (1992) (renewed motion not barred because denial of original motion not appealed). It is well established that when a ruling is appealed, the appealing party must raise all available grounds.