Potts v. Rader

6 Citing cases

  1. Ballesteros v. Roney

    443 S.W.3d 548 (Ark. 2014)

    In other words, the order denying the motion for stay was not independently appealable in Glick, but was reviewable on appeal from the final decree. See also Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 219 S.W.2d 769 (1949) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree and later order refusing to vacate that decree); Martin v. Rolfe, 207 Ark. 1072, 184 S.W.2d 70 (1944) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree); Reynolds v. Haulcroft, 205 Ark. 760, 170 S.W.2d 678 (1943) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree).Here, Ballesteros's appeal, like the appeal in Piercy, is premature.

  2. Ballesteros v. Roney

    443 S.W.3d 548 (Ark. 2014)

    In other words, the order denying the motion for stay was not independently appealable in Glick, but was reviewable on appeal from the final decree. See also Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 219 S.W.2d 769 (1949) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree and later order refusing to vacate that decree); Martin v. Rolfe, 207 Ark. 1072, 184 S.W.2d 70 (1944) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree); Reynolds v. Haulcroft, 205 Ark. 760, 170 S.W.2d 678 (1943) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree). Here, Ballesteros's appeal, like the appeal in Piercy, is premature.

  3. Dupwe v. Wallace

    355 Ark. 521 (Ark. 2004)   Cited 56 times
    In Dupwe, we cited longstanding authority to the effect that this court would not permit a party litigant "to avail himself of inconsistent positions in a litigation concerning the same subject matter" nor "play fast and loose with the court."

    In Wendworth v. City of Fort Smith, 256 Ark. 735, 510 S.W.2d 296 (1974), appellants were estopped from denying in a lawsuit that a strip of land was a dedicated public street where the appellants had in a public proceeding preceding the lawsuit objected to a proposal to close or vacate the strip of land. In Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 162, 219 S.W.2d 769 (1949), this court stated, "The appellants cannot claim title to part of the land in reliance upon the deed and at the same time claim the rest upon the theory of its invalidity." In Potter v. Easley, 288 Ark. 133, 137, 703 S.W.2d 442 (1986) this court stated, "Potter cannot be allowed to take inconsistent positions by taking part in the bidding in its early stages and then repudiating the proceeding when the bidding reached what he considered a reasonable figure.

  4. Cavanagh v. Cavanagh

    118 R.I. 608 (R.I. 1977)   Cited 38 times
    Declining to find prejudice because there was no indication that respondent was unable to present his case in full and noting that all issues raised by the respondent were heard and fully considered

    Such "other elements" were present in the case at bar and, therefore, as previously stated the Family Court did not lack jurisdiction to order the partition. Accord, Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 162, 219 S.W.2d 769, 770 (1949). Whether jurisdiction over the property rights of two parties remains in Family Court after a petition for divorce filed by one of them is dismissed is not before us.

  5. Ark. State Hwy. Comm. v. Gladden

    385 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. 1965)   Cited 1 times

    We have often held that a jurisdictional defects of the chancery court can be waived. Ohio Galvanizing Mfg. Co. v. Nichol, 170 Ark. 16, 279 S.W. 377; Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 219 S.W.2d 769, rehearing denied 338 U.S. 882; State for Use of Ark. County v. Pollard, 171 Ark. 607, 286 S.W. 811; Hayes v. Bishop, 141 Ark. 155, 216 S.W. 298; Goodrum v. Merchants' Planters' Bank, 102 Ark. 326, 144 S.W. 198. Further, it is well settled that one who invokes the aid of chancery in a matter not wholly beyond equitable cognizance is in no position later to reject its jurisdiction.

  6. Crain v. Foster

    230 Ark. 190 (Ark. 1959)   Cited 9 times
    In Crain v. Foster, 230 Ark. 190, 322 S.W.2d 443 (1959), the supreme court said that one who accepts the benefit of a decree is estopped to deny its validity.

    See also Illinois Standard Mfg. Co. v. Collins, 187 Ark. 902, 63 S.W.2d 342. In Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 219 S.W.2d 769, we said: "The appellants cannot claim title to part of the land in reliance upon the deed and at the same time claim the rest upon the theory of its invalidity. Wood v. Hay, 206 Ark. 892, 175 S.W.2d 189.