The probability or improbability of the occurrence alleged, and the weight and credibility to be given to the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, were matters singularly within the province of the jury. Poston v. Alexander, 191 Okla. 653, 132 P.2d 343; Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Benson, 208 Okla. 588, 257 P.2d 1084. Defendant's argument that the evidence showed the ditch to be too narrow and too shallow for the accident to have happened as testified to is based entirely upon defendant's interpretation of the evidence. And, this is true also as to the argument plaintiff could not have been injured in the manner testified to, because the narrowness of the ditch made it impossible to get down into the ditch next to the animal.
In this connection, it is elementary that the jury was not bound by the testimony of the actuary, and could have awarded damages less than or in excess of the amount named in this testimony. See Poston v. Alexander, 191 Okla. 653, 132 P.2d 343, the second syllabus of which is as follows: "The credibility of witnesses and the weight and value of their testimony, in actions of legal cognizance, are questions exclusively for the jury to pass upon."
The attack on the credibility of the witnesses is without merit. The jury was properly instructed as to that question and, this being so, the rule applicable is that credibility of witnesses and the weight and value of their testimony, in actions of legal cognizance, are questions exclusively for the jury to pass upon. Poston v. Alexander, 191 Okla. 653, 132 P.2d 343. However, defendant Cooke argues that there was a contract release and notice to the public signed by Lee McNutt, Nealtha McNutt and C.C. Cooke which Lee McNutt acknowledged under oath on August 29, 1947, and thereby agreed that from and after the date thereof no other persons, firms or corporations were to have any interest in live stock transactions except himself and C.C. Cooke; that notwithstanding these solemn pronouncements by Lee McNutt, he took the witness stand and undertook to impeach himself and impeach this contract under the terms of which Cooke had invested large sums of money; that the proof shows that Lee McNutt was a consistent dealer in livestock buying and selling promiscuously; that he was well known to be such a dealer at the time this agreement was entered into and that such knowledge was imputable to plaintiff Townley; that these notes and mortgages come squarely within the rule laid down by this Court in Howell v. Board, 185 Okla. 513, 94 P.2d 830 and Rogers C