Opinion
July, 1917.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event. The allegation of injuries contained in the complaint and limited in the bill of particulars did not permit evidence that the plaintiff was suffering from irregularity of menstruation as a result of the injury. The effect of the cases of Kleiner v. Third Avenue R.R. Co. ( 162 N.Y. 193) and Keefe v. Lee (197 id. 68) on the rule laid down in Ehrgott v. Mayor, etc. (96 id. 264), was carefully analyzed and explained by Mr. Justice Carr in the case of Gilleland v. Greason ( 156 App. Div. 46; affd., 215 N.Y. 744). (See, also, Briscoe v. City of Mount Vernon, 174 App. Div. 200.) The general allegations of damage in this complaint and bill of particulars are so limited by the specifications of the respect wherein the plaintiff was injured as to limit the recovery to compensation for the injuries specified. As irregularity of menstruation is not shown to be the necessary, usual and immediate result of the physical injuries from which the plaintiff suffered ( Briscoe's Case, supra, 204), it cannot be proved without specific allegations in the complaint that it was caused by the injury, or general allegations unlimited by the recital of the specific injuries. Jenks, P.J., Thomas, Mills, Putnam and Blackmar, JJ., concurred.