A safety statute such as the one in question is pertinent only when there is evidence tending to show the violation proximately caused the injuries. Powell v. Clark, 255 N.C. 707, 122 S.E.2d 706 (1961); Ingram v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 35 S.E.2d 337 (1945). In Powell, our Supreme Court held as prejudicial error the trial court's instruction to the jury on N.C.G.S. 20-146, under facts substantially similar to the present case.
Conversely, an instruction relating to a factual situation not properly supported by the evidence is also erroneous. Dennis v. Voncannon, 272 N.C. 446, 158 S.E.2d 489 (1968); Dove v. Cain, 267 N.C. 645, 148 S.E.2d 611 (1966); Powell v. Clark, 255 N.C. 707, 122 S.E.2d 706 (1961). Applying the foregoing principles to assignments one, two and three, we hold that the court's instructions are properly supported by the evidence in the record.
"Yellow lines are designed primarily to prevent collision between an overtaking and passing automobile and a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, and to protect occupants of other cars, pedestrians and property on the highway. Powell v. Clark, 255 N.C. 707, 710, 122 S.E.2d 706; Walker v. Bakeries Co., 234 N.C. 440, 443, 67 S.E.2d 459. The presence and the crossing of a yellow line are evidential details in the totality of circumstances in the instant case.
We are constrained to hold that the instructions discussed above, in relation to the present factual situation, were erroneous and prejudicial. See Powell v. Clark, 255 N.C. 707, 122 S.E.2d 706; McGinnis v. Robinson, supra; Lookabill v. Regan, 245 N.C. 500, 96 S.E.2d 421. The questions raised by defendant's other assignments of error may not recur upon a new trial.
Since a new trial is awarded for reasons hereinafter stated, we refrain from a discussion of the evidence set forth in the record except to the extent deemed necessary in the disposition of other assignments, of error. Powell v. Clark, 255 N.C. 707, 122 S.E.2d 706; Tucker v. Moorefield, 250 N.C. 340, 108 S.E.2d 637. It is unlawful for a pedestrian to cross a street between intersections at which traffic signals are maintained unless there is a marked crosswalk between the intersections at which the may cross and on which he has the right of way lover vehicular traffic, and his failure to observe the statutory requirements is evidence of negligence but not negligence per se. Templeton v. Kelley, 216 N.C. 487, 5 S.E.2d 555; Simpson v. Curry, 237 N.C. 260, 74 S.E.2d 649, and cited cases; Moore v. Bezalla 241 N.C. 190, 84 S.E.2d 817; G.S. 20-174.
Under these circumstances, we are constrained to hold that such instructions are erroneous land prejudicial. Powell v. Clark, 255 N.C. 707, 711, 122 S.E.2d 706, and cases cited. True, if Mitchell's testimony were accepted, namely, testimony to the effect that Jarrett overtook and struck the rear of the Mitchell truck as it was proceeding straight in the center lane and alongside a station wagon (in the east lane) the Mitchell truck was passing, testimony as to excessive speed on the part of Jarratt would be relevant.
Yellow lines are designed primarily to prevent collision between an overtaking and passing automobile and a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, and to protect occupants of other cars, pedestrians and property on the highway. Powell v. Clark, 255 N.C. 707, 710, 122 S.E.2d 706; Walker v. Bakeries Co., 234 N.C. 440, 443, 67 S.E.2d 459. The presence and the crossing of a yellow line are evidential details in the totality of circumstances in the instant case.
The purpose of the above-quoted statute is to protect occupants of other vehicles and pedestrians. Powell v. Clark, 255 N.C. 707, 122 S.E.2d 706 (1961). Our Courts have consistently held that the violation of this section constitutes negligence per se, and when it is the proximate cause of injury or damage, such violation is actionable negligence.
We think that under the circumstances of this case it was prejudicial error. Powell v. Clark, 255 N.C. 707, 122 S.E.2d 706 (1961). Plaintiffs also contend that the judge committed error in his instructions to the jury relative to G.S. 20-146.