Since this was the only evidence in defendants' favor, we cannot conclude that its admission was harmless, cf. Palmer v. Edgerly, 87 N.H. 391, 395, 181 A. 419 (1935), and plaintiff is therefore entitled to a new trial. See Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256, 257, 154 A.2d 750, 751 (1959); Daniels v. Barker, 89 N.H. 416, 420-421, 200 A. 410, 415 (1938). Littlefield testified that it was not normal practice to stop and inspect the pallet immediately before loading it onto the handtruck.

" Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256, 257, 154 A.2d 750, 751 (1959) (citations omitted). Therefore, the question for decision is whether there was evidence to support a causal connection between the misrepresentations claimed and the harm allegedly resulting.

The court could have inferred that Susan Pockett would have purchased the minimum U.M. coverage even if Ganley had advised her against it. "Since the Trial Court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses on the stand, we do not set aside the verdict merely because on the cold record we might draw different inferences on questions of fact." Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256, 257, 154 A.2d 750, 751 (1959). Affirmed.

As the court's ruling on the issue is not unreasonable and is supported by the record, it is affirmed. Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256, 154 A.2d 750 (1959); Hahn v. Hemenway, 96 N.H. 214, 72 A.2d 463 (1950). Exceptions overruled.

There was no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that it was against the law and the evidence, and the result of plain mistake. Condiles v. Waumbec Mills, 95 N.H. 127, 58 A.2d 726 (1948); Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256, 257, 154 A.2d 750, 751 (1959). Judgment for the plaintiff.

The evidence did not require the trial court to accept this claim as correct and we would be warranted in sustaining dismissal of the petition on this ground alone. Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256, 154 A.2d 750 (1959); Fournier v. Kattar, 108 N.H. 424, 238 A.2d 12 (1968). However the events subsequent to the agreement of sale provide evidence completely contrary to plaintiffs' theory of an implied promise.

Vandell v. Sanders, 85 N.H. 143. The evidence was not so preponderantly in favor of the plaintiff that the verdict for the defendant may be set aside. Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256; Condiles v. Waumbec Mills, 95 N.H. 127; Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242. Accordingly, the plaintiff's exception to the denial of the motion to set the verdict aside is overruled. The plaintiff's exceptions to evidentiary rulings present no ground for reversal.

This Court may not substitute its judgment on facts for that of the Trial Judge whose decision, quite properly, is based upon many factors, including the view, which do not appear in the transferred record. Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256; Hahn v. Hemenway, 96 N.H. 214. In this case it should be noted that the record amply supports the Trial Court's finding that the defendants' operation of their poultry farm entitled the plaintiffs to relief. There was testimony from which the Court properly found that the defendants carried on their business in an unreasonable manner which threatened the plaintiffs with irreparable damage.

It cannot be said that there was no evidence to support the verdicts or that the Court fell into a plain mistake, and therefore the motions to set aside the verdicts cannot prevail. Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256, 257. This appears to dispose of all issues, and there being no error in the trial, the order is

The plaintiffs' motions to set aside the verdict can prevail only if we can say there was no evidence to support the Court's finding or it involved a plain mistake. Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256, 257. At the time of the accident Mrs. Cormier had been driving northerly on Mechanic Street and was preparing to make a left turn into Stark Street. The defendant was proceeding easterly on Stark Street. There were high snow banks on both streets at the intersection, high enough so that both operators could not see the car on the other street.