Opinion
NO. 2017 CA 1743 NO. 2017 CW 1697
06-04-2018
JOHN POULLARD v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
John Poullard Angola, Louisiana Plaintiff/Appellant, In Proper Person Heather C. Hood Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellee, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from The 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. C651624
The Honorable Donald Johnson, Judge Presiding John Poullard
Angola, Louisiana Plaintiff/Appellant,
In Proper Person Heather C. Hood
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellee,
Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections BEFORE: GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, AND CRAIN, JJ. CRAIN, J.
John Poullard, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, appeals the dismissal of his petition for judicial review. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Poullard was convicted of attempted second degree murder in 1987 and was sentenced to 50 years at hard labor. According to his claim, Poullard signed a "Double Good-Time Form" that allowed him to accrue good-time credits, in lieu of incentive wages, at the rate of 30 days for every 30 days in actual custody (referred to hereinafter as "30/30"). Former Louisiana Revised Statute 15:571.14 permitted eligible inmates to accrue good-time credits in that manner, subject to certain requirements, one of which was the option must be exercised at the time the inmate becomes eligible. See La. R.S. 15:571.14(3) (repealed by 1991 La. Acts. 138, §3). In 1995, for reasons not explained in the record, Poullard's sentence was vacated, and he was resentenced to 50 years at hard labor, with credit for time served. Prior to his resentencing, the law governing good-time credits was amended to extend 30/30 good-time credits to all eligible inmates, which included Poullard. See La. R.S. 15:571.3B(1).
The citation to Section 15:571.3 is to the version in effect in 1995, as amended in relevant part by 1991 La. Acts. 138, §1 (Act 138). Act 138 became effective January 1, 1992 and applies to "persons sentenced on or after the effective date of this Act and . . . prospectively only to the remaining portion of any sentence of any person serving a sentence or sentences on or after the effective date of this Act." See 1991 La. Acts. 138, §§4-5.
Poullard does not dispute that his good-time credits have been calculated at the 30/30 rate, both before and after his resentencing in 1995. Nevertheless, in 2016, he filed a claim under the Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure Act (CARP), assigned case number LSP-2016-1027, demanding he be allowed to sign another Double Good-Time Form. According to Poullard, the form he previously signed was applicable only to the sentence imposed in 1987 and did not apply to the "new" sentence imposed in 1995. Poullard believes that by signing another form, his good-time will be "restored retroactive" to the 1995 resentencing without any deductions for numerous forfeitures of good-time incurred by him since 1995, apparently due to disciplinary violations. As explained by Poullard, "I could not forfeit [g]ood-time I was not earning and I cannot earn the [d]ouble [g]ood-time retroactive until I signed the Form."
The claim was denied with the following explanation:
You are requesting to sign a "Double Good-Time Form" which is not necessary. According to your master prison record you are receiving good time at a rate of .50 percent which calculates at 30 days for every 30 days you serve in custody. . . .
You do not need to sign a "Double Good-Time Form" specifically for the fifty year sentence received. [Y]ou were automatically calculated with "Double Good-Time."
Poullard pursued the claim to a second-step review, where it was again denied. The Department reiterated:
You were re-sentenced in 1995 to a term of 50 years. Act 138 of 1991 . . . allowed for all [eligible] offenders sentenced or resentenced on or after January 01, 1992 [to earn] good time at the rate of 30 days for every 30 incarcerated (double good time). Since you [were] resentenced in 1995, Act 138 applied to your sentence and your sentence was calculated from the date of arrest under Act 138.
Despite these confirmations, Poullard filed a petition seeking judicial review of the denial of his request to execute a second Double Good-Time Form. The Department answered and filed a copy of the administrative record with the district court. Over Poullard's objection, the presiding commissioner held a hearing where additional evidence was submitted. The commissioner issued a report recommending the claim be dismissed, and the trial court agreed, signing a judgment on September 19, 2017. Poullard appeals.
DISCUSSION
Judicial review of a CARP claim is governed by Louisiana Revised Statute 15:1177. A reviewing court may reverse or modify the administrative decision only if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative decisions or findings are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (6) manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. La. R.S. 15:1177A(9). On appeal of the district court's judgment, the appellate court reviews the administrative record de novo under the criteria of Subsection 15:1177A(9), owing no deference to the factual findings or legal conclusions of the district court. Addison v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, 15-1069 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/26/16), 191 So. 3d 1077, 1078.
Poullard asserts the commissioner erred by receiving evidence that was not part of the administrative record. We agree. Under CARP, the opportunity for the parties to present evidence occurs at the administrative level, not at the district court level. Millsap v. Cain, 09-0511, 2009WL3452891, p.1 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/23/09), writ denied, 10-0156 (La. 1/7/11), 52 So. 3d 881; Robinson v. Stalder, 98-0558 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/1/99), 734 So. 2d 810, 812. The district court's review "shall be confined to the record" established at the administrative level, absent alleged irregularities in the procedure. See La. R.S. 15:1177A(5); Millsap, 2009WL3452891 at p.1; Robinson, 734 So. 2d at 812. The district court has no authority to accept evidence or testimony at the hearing on review. Millsap, 2009WL3452891 at p.1; Curry v. Cain, 05-2251 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/6/06), 944 So. 2d 635, 639. Rather, the district court may order additional evidence be taken before the agency upon conditions determined by the court or to remand the case for further proceedings. See La. R.S. 15:1177A(4)&(8); Millsap, 2009WL3452891 at p.1. The commissioner, being subject to these same statutory limitations, erred in allowing additional evidence. See Millsap, 2009WL3452891 at p.1; see also La. R.S. 13:713. In reviewing the Department's decision, we thus confine our review to the administrative record.
On the merits, this case presents the unusual twist of a petitioner arguing that he is not entitled to double good-time credit, at least not until he signs a second Double Good-Time Form, at which time, according to his argument, the good-time will vest retroactively to 1995 without any deductions for numerous forfeitures imposed in the interim. Poullard cites Owens v. Stalder, 06-1120 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/8/07), 965 So. 2d 886, which is factually distinguishable. The plaintiff in Owens was eligible for double good-time credit from the beginning of his sentence, but the Department provided the credit only after Owens signed a double good-time form, which was several years into the sentence. The Department provided the double good-time credit on a prospective basis only, beginning on the date Owens signed the form. Owens argued that regardless of when he signed the form, he was legally entitled to double good-time credit from the beginning of his sentence. The Owens court agreed, stating:
Even though DPSC regulations may have required Owens to sign an approval form in order to be eligible for double good time credits, DPSC presented no evidence that it ever offered Owens the opportunity to sign a form that stated and recognized the correct effective date. . . . Owens' right cannot be limited by his signature on an approval form reflecting the application of a subsequent amendment to the statute and providing a later effective date for his double good time credit.Owens, 965 So. 2d at 889.
The Owens court relied on Cox v. Whitley, 612 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613 So. 2d 1001 (La. 1993), which addressed similar circumstances where the Department sought to limit an inmate's accrual of double good-time credit prospectively from the date he signed a double good-time form. The court found the petitioner was entitled, by virtue of a statutory amendment, to double good-time credit from the date of his sentencing and awarded that credit "retroactive to date of sentencing." Cox, 612 So. 2d at 159.
In both of those cases, the Department incorrectly tried to limit an inmate's double good-time credit to the period of time accruing after he signed the provided form. Here, in contrast, the Department has correctly allowed Poullard to earn double good-time credit on a 30/30 basis during his entire sentence to date, a fact repeatedly confirmed for Poullard by the Department. Poullard acknowledges he signed a form at the outset of his sentence opting for 30/30 good-time credits in lieu of incentive wages, as authorized by former Louisiana Revised Statute 15:571.14. When he was resentenced in 1995, Poullard was entitled to good-time credit at the same 30/30 rate pursuant to the applicable version of Subsection 15:571.3B(1), which, following its amendment by Act 138, allowed "[e]very inmate in the custody of the department" to earn 30/30 good-time credits, subject to certain exceptions not relevant herein. Poullard does not dispute that his good-time credit has been consistently calculated on a 30/30 basis.
Poullard nevertheless insists he cannot earn double good-time credit until he signs another Double Good-Time Form, citing a Department regulation that, according to Poullard, requires an inmate sign such a form to accrue double good-time credit. The cited regulation is not a part of the administrative record, nor is it published in the Public Register or promulgated in the Louisiana Administrative Code. Nevertheless, even assuming a Department regulation requires a signed form, Poullard acknowledges he signed a form for this purpose in 1987. Poullard cites no Department regulation, or any other authority, suggesting the form he signed does not suffice for the full duration of his custody with the state, whether served pursuant to the original sentence imposed in 1987 or the "new" sentence imposed at resentencing in 1995.
The Department correctly denied Poullard's request to sign another Double Good-Time Form. The district court did not err in dismissing his petition for judicial review with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The district court's judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to John Poullard.
Poullard filed a motion in the district court seeking to supplement the administrative record to include the regulation purportedly requiring an inmate sign a form to accrue double good-time. The trial court did not act on the motion, and Poullard filed a writ application with this court seeking a mandamus directing the record be supplemented, which was referred to this panel for disposition. See Poullard v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2017 CW 1697 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/6/18). Given Poullard's admission that he signed such a form, we deny the writ application. --------