In other words, the order denying the motion for stay was not independently appealable in Glick, but was reviewable on appeal from the final decree. See also Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 219 S.W.2d 769 (1949) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree and later order refusing to vacate that decree); Martin v. Rolfe, 207 Ark. 1072, 184 S.W.2d 70 (1944) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree); Reynolds v. Haulcroft, 205 Ark. 760, 170 S.W.2d 678 (1943) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree).Here, Ballesteros's appeal, like the appeal in Piercy, is premature.
In other words, the order denying the motion for stay was not independently appealable in Glick, but was reviewable on appeal from the final decree. See also Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 219 S.W.2d 769 (1949) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree and later order refusing to vacate that decree); Martin v. Rolfe, 207 Ark. 1072, 184 S.W.2d 70 (1944) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree); Reynolds v. Haulcroft, 205 Ark. 760, 170 S.W.2d 678 (1943) (denial of stay under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act reviewed on appeal of final decree). Here, Ballesteros's appeal, like the appeal in Piercy, is premature.
In Wendworth v. City of Fort Smith, 256 Ark. 735, 510 S.W.2d 296 (1974), appellants were estopped from denying in a lawsuit that a strip of land was a dedicated public street where the appellants had in a public proceeding preceding the lawsuit objected to a proposal to close or vacate the strip of land. In Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 162, 219 S.W.2d 769 (1949), this court stated, "The appellants cannot claim title to part of the land in reliance upon the deed and at the same time claim the rest upon the theory of its invalidity." In Potter v. Easley, 288 Ark. 133, 137, 703 S.W.2d 442 (1986) this court stated, "Potter cannot be allowed to take inconsistent positions by taking part in the bidding in its early stages and then repudiating the proceeding when the bidding reached what he considered a reasonable figure.
Such "other elements" were present in the case at bar and, therefore, as previously stated the Family Court did not lack jurisdiction to order the partition. Accord, Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 162, 219 S.W.2d 769, 770 (1949). Whether jurisdiction over the property rights of two parties remains in Family Court after a petition for divorce filed by one of them is dismissed is not before us.
We have often held that a jurisdictional defects of the chancery court can be waived. Ohio Galvanizing Mfg. Co. v. Nichol, 170 Ark. 16, 279 S.W. 377; Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 219 S.W.2d 769, rehearing denied 338 U.S. 882; State for Use of Ark. County v. Pollard, 171 Ark. 607, 286 S.W. 811; Hayes v. Bishop, 141 Ark. 155, 216 S.W. 298; Goodrum v. Merchants' Planters' Bank, 102 Ark. 326, 144 S.W. 198. Further, it is well settled that one who invokes the aid of chancery in a matter not wholly beyond equitable cognizance is in no position later to reject its jurisdiction.
See also Illinois Standard Mfg. Co. v. Collins, 187 Ark. 902, 63 S.W.2d 342. In Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 219 S.W.2d 769, we said: "The appellants cannot claim title to part of the land in reliance upon the deed and at the same time claim the rest upon the theory of its invalidity. Wood v. Hay, 206 Ark. 892, 175 S.W.2d 189.