"In assessing 'a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction... [W]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[s] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" (Pottorff v Centra Fin. Group, Inc., 192 A.D.3d 1552, 1553 [4th Dept 2021]; see Bratge v Simons, 167 A.D.3d 1458, 1461 [4th Dept 2018]).
"In assessing ‘a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction ... We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ( Leon v. Martinez , 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 [1994] ). ‘Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss’ ( EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 N.Y.3d 11, 19, 799 N.Y.S.2d 170, 832 N.E.2d 26 [2005] )" ( Pottorff v. Centra Fin. Group , Inc. , 192 A.D.3d 1552, 1553, 145 N.Y.S.3d 702 [4th Dept. 2021] ; seeJ.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co. , 21 N.Y.3d 324, 334, 970 N.Y.S.2d 733, 992 N.E.2d 1076 [2013] ). With respect to the first cause of action, for tortious interference with business relations, the party asserting such a claim must allege "(1) that it had a business relationship with a third party; (2) that the defendant knew of that relationship and intentionally interfered with it; (3) that the defendant acted solely out of malice or used improper or illegal means that amounted to a crime or independent tort; and (4) that the defendant's interference caused injury to the relationship with the third party" ( Amaranth LLC v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. , 71 A.D.3d 40, 47, 888 N.Y.S.2d 489 [1st Dept. 2009], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 14 N.Y.3d 736, 898 N.Y.S.2d 74, 925 N.E.2d 73 [2010] ; seeConklin v. Laxen , 180 A.D.3d 1358, 1359, 118 N.Y.S.3d 893 [4th Dept. 2020] ; see generallyCarvel Corp. v. Noonan , 3 N.Y.3d 182, 189-190, 785 N.Y.S.2d 359,
We agree with plaintiff, however, that the court erred in concluding that the sidewalk was suitable for the recreational use of bike riding (see Albright, 88 N.Y.2d at 662). In evaluating the suitability of a property for a particular activity, courts look to whether the premises is the "type of property which is not only physically conducive to the particular activity or sport but is also a type which would be appropriate for public use in pursuing the activity as recreation" (Iannotti v Consolidated Rail Corp., 74 N.Y.2d 39, 45 [1989]). Accepting the allegations in the amended complaint as true, as we must (see Pottorff v Centra Fin. Group, Inc., 192 A.D.3d 1552, 1553 [4th Dept 2021]), we conclude that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the sidewalk at issue was not appropriate for public use in pursuing the recreational activity of bike riding. Plaintiff alleged that the sidewalk area where he fell was not designated by defendant for bike riding and was situated along a busy campus roadway near the front entrance of an academic building containing classrooms and offices.