Prejean v. State

5 Citing cases

  1. Morgan v. State

    267 Ga. 203 (Ga. 1996)   Cited 92 times
    Interpreting a predecessor statute with substantially similar language

    By granting the motion in limine, the trial court prohibited defense counsel from drawing the jury's attention to the fact that the State did not present as witnesses the EMS personnel who attended to Morgan's injuries at the scene of the collision, and from suggesting that the uncalled witnesses would have been helpful in determining whether Morgan's appearance and behavior after the collision were attributable to the injuries he sustained rather than the alcohol he had consumed. After much discussion, the trial court based its ruling on this court's decision in Wilson v. Zant, supra, 249 Ga. 373, and the Court of Appeals' decision in Prejean v. State, 209 Ga. App. 411 (3) ( 433 S.E.2d 628) (1993), which cited Wilson v. Zant as controlling authority. In Wilson v. Zant, this Court addressed Wilson's contention about the prosecutor's comments in closing argument concerning Wilson's failure to produce certain witnesses who allegedly would have given favorable testimony.

  2. Avila-Nunez v. State

    237 Ga. App. 649 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 9 times
    In Avila-Nunez v. State, 237 Ga. App. 649, 516 S.E.2d 335 (1999), the Georgia Court of Appeals was faced with an argument similar to the one made by Petitioner.

    The jury was free to reject Avila-Nunez's inconsistent story of the babysitter, particularly when the record shows that many of the baby's injuries occurred over several weeks, not during the short time span the babysitter purportedly kept the child. See Prejean v. State, 209 Ga. App. 411, 412 (1) ( 433 S.E.2d 628) (1993). The evidence was sufficient to present a jury question on whether Avila-Nunez maliciously inflicted physical pain on the child.

  3. Hammitt v. State

    225 Ga. App. 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 6 times

    While a continuance of a proper length, coupled with the right to recall the witnesses would have restored such rights, defendant did not request such relief. Inasmuch as the trial court was never called upon to invoke this remedy, there can be no error in a continuance not being granted. It cannot therefore be said that the trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial when an appropriate, less drastic measure was not requested. See Prejean v. State 209 Ga. App. 411, 414 (5) ( 433 S.E.2d 628) (1993) (affirming denial of motion for mistrial where defendant made no request for continuance). While I concur in the judgment of the majority, I would apply the above analysis.

  4. Morgan v. State

    219 Ga. App. 760 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 2 times
    In Morgan v. State, 219 Ga. App. 760 (466 S.E.2d 658) (1996), we affirmed appellant's judgment of conviction of DUI and several traffic offenses.

    Id. Here, as in such cases as Prejean v. State, 209 Ga. App. 411, 413 (3) ( 433 S.E.2d 628) (1993), and Gober v. State, 203 Ga. App. 5, 7 (5) ( 416 S.E.2d 292) (1992), the defendant failed to demonstrate why the general rule should not be applied. The EMS personnel "were as available to [him] as to the state, and the defense could have called them to testify."

  5. Hathcock v. State

    214 Ga. App. 188 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that "testimony ... that defendant was abused as a child was irrelevant to the question of whether he committed the crime of child molestation"

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Prejean v. State, 209 Ga. App. 411, 412 (2) ( 433 S.E.2d 628) (1993). Defendant's reliance on Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888 ( 427 S.E.2d 490) (1993), is misplaced. That case simply held that in cases involving the presumption of sanity or insanity, the factfinder may not disregard expert medical evidence and rely solely on the presumption of insanity.