Carter v. State, 257 Ga. 510, 513 (3) ( 361 SE2d 175) (1987).Powell v. State, 201 Ga. App. 188, 189 (3) ( 410 SE2d 378) (1991). Despite evidence of intoxication, police testimony that the defendant was in control of himself and knew what he was saying, or that he understood his rights and knew what was going on, will sustain a trial court's finding that the statement was voluntary.

"`The granting or refusing of a motion for mistrial is necessarily a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and unless it is apparent that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial, the exercise of the judge's discretion will not be interfered with. [Cits.]' Stanley v. State, 250 Ga. 3, 4 (2) ( 295 S.E.2d 315). The circumstances of [this] case . . . do not reveal an abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying defendant's motion for mistrial. Curative instructions were promptly given...." Powell v. State, 201 Ga. App. 188, 189 (2) ( 410 S.E.2d 378) (1991). See Russell v. State, 184 Ga. App. 657, 658 (1) ( 362 S.E.2d 392) (1987).

"`The granting or refusing of a motion for mistrial is necessarily a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and unless it is apparent that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial, the exercise of the judge's discretion will not be interfered with. (Cits.)' Stanley v. State, 250 Ga. 3, 4 (2) ( 295 S.E.2d 315). The circumstances of the case sub judice do not reveal an abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying defendant's motion for mistrial. Curative instructions were promptly given. ..." Powell v. State, 201 Ga. App. 188, 189 (2) ( 410 S.E.2d 378). Besides, there was other evidence in the case (the fact that the police sought to arrest defendant pursuant to outstanding warrants) that lessened the prejudicial impact of the witness' statement. See Sabel v. State, 250 Ga. 640, 644 (5) ( 300 S.E.2d 663).

" This evidence, testimony of defendant's unauthorized presence on motel property near the victim's room a few hours before the commission of the crimes charged and testimony that defendant was in possession of the victim's watch and several "Snickers" candy bars on the morning after the assault is sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of burglary, aggravated assault and the lesser included offense of robbery by force. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560); Powell v. State, 201 Ga. App. 188 (1) ( 410 S.E.2d 378). The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal. 2.

We find this evidence satisfies the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979) and was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense and was guilty of the charged crimes. See Powell v. State, 201 Ga. App. 188 (1) ( 410 S.E.2d 378) (1991); Murray v. State, 180 Ga. App. 493-494, 495 (4) ( 349 S.E.2d 490) (1986). Although no witness testified with absolute certainty that appellant had been in possession of the revolver introduced into evidence, the conviction for firearm possession was authorized because the testimony from eyewitnesses who saw appellant with a gun constituted direct evidence of possession of a firearm.