Because Rule 5A:18 provides that "[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or . . . to attain the ends of justice," Beckford's failure to object to Parker's oral out-of-court statements bars his claim on this issue. See People v. Foster, 473 N.Y.S.2d 978, 984 (N.Y. 1984) (in a joint trial, codefendants "cannot avail themselves of their [codefendant's] objection"); Wolfe v. East Texas Seed Co., 583 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tx.App. 1979) (appellant who failed to make objection at trial cannot avail himself of codefendant's objection to preserve issue for appeal); Poston v. Ragan, 187 S.E.2d 503, 505 (N.C.App. 1972) (a party is not entitled to the benefit of an exception not taken by himself, and therefore exception taken by one party is not available to a co-party). Moreover, when a party objects to the admissibility of material offered as evidence, and the same material is subsequently offered as evidence, failure to restate the objection constitutes a waiver of the previous objection.
As previously noted, a statutory disqualification must be raised by personal objection ( Kohl v Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 302, supra). The codefendants, who made no objection to the venireman before he was sworn as a trial juror (CPL 270.15, subd 4), waived the issue of disqualification and cannot avail themselves of their colleague's objection (see Overend v Kiernan, 5 NJ Misc Rep 704; Poston v Ragan, 14 N.C. App. 134; Wolfe v East Texas Seed Co., 583 S.W.2d 481 [Tex]; State v Wood, 121 Vt. 49; 4 CJS, Appeal and Error, ยง 348). A defendant at a joint trial has the right to pursue his own interests and strategies and is not the guardian of the rights and interests of his codefendants ( People v Carter, 86 A.D.2d 451).