Opinion
2012-11-8
Larry POUNCY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Jason L. SOLOTAROFF, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Larry Pouncy, appellant pro se. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, New York (Patrick J. Lawless of counsel), for respondents.
Larry Pouncy, appellant pro se. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, New York (Patrick J. Lawless of counsel), for respondents.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen A. Rakower, J.), entered May 12, 2011, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Order, same court and Justice, also entered May 12, 2011, which dismissed as moot plaintiff's motion for a default judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Upon defendants' motion, the IAS court tolled the time to answer or move in response to the complaint, and defendants submitted their motion to dismiss by the date ordered. As a result, defendants did not default in responding to the complaint, even though they responded after the original deadline ( see DiPietro v. Seth Rotter, P.C., 267 A.D.2d 1, 2, 699 N.Y.S.2d 353 [1st Dept. 1999] ).
The IAS court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice, as the complaint failed to state a claim for that cause of action. Rather, plaintiff's complaintamounts “to no more than retrospective complaints about the outcome of defendant[s'] strategic choices and tactics,” with no demonstration that those choices and tactics were unreasonable ( Rodriguez v. Fredericks, 213 A.D.2d 176, 178, 623 N.Y.S.2d 241 [1st Dept. 1995],lv. denied 85 N.Y.2d 812, 631 N.Y.S.2d 288, 655 N.E.2d 401 [1995] ). In any event, plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel ( see D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 659, 664, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24, 564 N.E.2d 634 [1990];Wray v. Mallilo & Grossman, 54 A.D.3d 328, 329, 863 N.Y.S.2d 228 [2d Dept. 2008] ).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.