Opinion
CASE NO. 775 CRD-5-88-10
DECEMBER 30, 1988
The claimant was represented by Peter Rotatori Jr., Esq. and Peter Rotatori III, Esq.
The respondents were represented by Susan N. Murray, Esq., Thomas G. Cotter, Esq. and Thomas H. Cotter, Esq., Cotter, Cotter Sohon, P.C.
This Petition for Review from the claimant's August 22, 1988 Motion in Limine before the Commissioner At Large acting for the Fifth District was heard December 2, 1988 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Rhoda Loeb and Frank Verrilli.
OPINION
Claimant seeks review of the Commissioner at Large's refusal to rule on a Motion in Limine. His Motion in Limine filed September 16, 1988 sought to bar the introduction into evidence of a deposition of Robert M. Margolis, M.D.. Dr. Margolis had performed a medical examination pursuant to Sec. 31-305, C.G.S. The doctor's testimony purportedly would have addressed the compensability of and resultant disability from the injury sustained by the claimant. The Commissioner below returned the claimant's Motion in Limine in a letter dated October 6, 1988. Claimant argues it was error for the Commissioner to refuse to rule on the Motion in Limine.
Claimant's use of a Motion in Limine for this purpose is a case of first impression in this forum. Such a motion is defined as, "A written motion which is usually made before or after the beginning of a jury trial for a protective order against prejudicial questions and statements", Black's Law Dictionary 914 (5th ed. 1979). It is a preliminary trial motion arguably permitted in Connecticut courts under Practice Book Sec. 265(h). But its appropriateness in a Workers' Compensation forum is open to serious question.
See, Spencer, The Motion in Limine, Pretrial Tool to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 56 Conn. Bar J. 325 (1982).
Id. at 328.
The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to provide an injured worker with a speedy remedy and resolution of his claim. Our legislators in 1913 did not envision that claims procedure would be encumbered with the pleading formalities required in the courts, Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 147 (1915). "It is only when the rights of parties are prejudicially affected that we will consider on appeal matters of procedure before the commissioner." Gonirenki v. American Steel Wire Co., 106 Conn. 1, 9 (1927).
The trial Commissioner's refusal to rule did not prejudicially affect the rights of the parties. Claimant is still free to object to the admissibility of such evidence at the time of trial. If the trier admits the evidence over objection and the claimant is dissatisfied with the Commissioner's decision on the case in chief, he may then appeal citing the ruling on the evidential admission as a reason of appeal.
Contrary to appellate practice in the courts, Sec. 31-301(a), C.G.S. does contemplate some C.R.D. jurisdiction over interlocutory rulings in the districts. Our trial Commissioners also permit certain motions under the Act, e.g. motions to preclude, motions to re-open and modify, certain motions for discovery, motions to correct and motions to dismiss. However, each of these motions has either a statutory, regulatory or due process basis. We shall not now add this new pleading to that list given the public policy aptly described by Judge Wheeler in Powers, supra at 147:
Timothy v. Upjohn, 3 Conn. App. 162 (1985).
"Its [the Act's] procedure contemplates a speedy investigation and hearing by a commissioner without the formalities of a court. . . . It attempts to improve the condition of the workmen under modern methods of industry by giving him partial recompense for an injury, with a result more certain and speedy and less expensive than under the former method in tort litigation."
We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.
Commissioners Rhoda Loeb and Frank Verrilli concur.