But a trial court may also determine, in such mixed result cases, that neither party prevailed, see, e.g., Raffel v. Medallion Kitchens of Minnesota, Inc., 139 F.3d 1142, 1143 (7th Cir. 1998), or that “both parties [are] successful on significant issues in the action, ” Med+Plus Neck & Back Pain Ctr., SC v. Noffsinger, 726 N.E.2d 687, 694 (Ill.App.Ct. 2000), such that the outcome is essentially a stalemate, or a “draw.” Oak Forest, 116 N.E.3d at 345 (citing Powers v. Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc., 761 N.E.2d 237, 242 (Ill.App.Ct. 2001), and Raffel, 139 F.3d at 1143). In such cases, “it may be inappropriate to find that either party is the prevailing party and an award of attorney fees to either is inappropriate.”

"Whether either party prevailed *** in the trial court below involves an application of the facts to [the] law. Therefore, it remains a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peleton, Inc. v. McGivern's Inc., 375 Ill.App.3d 222, 226 (2007) (quoting Powers v. Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc., 326 Ill.App.3d 511, 516 (2001)). In cases of this type, where the interpretation of the term in the lease is not at issue and the judgment involves only the application of the lease term to the undisputed facts, "our review is based on an abuse of discretion standard." Peleton, Inc., 375 Ill.App.3d at 226 (citing Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc., 326 Ill.App.3d at 516), see also Oak Forest Properties, LLC v. RER Financial, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 161704, ¶ 11 ("Because the trial court applied the terms of the lease agreement to the facts, we review the trial court's ruling for an abuse of discretion.").

Defendant maintains that the trial court applied the incorrect test to determine whether there was a prevailing party where it announced a "verdict test" instead of applying the well-established "significant issue test."¶ 19 The general rule of law is that an unsuccessful party to a lawsuit is not responsible for the payment of the other party's attorney fees. Powers v. Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 511, 515 (2001); Mirar Development, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 488. The parties, however, may alter this rule by including a provision in their contract awarding attorney fees.

"To determine a reasonable fee award, a court must consider (1) the skill and standing of the attorney employed, (2) the nature of the cause, (3) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (4) the amount and importance of the subject matter, (5) the degree of responsibility in the management of the case, (6) the time and labor required, (7) the usual and customary charges in the community, and (8) the benefits resulting to the client." Powers v. Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc. , 326 Ill.App.3d 511, 260 Ill.Dec. 393, 761 N.E.2d 237, 240 (2001) (emphasis added). While "reasonably" (or "reasonably proportionate") encompasses a range of permissible values, it is nevertheless unambiguous, even under Illinois law.

In Illinois, the unsuccessful party in a lawsuit is not responsible for the prevailing party's attorneys' fees unless there is a contract provision altering the general rule. Powers v. Rockford Stop–N–Go, Inc., 326 Ill.App.3d 511, 260 Ill.Dec. 393, 761 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ill.App.Ct.2d Dist.2001). Any contract provisions regarding attorneys' fees “should be strictly construed and enforced at the discretion of the trial court.” Id.

¶ 84 The general rule is that the unsuccessful party in a lawsuit is not responsible to pay the other party's attorney fees. Powers v. Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc. , 326 Ill. App. 3d 511, 515, 260 Ill.Dec. 393, 761 N.E.2d 237 (2001). The parties may contractually alter this rule, but fee-shifting provisions in contracts must be strictly construed and enforced at the trial court's discretion.

Alecta further argues that BAB's partial success on its mitigation defense, which resulted in a minor reduction in damages, was not sufficient to deem BAB a prevailing party under the lease. Alecta maintains that the trial court properly reviewed its petition for fees and utilized its discretion to award Alecta 80% of the requested fees. ¶ 69 The general rule is that an unsuccessful party in a lawsuit is not responsible for the other party's attorney's fees. Powers v. Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 511, 515 (2001). "The parties to a contract may alter this rule, but contract provisions regarding attorney's fees should be strictly construed and enforced at the discretion of the trial court."

At issue in this case is whether the defendant qualified as a "non-prevailing party," a finding that the sublease required before the court could award attorney fees. This court reviewed almost the exact same issue in Powers v. Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 511 (2001). In Powers, the term "prevailing party "was in a lease as a prerequisite to the award of attorney fees. With respect to the appropriate standard of review, this court in Powers held:

In Illinois, "[t]he general rule is that the unsuccessful party in a lawsuit is not responsible for the other party's attorney fees." Powers v. Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 511, 515 (2d Dist. 2001) (citation omitted). A contract may, however, include a fee-shifting provision, but any such provision "should be strictly construed and enforced at the discretion of the trial court."

The general rule is that each party bears the burden of its own attorney's fees, but parties to a contract may alter this rule. Powers v. Rockford Stop-n-Go, Inc., 326 Ill. App.3d 511, 515 (2001) ( Powers). Such agreements should be strictly construed, Powers, 326 Ill. App.3d at 515; Pelton v. McGiven's Inc., 375 Ill. App.3d 222, 226 (2007) ( Pelton); and the court must determine the intention of the parties with respect to the payment of attorney's fees. Jackson v. Hammer, 274 Ill. App.3d 59, 70 (1995) ( Jackson); Pelton, 375 Ill. App.3d at 226.