Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co.

30 Citing cases

  1. Baker v. Cooper Farms Cooked Meats

    2009 Ohio 3320 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009)

    R.C. 2317.48 "occupies a small niche between an unacceptable `fishing expedition' and a short and plain statement of a complaint or defense filed pursuant to the Civil Rules." Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 124, 127, 541 N.E.2d 1031. In other words, R.C. 2317.48 "provide[s] a `satisfactory middle course' for litigants who require additional facts in order to sufficiently file a valid complaint, but who already have enough factual basis for their assertions that the discovery process would not be turned into a `fishing expedition.'"

  2. Wheeler v. Girvin

    Appeal No. C-980302 Trial No. A-9606109 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1999)   Cited 2 times

    Upon the final disposition of the action, the costs of the action shall be taxed in the manner the court deems equitable. In Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 124, 541 N.E.2d 1031, the Ohio Supreme Court examined this statute, which is a holdover from practice prior to the enactment of the Rules of Civil Procedure when little discovery was allowed in actions at law. Id. at 125, 541 N.E.2d at 1033, fn. 2.

  3. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Hankook Tire Manufacturing Co.

    116 Ohio App. 3d 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 7 times
    Finding dismissal of petition in discovery proper where petitioner "failed to aver sufficient facts to reveal a `potential cause of action' against either defendant"

    " The Ohio Supreme Court, in Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 124, 541 N.E.2d 1031, considered the application of R.C. 2317.48. The plaintiff in that action claimed to be part owner and developer of a prototype sweeper for use in movie theaters.

  4. Tilr Corp. v. TalentNow, LLC

    2023 Ohio 1345 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023)

    See Wheeler, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-980302, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1568, at 2. In a tersely-worded paragraph, we recounted the promulgation of Civ.R. 34(D) following the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of R.C. 2317.48 in Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co., 44 Ohio St.3d 124, 541 N.E.2d 1031 (1989). Considering the issue at a high level of generality, we recognized that "[t]o some extent, the rule expands the concept of pre-suit discovery." Wheeler at 2.

  5. Riverview Health Inst., LLC v. Kral

    2012 Ohio 3502 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012)

    " {ΒΆ 8} Regarding dismissal of RHI's complaint, the trial court reviewed the language of Civ.R. 34(D) and noted that the rule was promulgated in response to the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of R.C. 2317.48, in Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co., 44 Ohio St.3d 124, 541 N.E.2d 1031 (1989). The court further stated that the rule and the statute together govern discovery actions.

  6. ROOD v. FRJ, LTD.

    2011 Ohio 2712 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011)

    {ΒΆ 15} The Supreme Court of Ohio has limited the application of R.C. 2317.48, allowing an action for discovery pursuant to this statute to only interrogatories "specifically concerning the facts necessary to the complaint or answer and [the interrogatories] are to be submitted only to the potentially adverse party to the contemplated lawsuit." Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 124. {ΒΆ 16} Therefore, "[a]n action for discovery is to be used only to uncover facts necessary for pleading, not to gather proof to support a claim or to determine whether a cause of action exists.

  7. Onyshko v. Onyshko

    2010 Ohio 969 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)

    A trial court's decision regarding child support will not be reversed by a reviewing court unless it is shown that the trial court abused its discretion. Pauly v. Pauly (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390, citing Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 124, 144. {ΒΆ 85} Mr. Onyshko testified he is a contractor with variable income.

  8. Huge v. Ford Motor Co.

    2004 Ohio 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 6 times

    R.C. 2317.48 "occupies a small niche between an unacceptable `fishing expedition' and a short and plain statement of a complaint or defense filed pursuant to the Civil Rules." Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d at 127. In other words, R.C. 2317.48 "provide[s] a `satisfactory middle course' for litigants who require additional facts in order to sufficiently file a valid complaint, but who already have enough factual basis for their assertions that the discovery process would not be turned into a `fishing expedition.'"

  9. Thomas v. Dollar Gen. Corp.

    Appeal No. C-010017, Trial No. A-0005437 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2001)

    Accordingly, the court has emphasized that the person bringing the action for discovery must set forth sufficient facts to reveal a potential cause of action, and if that is not done, the action may be dismissed under Civ.R. 12. Finally, the court has adopted a "reasonable and literal construction" of the language of R.C. 2317.48, stating that the action for discovery is limited to interrogatories that specifically concern the facts necessary to make out a complaint. See Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 124, 541 N.E.2d 1031.Id. at 127, 541 N.E.2d at 1034.

  10. Cleveland Construction, Inc., v. Carr

    Case No. 98-A-0002 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998)   Cited 3 times

    "When a person claiming to have a cause of action or a defense to an action commenced against him, without the discovery of a fact from the adverse party, is unable to file his complaint or answer, he may bring an action for discovery, setting forth in his complaint in the action for discovery the necessity and the grounds for the action, with any interrogatories relating to the subject matter of the discovery that are necessary to procure the discovery sought." In Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 124, 127, the court stated: "We therefore adopt a reasonable and literal construction of the language of R.C. 2317.48 and hold that an action for discovery pursuant to R.C. 2317.48 is limited solely to interrogatories specifically concerning the facts necessary to the complaint or answer * * *. Furthermore, we hold that the statutory language contemplates that the person `claiming to have a cause of action or a defense to an action' must in his statutory action for discovery set forth `the necessity and the grounds for the action' and the facts sought and deemed necessary to state a cause of action."