Opinion
No. CV 04-5000042 S
March 21, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ARTICULATION #110
Before the court is the plaintiff Judy Prado's motion for articulation filed on March 6, 2007. The motion is hereby granted.
In this negligence action against the defendant state of Connecticut, the plaintiff, Judy Prado, seeks to recover for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of a slip and fall on state-owned property in Waterbury. In its answer, the defendant claims a setoff in the amount of $134,665.05, the amount of "cash assistance" allegedly provided by the defendant to the plaintiff between June 8, 1988 and October 1, 1998. The defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of its claim for a setoff on February 26, 2007. On March 5, 2007, this court issued a memorandum of decision in response to the defendant's memorandum, in which the court ruled that the defendant is entitled to a 100 percent setoff for cash assistance paid to the plaintiff. On the following day, March 6, 2007, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation of the court's decision. As more fully discussed below, this court's March 5, 2007 decision is hereby overruled, as the defendant is entitled to a setoff of no more than 50 percent of the proceeds of this action or the full amount of assistance paid to the plaintiff, whichever is less.
Based on the plain meaning of General Statutes §§ 17b-93 and 17b-94, the state is entitled to recover no more than 50 percent of the proceeds of a cause of action as repayment of financial assistance provided by the state. "When construing a statute, [the court's] fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . In other words, [the court] seek[s] to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs [the court] first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 677, 911 A.2d 300 (2006).
General Statutes § 1-2z provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."
Section 17b-93 provides in relevant part: "(a) If a beneficiary of aid. . . has or acquires property of any kind or interest in any property, estate or claim of any kind, except moneys received for the replacement of real or personal property, the state of Connecticut shall have a claim. . . which shall have priority over all other unsecured claims and unrecorded encumbrances, against such beneficiary for the full amount paid, subject to the provisions of section 17b-94, to him or in his behalf under said programs. . ." (Emphasis added.) Section 17b-94 provides in relevant part: "(a) In the case of causes of action of beneficiaries of aid. . . the claim of the state shall be a lien against the proceeds therefrom in the amount of the assistance paid or fifty percent of the proceeds received by such beneficiary or such parent after payment of all expenses connected with the cause of action, whichever is less, for repayment under said section 17b-93, and shall have priority over all other claims except attorneys fees for said causes, expenses of suit, costs of hospitalization connected with the cause of action. . . and. . . physicians' fees. . ." (Emphasis added.) These statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous. Pursuant to §§ 17b-93 and 17b-94, the state is entitled to a setoff in the amount of the assistance paid to the plaintiff by the state or 50 percent of the net proceeds received by the plaintiff in this action, whichever is less. As the defendant in this case seeks to recover funds that it provided to the plaintiff as financial assistance from the proceeds of a cause of action, the setoff to which the defendant is entitled may not exceed 50 percent of the proceeds received by the plaintiff in this action.
In its memorandum of law in support of its claim for a setoff, the defendant relies heavily on a Superior Court decision, Mccoy v. Dept. of Mental Health Addiction Services, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 121494 (November 13, 2001) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 683). In that case, the plaintiff had brought suit against the state for injuries he sustained while he was a resident at Norwich State Hospital. Id. The state documented $1,619,636.45 in expenses paid on behalf of the plaintiff, while the plaintiff claimed $50,305 in damages. Id. In its decision, the court, Hurley, J.T.R., allowed a setoff of 100 percent of the assistance provided to the plaintiff, which was not subject to the 50 percent limitation of § 17b-94, because the state was the defendant in that case. Id., 684-85. Although the facts of that case are analogous to those of this case, this court respectfully disagrees with the reasoning in that case and declines to follow its holding.
In its decision, the court in McCoy reasoned that § 17b-93, which allows a setoff for the full amount of any assistance paid, was applicable, while § 17b-94, providing a limitation of 50 percent of the proceeds, was not. Id., 684. The court explained that "[a] plain reading of the statute holds that if a beneficiary of [state] aid such as [the plaintiff] acquires property of any kind, such as proceeds from the case, the State of Connecticut shall have a claim which shall have priority over all other claims against [the plaintiff] for the full amount [of assistance paid], subject to the provision of § 17b-94." McCoy v. Dept. of Mental Health Addiction Services, supra, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 684.
The court further reasoned: "Ordinarily, § 17b-94 limits the amount of the state's recovery against the plaintiff to the full amount of assistance paid or 50 [percent] of the proceeds from a judgment after payment of attorneys fees and costs whichever is less. However, in this case, the plaintiff did not bring an action against a third party and recover damages but rather brought this action against the state which is the alleged tortfeasor." McCoy v. Dept. of Mental Health Addiction Services, supra, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 684.
This court respectfully disagrees with this reasoning. Neither statute contains any distinction based upon whether the state is a defendant. Section 17b-93 sets forth general provisions allowing for a claim by the state for reimbursement of assistance paid, subject to the limitations of § 17b-94. Section 17b-94 specifically applies, inter alia, to causes of action. In the context of a cause of action, § 17b-94 limits the state's entitlement to no more than 50 percent of the proceeds received by the plaintiff. Accordingly, the 50 percent limitation set forth in § 17b-94 applies in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the state is entitled to a setoff in the amount of the assistance paid to the plaintiff by the defendant or 50 percent of the proceeds received by the plaintiff in this action after the payment of expenses, whichever is less, subject to the limitations set forth in § 17b-94. The decision that this court issued on March 5, 2007 is hereby overruled.