Furthermore, there is no evidence that Castillo was concerned with her possession of the cellphone at the time of the assault, and the most that can be inferred from the testimony is that Castillo was angry with Ramirez for some other event. Finally, under § 9.41(b), a defense-of-property instruction is applicable only if the defendant used force "immediately" or "in fresh pursuit" after he or she was dispossessed of the property. Id. § 9.41(b); see Hernandez v. State, 914 S.W.2d 218, 224 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, pet. ref'd) (concluding evidence was insufficient to warrant instruction on defense-of-property because there was no evidence of imminent criminal mischief and any criminal conduct had already been completed); see also Pozzerle v. State, No. 14-14-00610-CR, 2015 WL 5935585, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that appellant, who used force to recover cell phone stolen earlier in the day, was not entitled to defense-of-property instruction because he did not act immediately or in fresh pursuit); Salley v. State, No. 14-97-00656-CR, 2000 WL 552193, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 4, 2000, pet. dism'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that appellant's use of force was not immediately after or in fresh pursuit after dispossession when he walked down to his van, retrieved a shotgun, returned upstairs, and shot the complainant who refused to return appellant's revolver). Again, there was no evidence here that Castillo used force immediately or in fresh pursuit after she was allegedly dispossessed of her cell phone; instead, the evidence showed that Castillo got out of the car and picked up her belongings from the lawn while continuing to talk to Ramirez.

Thus, the instruction is only applicable to appellant if she used force "immediately" or "in fresh pursuit" after she was dispossessed of the motorcycle. Id.; see Hernandez v. State, 914 S.W.2d 218, 224 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, pet. ref'd) (holding evidence was insufficient to warrant instruction on defense-of-property because was no evidence of imminent criminal mischief); see also Pozzerle v. State, No. 14-14-00610-CR, 2015 WL 5935585, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding appellant who used force to recover cell phone stolen earlier in the day was not entitled to defense-of-property instruction because he did not act immediately or in fresh pursuit) (citing Ordonez v. State, No. 14-10-00132-CR, 2010 WL 5395808, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 2010, no pet.)