Opinion
Nos. 97-2013, 97-2258 98-2072.
Opinion filed June 18, 1999.
Final Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, Bruce W. Jacobus, and Warren Burk, Judges.
David H. Simmons, Kenneth P. Hazouri, and Stephen J. Jacobs of Drage, de Beaubien, Knight, Simmons, Romano Neal, Orlando, for Premier Cruise Lines, Ltd., Inc.
Douglas Bowdoin of Smith, Mackinnon, Greeley, Bowdoin Edwards, P.A., Orlando, Stephanie M. Zorie, Santa Fe, New Mexico, W. Roderick Bowdoin of Darby, Peele, Bowdoin Payne, P.A., Lake City, and J. Craig Bourne, Orlando, for Joan Picaut, Eugene Picaut, et al.
The trial court entered an interlocutory order granting certification of a class action lawsuit. The lawsuit alleged that Premier Cruise Lines, Ltd., Inc. (Premier) had violated Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Practices Act. See §§ 501.201 — .213, Fla. Stat. (1995). Premier and Eugene Picaut, Joan Picaut, Robert Bauries, and Patricia Bauries (the Plaintiffs) separately appealed the certification order (case nos. 97-2013 97-2258). Upon Premier's unopposed motion, the two appeals were consolidated. While the interlocutory appeals were pending, Premier moved this court to relinquish jurisdiction over the matter so that the trial court could rule on Premier's pending motion for final summary judgment. We relinquished jurisdiction, and the trial court entered final summary judgment in favor of Premier. The Plaintiffs then filed a motion with the trial court seeking to amend their complaint. The trial court denied the motion. The Plaintiffs appealed both orders (case no. 98-2072), and the appeal was consolidated with the two pending appeals. Upon review of all three appeals, we affirm the trial court's order entering summary judgment in favor of Premier, and the trial court's order denying the Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. These rulings render moot the appeals pertaining to the class action certification order.
The Plaintiffs sued Premier alleging a violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Practices Act. In their complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Premier had misrepresented "port charges" as "port authority taxes" in its advertisements, and that the Plaintiffs had relied on the misrepresentation. The Plaintiffs alleged that Premier's use of the term "port charges" was misleading because it led them to believe that the money collected was "imposed and received by port authorities when in fact such `port charges' were received and kept by Premier." In its summary final judgment the trial court determined that, as a matter of law, the term "port charges" was not misleading because under maritime law the term is not limited to "port authority taxes." The court also found that there was no issue of fact with regard to reliance or proximate cause alleged by the Plaintiffs. As stated by the trial court, "[t]he term `port charges' as used in the shipping industry is not limited solely to port authority taxes, but refers to all charges and expenses related to a ship's presence in a port (whether such charges are made by a public or private entity) including, but not limited to, cost of fumigation, wharfage, dockage, watching, tug boat charges, stevedoring fees, tonnage dues, customhouse fees, levee dues, quarantine fees, and outside pilotage." See The Vigo, 257 F. 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). We agree with the trial court that Premier's use of the term "port charges" in its advertisements is not misleading because that term is not limited to taxes or governmental fees paid to port authorities and thus affirm the court's ruling.
We also affirm the trial court's order denying the Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. The Plaintiffs waited until eight months after the summary judgment hearing, and eleven days after the entry of the summary judgment order, to file their motion to amend the complaint. This delay occurred even though the Plaintiffs indicated almost eleven months earlier that they were prepared to file an amended complaint. While it is the policy in Florida to liberally grant motions to amend,see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a); see also Ujcic v. City of Apopka, 581 So.2d 218, 220 (Fla.5th DCA 1991), the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on motions to amend pleadings including complaints. In determining whether the denial of a motion to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion, the appellate court must review the surrounding circumstances. See Gate Lands Co. v. Old Ponte Vedra Beach Condominium, 715 So.2d 1132, 1135 (Fla.5th DCA 1998). We conclude that under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Plaintiffs' motion to amend.
Summary judgment procedures exist in order to expedite final resolution in cases where there are no genuine issues of material fact. This valuable procedure would be eviscerated if a party were permitted to move to amend the pleadings long after the trial court enters summary judgment. Accordingly, when delay in seeking leave to amend a pleading is unwarranted and results in prejudice to the adverse party, denial of the motion is appropriate. See Mrmich v. Switzer, 553 So.2d 1308, 1309 (Fla.3d DCA 1989); see also Reyher v. Equitable Life Assurance Society etc., 900 F. Supp. 428, 430 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
In summary, we affirm both the order entering final summary judgment and the order denying the Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint in Case No. 98-2072. We dismiss as moot the appeals of the trial court's order granting class certification in Case Nos. 97-2013 and 97-2258.
AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.
DAUKSCH, HARRIS, and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF.