Opinion
Case No. 99-4136-JAR
October 8, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 177) the Court's Memorandum Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike (Doc. 175). Because Defendants fail to demonstrate any of the bases for a reconsideration of the Court's decision, their motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a federally recognized Indian tribe located on its Indian reservation in Jackson County, Kansas. On March 16, 1999, the Nation enacted the Prairie Band Motor Vehicle Code ("PBMVC"). According to the PBMVC, it was enacted to "implement rules, regulations, and penalties essential to maintaining a safe and efficient transportation system" within the boundaries of the Nation's jurisdiction.
PBMVC § 17-1 to 17-10-48.
Pl. Ex. 2.
Plaintiff brought this action for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to have its motor vehicle registration and titles recognized by the State of Kansas, and seeking to prohibit the State from enforcing or applying Kansas motor vehicle registration and titling laws against any person who owned or operated a vehicle registered and licensed under tribal laws and driven beyond the boundaries of the reservation. The court granted a preliminary injunction which was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. In granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, this Court heavily relied on the analysis and framework in the Tenth Circuit's opinion affirming the preliminary injunction.
The Honorable Dale E. Saffels rendered this decision. After Judge Saffels passed away, the case was assigned to the undersigned judge, who entered the order granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2001).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may reconsider and alter a prior judgment if it is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to accept newly discovered evidence. However, this does not include a review of arguments or evidence that could and should have been presented through the summary judgment process. Likewise, it is inappropriate to re-visit issues that have already been addressed. There is no entitlement to a second chance when a party has failed to present its strongest case in the first instance. Three grounds for reconsideration are generally recognized: (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) availability of newly discovered evidence, and (3) a need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to alter or amend a judgment is within the court's discretion.
Buell v. Security General Life Ins. Co., 784 F. Supp. 1533, 1536 (D. Colo. 1992), aff'd 987 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1993).
Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1520 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1993); Wolfgang v. Mid-American Motorsports, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 434, 438 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd 111 F.3d 1515 (10th Cir. 1997); Buell, 784 F. Supp. at 1536.
Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (D. Kan. 1992).
Anspachv. Tomkins Indus., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1499, 1518 (D. Kan. 1993), aff'd 51 F.3d 285 (10th Cir. 1995) (Table).
See e.g., Eichenwald v. Krigel's, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1531, 1564-65 (D. Kan. 1995).
BancAmerica Comm. Corp. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., No. 90-2325-GTV, 1995 WL 646790, at *1 (D.Kan. Oct. 19, 1995) (citing Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988)).
DISCUSSION
Defendants do not rely on the third ground for reconsideration, as they do not argue that there has been an intervening change in controlling law or that there is now available newly discovered evidence. Rather, Defendants argue that the Court has committed clear error justifying reconsideration. The Court disagrees.
The arguments raised by Defendants were raised and appropriately addressed in the Court's memorandum opinion. These arguments include: the substantiality of the State's interest and the violation of federalism principles and the Tenth Amendment. The Court exhaustively addressed these arguments and sees no reason to revisit them simply because Defendant wishes to rehash its arguments and analysis.
Notably, many of Defendants' assertions were rejected by the Tenth Circuit, albeit in the context of reviewing a preliminary injunction. For example, the Tenth Circuit noted that Defendants' assertion of substantial risk to officer safety was exaggerated, based on the record. Defendants' argument that tribal jurisdiction stops at the borders of the reservation, ignores the body of federal Indian law, which the Tenth Circuit noted is ". . . replete with examples in which state law has had to accommodate tribal sovereignty." The fact that vehicles may drive off the reservation is a factor, but certainly not determinative of the preemption issue. Defendants continue to argue that preemption requires a showing of an express congressional statement of preemption, failing to recognize that this showing is not necessary when considering federal preemption in the context of tribal interests. Moreover, Defendants continue to avoid employing the balancing of three interests: state, tribal and federal, despite the Tenth Circuit's direction that such balancing must be done when analyzing the federal preemption doctrine in the context of federal Indian law. IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Reconsider and Alter Judgment (Doc. 177) is denied.
Prairie Band, 253 F.3d at 1251-1252.
Defendants argue that the Court's decision heavily relies on Queets Band of Indians v. State of Wash., 765 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated by, 783 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1986), that has since been vacated. The Court's decision clearly relied on a number of cases, including the Tenth Circuit's opinion affirming the preliminary injunction. It should be noted, however, that the Queets decision was not reversed or remanded; rather the Ninth Circuit's decision was withdrawn at the joint request of the parties in anticipation of legislation that would render the controversy moot. While the on reservation-off reservation distinction has been critical in many decisions involving tribal authority to tax, the analysis is necessarily different when the issue involved tribal authority to license and register vehicles. See Kathleen Corr, A Doctrinal Traffic Jam: The Role of Federal Preemption Analysis in Conflicts Between State and Tribal Vehicle Codes, 74 U.Colo.L.Rev. 715 (Spring 2003).
Prairie Band, 253 F.3d at 1252.
Id.