Moreover, appellate courts must not substitute their idea of a proper damage award for that of the jury. Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994), reh'g denied trans. denied.
"Damages are particularly a jury determination." Prange v. Martin , 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied. "No particular degree of mathematical certainty is required in awarding damages."
[13] "Damages are particularly a jury determination." Prange v. Martin , 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied . "No particular degree of mathematical certainty is required in awarding damages." Greives v. Greenwood , 550 N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
Waiver notwithstanding, we do not agree that the award was excessive or beyond the scope of the evidence. Damages are particularly a jury determination. Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, trans. denied. We will not substitute our idea of a proper damage award for that of the jury.
Moreover, we must not substitute our idea of a proper award for that of the jury. Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
"Appellate courts will not substitute their idea of a proper damage award for that of the jury." Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 462 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994), reh'g denied, trans. denied). "We will not deem a verdict to be the result of improper considerations unless it cannot be explained on any other reasonable ground."
Therefore, we do not substitute our “idea of a proper damage award for that of the jury.” Id. (quoting Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied ). Because appellate courts are unable “to actually look into the minds of the jurors, ....we will not reverse if the award falls within the bounds of the evidence.
Moreover, we must not substitute our idea of a proper award for that of the jury. Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994), trans. denied. Further, we will not reverse a damage award so long as the damages are within the scope of the evidence.
In addition, we must not substitute our idea of a proper award for that of the jury. Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994), trans. denied.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 742 N.E.2d at 462 (emphasis added) (quoting Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994) (citations omitted)). The Indiana Supreme Court has further noted: