The record supports the motion court's conclusion that Lederer failed to establish that its failure to produce certain documents in the underlying action, resulting in the preclusion order, was the result of defendants' negligence rather than the "intransigence" of plaintiff's principal. In any event, Lederer fails to show that it suffered any actual damages as a result of defendants' conduct ( see Postel v Jaffe Segal, 237 AD2d 127).

The proposed fiduciary breach claim lacks merit in that it fails to allege facts, rather than conclusions, to support the element of "but for" causation ( see Weil, Gotshal Manges, LLP v Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 10 AD3d 267, 271-272), and was therefore properly rejected ( see Thompson v Cooper, 24 AD3d 203, 205) even if, arguendo, the alleged conduct involved ethical violations ( see Schwartz v Olshan Grundman Frome Rosenzweig, 302 AD2d 193, 199). The damages sought are speculative or otherwise not recoverable ( see Postel v Jaffe Segal, 237 AD2d 127). In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to address the timeliness of the proposed claim.

With respect to damages, conclusory allegations of damages or injuries predicated on speculation cannot suffice for a malpractice action, and dismissal is warranted where the allegations in the complaint are merely conclusory and speculative (Mid City Elec. Corp. v Peckar & Abramson, 214 A.D.3d 646, 649 [2d Dept 2023]; Lam v Weiss, 219 A.D.3d 713, 716 [2d Dept 2023]; Denisco v Uysal, 195 A.D.3d 989, 991 [2d Dept 2021]; Kaplan v Conway and Conway, 173 A.D.3d 452, 452 [1st Dept 2019] ["Given the vague, speculative, and conclusory nature of these allegations, plaintiffs failed to allege facts that 'fit into any cognizable legal theory.'"]; Bua v Purcell & Ingrao, P.C., 99 A.D.3d 843, 848 [2d Dept 2012]; Zarin at 387-388 [The Court found plaintiff's alleged damages to his good reputation and credit-worthiness were speculative and incapable of being proven.]; see Postel v Jaffe & Segal, 237 A.D.2d 127, 127 [1st Dept 1997]; Brown v Samalin & Bock, P.C., 168 A.D.2d 531, 532 [2d Dept 1990] ["The plaintiff had no experience in real estate development, and his financing was questionable. Furthermore, there is no evidence that he would have been able to obtain permission to subdivide the property into a sufficient number of building lots to make subdivision profitable.

Likewise, in a recent First Department case, the Court held that: "The proposed fiduciary breach claim lacks merit in that it fails to allege facts, rather than conclusions, to support the element of "but for" causation . . . and was therefore properly rejected . . . even if, arguendo, the alleged conduct involved ethical violations . . . The damages sought are speculative or otherwise not recoverable (see Postel v Jaffe Segal, 237 AD2d 127, 654 NYS2d 25)." Cosentino v.Sullivan Papain Block McGrath Cannavo, P.C. , 47 AD3d 599 (1st Dept. 2008).

Because plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence to prove that his damages are actual and ascertainable, he is unable to carry his burden in this legal malpractice action, and his claim must be dismissed as a matter of law ( see e.g Postel v Jaffe Segal, 237 AD2d 127, 127 [1st Dept 1997] ["Vacatur of plaintiffs' default was properly denied because, having failed to set forth the names of the experts who would have testified and the substance of their testimony, plaintiffs' claim of damages remains speculative"]; Zarin v Reid Priest, 184 AD2d at 388 ["Here, the damages claimed by plaintiffs are too speculative and incapable of being proven with any reasonable certainty' (citation omitted)"]). Accordingly, plaintiff's first cause of action for legal malpractice must be dismissed.

As such, plaintiffs damages are completely speculative (see Oot v. Arno, supra; Igen, Inc. v. White, supra). Absent the showing of actual damages, there can be no cause of action for legal malpractice (see Postel v. Jaffe Segal, 237 A.D.2d 127, 654 N.Y.S.2d 25 [1st Dept., 1997]). Accordingly, because Skvara failed to properly plead each of the required elements of a legal malpractice cause of action, this action must be dismissed in its entirety, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(7).