Two of these cases were decided before the statutory definition was clarified in 1957. In Poyer v. State, 240 Wis. 337, 3 N.W.2d 369 (1942), the court stated that a highway included "at least" such portions of the area dedicated for use as a public highway "as are open to the use by the public as a matter of right for vehicular traffic." 240 Wis. at 340.
Stat. ยง 85.44(6) (1946) which required pedestrians to walk on the left side of the highway when there is no sidewalk, refers to the portions of the highway open to use by vehicular traffic including the gravel shoulder.); and Poyer v. State, 240 Wis. 337, 340, 3 N.W.2d 369 (1942) (relying on ยง 340.01(22) in a dispute regarding the public or private nature of an alley and concluding that the area adjacent to the paved roadway is part of the highway because "[v]ehicles may use this for the purpose of making turns and other maneuvers incident to the use of the roadway . . . ."). ยถ 31.
Sec. 340.01(22), Stats. See also: Poyer v. State (1942), 240 Wis. 337, 340, 3 N.W.2d 369. The power company argues that its power pole, constructed a distance of four feet from the traveled portion of West Mill Road, did not obstruct legitimate vehicular use and did not, therefore, violate sec. 182.017.
Thus the barrier was not in the traveled portion of Main street but was located within the area dedicated for highway purposes. In support of the contention that the barrier was on the highway, plaintiffs cite Poyer v. State (1942), 240 Wis. 337, 3 N.W.2d 369. That case involved the violation of a statute prohibiting placing upon a highway any foreign material which might be injurious to an automobile. The court found that portion of an alley lying within the property lines of the highway to constitute part of the highway.
The traffic law of Wisconsin is practically the same as ours in its definition of a highway. Although no intersection question was involved, in the case of Payer v. State, 240 Wis. 337, 3 N.W.2d 369, 371, the Supreme Court of that State said: "* * * where a portion of the highway between the roadway and the property line" (of abutting owners) "is paved and available for vehicular travel, this is certainly a part of the highway. Vehicles may use this for the purpose of making turns and other maneuvers incident to the use of the roadway * * *.
Womack v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 337 Mo. 1160, 88 S.W.2d 368. (6) There was a submissible case on failure to swerve and turn to the right. State ex rel. Grisham v. Allen, 344 Mo. 66, 124 S.W.2d 1080; Griffith v. Berlin, 130 Conn. 84, 32 A.2d 56; LaRue v. Borrman, 260 A.D. 337, 22 N.Y.S.2d 209, affirmed, 285 N.Y. 550, 33 N.E.2d 239; Poyer v. State, 240 Wis. 337, 3 N.W.2d 369; Evans v. Farmers Elev. Co., 347 Mo. 326, 147 S.W.2d 593; Womack v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 337 Mo. 1160, 88 S.W.2d 368. [438] LEEDY, J.
"Pedestrians using those highways not provided with sidewalks shall travel on and along the left side of such highway and the pedestrian, upon meeting a vehicle shall, if practicable, step off the traveled roadway." In Poyer v. State, 240 Wis. 337, 340, 3 N.W.2d 369, this court said: "The term `highway' is a broader term than `roadway' and it includes at least such portions of the space dedicated for use as a public highway as are open to the use by the public as a matter of right for vehicular traffic."
The cases do not purport to equate roadways with highways. See Weiss v. Holman, 58 Wis.2d 608, 618-20, 207 N.W.2d 660, 665-66 (1973) (safety statutes related to highways are not limited to roadway portion of highway); Guderyon v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 240 Wis. 215, 221-22, 2 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1942) (shoulders of highway cannot be used to fulfill regulations dealing with roadway part of highway); Poyer v. State, 240 Wis. 337, 339-40, 3 N.W.2d 369, 370-71 (1942) (when access road from highway to an alley lies within highway right-of-way, it is subject to regulations for highway's roadway, even though access road does not constitute highway's main roadway). We determine that the Beidlers' primary premise is erroneous. Roadways are not always part of highways such that they must be defined as a public thoroughfare.
ral Assembly has not always used "roadway" in the same sense or with the same meaning. So, in our endeavor to ascertain what the General Assembly intended by use of the term "roadway" in Section 304.016, subd. 4, legislative intention being the touchstone of statutory construction, we find it appropriate to invoke the aid of certain auxiliary principles of statutory construction, namely, that the particular meaning to be ascribed to a specific word in a statute may depend to some extent upon the context in which the word is used and, where the word is susceptible of two or more meanings, that interpretation should be adopted which best harmonizes with the manifest purpose of the statute as gathered from its context; that the law favors a statutory construction harmonizing with reason and tending to avoid unreasonable or absurd results; and, that statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized, insofar as reasonably possible. See the statutory definitions quoted in Poyer v. State, 240 Wis. 337, 3 N.W.2d 369, 371; Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 27 N.W.2d 15, 18; Nelson v. Rumsey, 5 A.D.2d 460, 172 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700; Blanton v. Curry, Cal.App., 121 P.2d 125, 135; Schachunazarian v. Widmer, 159 Cal.App.2d 180, 323 P.2d 865, 866. E. g., Section 304.015, subd. 3, provides that "(i)t is unlawful to drive any vehicle upon any highway or road which has been divided into two or more road-ways by means of a physical barrier or by means of a dividing section or delineated by curbs, lines or other markings on the roadway, except to the right of such barrier or dividing section * * *."