Opinion
No. 1898 C.D. 2014
05-27-2015
Michael C. Prekopa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH
The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Bureau) appeals from the September 17, 2014 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court) sustaining the statutory appeal of Michael C. Prekopa (Prekopa) from a three-month suspension of his vehicle registration. The suspension was imposed by the Bureau pursuant to section 1786(d)(1) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(1) (failure to secure or maintain financial responsibility coverage).
By order dated March 13, 2015, Prekopa was precluded from filing a brief in this matter after failing to comply with this Court's February 3, 2015 order directing him to do so within 14 days.
GEICO Indemnity Company (GEICO) terminated a policy of liability insurance for Prekopa's 2009 Chevrolet truck on May 28, 2014, due to non-payment of the premium, and reported the termination of coverage to the Bureau. By correspondence dated June 7, 2014, the Bureau informed Prekopa that it had received notice of the policy cancellation from GEICO. The letter also listed seven scenarios and advised Prekopa of the potential consequences associated with each and appropriate measures he could take. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 19a-20a.) Thereafter, by official notice dated July 24, 2014, the Bureau advised Prekopa that as a consequence of his failure to maintain financial responsibility, the registration of his vehicle was being suspended for a period of three months, effective August 28, 2014, pursuant to section 1786(d) of the Vehicle Code. (R.R. at 6a.)
Prekopa filed a statutory appeal from the suspension, alleging that he did not receive notice of the policy cancellation from GEICO. (R.R. at 3a-4a.) The trial court held a de novo hearing on September 17, 2014, and Prekopa participated without benefit of counsel. The Bureau presented certified documents reflecting that the insurance on Prekopa's vehicle had been cancelled on May 28, 2014, and rested its case. Responding to the trial court's questions, Prekopa testified that he currently has insurance, and he offered as evidence a financial responsibility identification card issued by Progressive Insurance with an effective date of coverage of June 30, 2014. In response to the trial court's next question, Prekopa stated that he was employed as an EMT with Community Life Support. The trial court then dictated an order reversing the suspension of Prekopa's vehicle registration, citing evidence that Prekopa had obtained liability insurance "within a time frame deemed reasonable by this Court, in view of his responsibilities as an EMT . . . ." (R.R. at 11a.)
In its opinion, the trial court concluded that EMT service would suffer if Prekopa's vehicle registration suspension were upheld. The trial court further stated that the Bureau's enforcement of the statute "imposes a devastating financial impact on this Petitioner." (R.R. at 26a.) Additionally, according to the trial court, Prekopa testified he had not driven the vehicle during the lapse in his insurance coverage. Id.
On appeal to this Court, the Bureau argues that the trial court erred in sustaining Prekopa's appeal for these reasons. We agree.
Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Banks v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 856 A.2d 294, 295 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
Section 1786(a) of the Vehicle Code provides that "every motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title which is operated or currently registered shall be covered by financial responsibility." 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(a). In relevant part, section 1786(d) of the Code further provides:
(1) The Department of Transportation shall suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three months if it determines the required financial responsibility was not secured as required by this chapter and shall suspend the operating privilege of the owner or registrant for a period of three months if the department determines that the owner or registrant has operated or permitted the operation of the vehicle without the required financial responsibility.75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(1) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, in any case of a lapse in financial responsibility in violation of this provision, a three-month registration suspension is mandatory. Greenfield v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 67 A.3d 198, 201 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); Pray v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 708 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). This subsection does not apply when "the owner or registrant proves to the satisfaction of the department that the lapse of financial responsibility coverage was for a period of less than 31 days and that the owner or registrant did not operate or permit the operation of the vehicle during the period of lapse in financial responsibility." Section 1786(d)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(2)(i). However, if the duration of the lapse in financial responsibility is not less than 31 days, a registration suspension must be imposed. 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(1).
On appeal from a vehicle registration suspension, the Bureau has the initial burden of proving that the vehicle in question is of a type required to be registered in the Commonwealth and that the required automobile liability insurance has been cancelled or otherwise terminated. Pray, 708 A.2d at 1316 n.2. Once the Bureau establishes its prima facie case, the burden shifts to the registrant to prove that he meets one of the exceptions provided in subsection 1786(d)(2) of the Vehicle Code. Id.
Preliminarily, we note that the record contains no evidence that the suspension of Prekopa's vehicle registration would affect EMS services in any way, that the suspension would have an adverse financial impact on Prekopa, or that Prekopa did not drive during the period of suspension.
Moreover, it is by now firmly settled "that the statutory scheme is clear and does not allow the trial court to resort to an equitable remedy." Greenfield, 67 A.3d at 201 (citing Banks v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 856 A.2d 294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)).
In Banks, we explained that a trial court lacks discretion to sustain an appeal of a vehicle registration suspension under section 1786 based on hardship or other equitable factors:
It is an erroneous concept that under the guise of a de novo hearing, a common pleas court can not only examine the
facts of a case to determine whether the appellant actually deserves his suspension, but can additionally modify the suspension period promulgated by the Secretary. Knowing this full well, some lower courts, as this one here, simply reverse the suspension altogether. To do so, or to modify the suspension, infringes upon the discretion vested in the Secretary and amounts to a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . Thus, the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Moogerman, [122 A.2d 804, 806 (Pa. 1956)], has said, 'The decision of the County Court in the case at bar, if unreversed, would tend to give ballast to the unsubstantiated notion that Courts may be called upon to mitigate the penalties which the Legislature empowered the Secretary of [Transportation] to impose under given conditions.'Banks, 856 A.2d at 296-97 (quoting Department of Transportation v. McCartney, 279 A.2d 77, 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971)).
In Greenfield we recognized that strict application of the mandatory registration suspension provisions of section 1786 will inevitably create hardship. 67 A.3d at 202. Nevertheless, we relied on our Supreme Court's observation in Moogerman that "the Courts of Common Pleas are not boards of clemency; they are strictly courts of law; they are bound by rules of legal procedure and their decisions must be founded on firm jurisprudence, not fluctuating policy. . . . Courts interpret and expound laws; they do not lay down policies." Moogerman, 122 A.2d at 806. In Banks, we concluded that these principles are "especially relevant to vehicle registration suspensions pursuant to section 1786 of the Vehicle Code because the legislature specifically mandates a three-month suspension for lapses in financial responsibility lasting longer than 31 days." Banks, 856 A.2d at 296-97.
In this case, the lapse in financial responsibility coverage exceeded 31 days. Thus, the statutory exception to a suspension provided under section 1786(d)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code does not apply, and the trial court erred in sustaining Prekopa's appeal for the reasons given.
More importantly, in its effort to "temper justice with mercy," (R.R. at 27a), the trial court effectively prevented Prekopa from pursuing the issue he raised in his notice of appeal, i.e., that he had not received notice of the policy cancellation from GEICO. As we noted in McGonigle v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 37 A.3d 1273, 1276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), section 1786(d)(5) of the Vehicle Code states that
[a]n alleged lapse, cancellation or termination of a policy of insurance by an insurer may only be challenged by requesting review by the Insurance Commissioner pursuant to [Article XX]. Proof that a timely request has been made to the Insurance Commissioner for such a review shall act as a supersedeas, staying the suspension of registration or operating privilege under this section pending a determination [or] final order pursuant to [Article XX].75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(5) (emphasis added).
The law is clear that examination into the validity of an insurer's policy cancellation is properly brought for review before the Insurance Commissioner. McGonigle, 37 A.3d at 1276-77 (vacating and remanding for the matter to be held in abeyance pending review by the Insurance Commissioner).
The Bureau's letter of June 7, 2014, includes the following information:
If you believe your insurance coverage was terminated in error or you did not receive proper notice of your insurance termination, you should file a complaint with the Pennsylvania Insurance Department, Bureau of Consumer Services. Complaints can be filed via the website at www.insurance.pa.gov or mailed to the Pennsylvania Insurance Department, Bureau of Consumer Services at 1209 Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA 17120. Please include your insurance company name and policy number with your complaint.(R.R. at 20a.) Unfortunately, in summarily deciding the registration suspension appeal in Prekopa's favor, the trial court neither inquired whether Prekopa had filed a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner nor allowed Prekopa the chance to establish that he had done so. Under these circumstances, we conclude that a remand is warranted in order to afford Prekopa that opportunity.
The June 7, 2014 letter does not direct the registrant to provide the Bureau with a copy of a complaint filed with the Insurance Department. --------
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's order and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of May, 2015, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court), dated September 17, 2014, is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge