Opinion
No. 1:00CV467-D-D.
February 13, 2001.
OPINION
Presently before the court is the Plaintiffs' motion to remand this matter to the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted and this cause remanded to state court for ultimate resolution.
A. Factual Background
The Plaintiffs instituted this action in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, on October 3, 2000, seeking compensation for state law claims of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, in connection with the alleged photographing or filming of the Plaintiffs without their permission. The Defendants removed the case to this court on November 21, 2000, asserting bankruptcy removal jurisdiction as the basis for removal. The Plaintiffs filed their initial motion to remand on December 22, 2000.
Then, on January 4, 2001, the Defendants filed an Amended Notice of Removal, asserting federal question jurisdiction and bankruptcy removal jurisdiction as the bases for removal. On January 17, 2001, the Plaintiffs filed the present motion seeking to have the case remanded to state court.
B. Standard for Remand 1. Federal Question Jurisdiction
A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to federal court provided that the federal court has original jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In this case, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have asserted claims that arise under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby giving this court original federal question jurisdiction over the claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
Whether a claim arises under federal law so as to confer federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Because the well-pleaded complaint rule provides, in most circumstances, for the determination of jurisdiction solely on the basis of the plaintiff's complaint, the rule makes the plaintiff master of his claim, and federal jurisdiction may be avoided by exclusive reliance on state law.Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392; Avitts v. Amoco Prod. Co., 53 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995).
2. Bankruptcy Removal Jurisdiction
In addition to federal question jurisdiction, the Defendants' Amended Notice of Removal also asserts that this case is removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 1452. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction of claims that are "related to" bankruptcy cases, and a party may remove such claims from state court to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), 1452.
Even if a removed claim is related to a bankruptcy case, however, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) mandates that:
[u]pon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2).
In other words, if section 1334(c)(2)'s conditions are met, the court must abstain from adjudicating the Plaintiffs' claims, even if those claims are related to a bankruptcy case. In re Southmark Corp., 163 F.3d 925, 929 (5th Cir. 1999).
C. Discussion 1. Federal Question Jurisdiction
It is axiomatic that, absent certain exceptions not applicable in this case, a plaintiff is master of his claim, and may avoid federal jurisdiction by choosing to rely exclusively on state law. Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392; Degruise v. NPC Int'l, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 168, 169 (N.D.Miss. 1997).
In this case, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs' complaint, on its face, solely raises state law claims, and the Plaintiffs seek compensation solely pursuant to state law. The Defendants, however, argue that because three of the thirteen Plaintiffs also filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and allegedly told the EEOC that they intended to assert their federal Title VII claims in the present lawsuit, that federal question jurisdiction exists and removal of this case was proper.
The Plaintiffs, however, have not amended their complaint to reflect that they are seeking relief pursuant to Title VII, and the court cannot discern their intent to raise such claims from their present complaint. Further, the Plaintiffs make clear in their amended motion to remand that they, as masters of their complaint, are asserting solely state law causes of action in the present lawsuit. As such, the court holds that none of the Plaintiffs' claims arise under federal law. See Degruise, 950 F. Supp. at 169 ("It was improper for defendants to remove this action based on nothing more than an EEOC charge . . . when nothing in [the plaintiff's] pleadings suggests a basis for original [federal] jurisdiction."). Federal question jurisdiction, therefore, is not present in this case, and is not a sufficient basis for removal.
2. Bankruptcy Removal Jurisdiction
The Defendants also assert that removal is proper because the Plaintiffs' claims are related to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case that was filed by Thomas Berry, one of the Plaintiffs in this action, after the causes of action at issue in this case allegedly accrued. However, even assuming, arguendo, that this case is related to Berry's bankruptcy case so as to render removal of this action proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1452, the court must abstain from adjudicating this cause if the conditions of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) are met. Southmark, 163 F.3d at 929.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) mandates that the court abstain from hearing this cause if the following conditions are met, even though this is an action related to a bankruptcy case:
(1) a motion has been timely filed requesting abstention;
(2) the cause of action is essentially one that is premised on state law;
(3) the proceeding is non-core or is related to the bankruptcy case;
(4) the proceeding could not otherwise have been commenced in federal court absent the existence of the bankruptcy case; and
(5) the proceeding has already been commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a state court forum.In re McCray, 209 B.R. 410, 414 (Bankr.N.D.Miss. 1997); see In re Rupp Bowman Co., 109 F.3d 237, 239 (5th Cir. 1997).
First, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs have timely filed a motion requesting that the court abstain from hearing this matter. As such, the first condition for mandatory abstention has been satisfied.
As for the second condition, it is plainly satisfied because, as noted previously, the Plaintiffs' causes of action are essentially premised on state law. Specifically, the Plaintiffs assert state claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress; no federal claims have been advanced. As such, the court finds that the second condition for mandatory abstention is satisfied.
Turning to the third condition, it is undisputed that this case is one that, at best, is related to Thomas Berry's pending bankruptcy case. Neither party alleges that this case itself arises under title 11, or that Berry's present claims arise in his pending bankruptcy case. As such, this proceeding is non-core, and is related to Berry's bankruptcy case. The third condition for mandatory abstention, therefore, has been met.
As for the fourth condition, this action could not have been commenced in this court absent bankruptcy removal jurisdiction. As noted above and despite the Defendants' assertions to the contrary, federal question jurisdiction does not exist because the Plaintiffs seek relief solely pursuant to state law, and no other basis for federal jurisdiction exists. As such, the fourth condition for mandatory abstention is satisfied.
Finally, this case has already been commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a state court forum of appropriate jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs filed this case in state court initially, and there is no evidence that this case cannot be timely adjudicated in that court, the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi. As such, the fifth and final condition for mandatory abstention has been satisfied, and the court hereby abstains from hearing this matter.
In sum, neither of the Defendants' asserted bases for removal are sufficient, and the court hereby remands this cause to state court for ultimate resolution.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
• the Plaintiff's motion to remand (docket entries 10, 16) is GRANTED; and
• this cause is hereby REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi.