Opinion
No. 34237
Decided July 6, 1955.
Workmen's compensation — Death claim — Causal relation between injury and employment — Evidence insufficient to establish — Jury question not presented — Directed verdict.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.
This is an action by a widow of a deceased workman to have determined her right to participate in the State Insurance Fund. The decedent, 77 years old at the time of his death, was employed as an elevator operator. The evidence discloses that prior to his death he was in good health except for occasional headaches, indigestion and chest pains. Shortly after decedent arrived at his place of employment on the day of the incident involved herein, he came outside the elevator which he was operating, stood by the door for a short time, and fell to the floor of the lobby, sustaining a fracture of the skull, causing an intracranial hemorrhage resulting in death.
There were two eyewitnesses to the accident. One witness testified that when he walked into the elevator decedent "walked outside and leaned against the edge" and "the next thing I knew his feet slid against the elevator door" and his head hit the "tile floor in the lobby" and "it sounded like somebody cracked a coconut." The other witness testified that decedent came out of the elevator, "stood there a minute and his eyes rolled and he went over," and his whole body struck the tile floor. The only sounds heard by the witnesses were the decedent's head striking the floor and his deep breathing while he was lying on the floor. The testimony disclosed further that both the tile floor of the lobby and the floor of the elevator cab were dry.
The Industrial Commission denied plaintiff's application for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Upon appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, that court, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, which was the only evidence presented, sustained defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, reversed the judgment of the trial court for error in instructing a verdict for defendant, and remanded the cause for a new trial.
The allowance of a motion to certify the record brings the cause to this court for review.
Mr. William Isaacs, for appellee.
Mr. C. William O'Neill, attorney general, Mr. Paul Tague, Jr., and Mr. James L. Young, for appellant.
Defendant concedes that there existed a direct and proximate causal relationship between the injury and death and that the injury was received in the course of employment. Defendant contends, however, that the accidental injury did not arise out of decedent's employment, that the evidence on that issue was insufficient to present a jury question, and that therefore the trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendant. With that contention, this court is in accord.
The record contains no evidence showing a circumstance of activity, condition, or environment of employment creating a hazard of employment greater than that to which the general public was exposed. Plaintiff's expert witness, when questioned as to the smoothness or slippery quality of the tile floor, stated, "well ordinarily, if it were dry, there would be very little chance of sliding." Decedent's fall was unexplained. The record contains no evidence of any fact or circumstance which might have caused him to fall. The fact that the floors of the lobby and the elevator cab were dry clearly distinguishes the instant case from that of Industrial Commission v. Tripsansky, 119 Ohio St. 594, 165 N.E. 297, relied upon by plaintiff. In that case the workman, after rolling a barrel partly filled with water, stood up for a few minutes and suddenly fell backwards, injuring his head. The court, in its per curiam opinion, stated:
"The place where he was standing was a greasy, slippery brick floor, and he might easily have slipped. Whether he slipped, or whether the fall and the death were due to bodily ailments, was not clearly shown. That is the question which the jury had to decide * * *.
"Without intending to recede in the least from the principle which was declared in Industrial Commission v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N.E. 38, that the employment must have some causal connection with the injury, we are of opinion that there was testimony from which the jury might reasonably infer that the deceased had slipped on the greasy floor. This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury in such cases, nor invade its province." (Emphasis supplied.)
The factual situation in the instant case falls within the rule expressed in the case of Eggers v. Industrial Commission, 157 Ohio St. 70, 104 N.E.2d 681. The mere fact that in the instant case the record discloses the character of the work performed by decedent and the place where he was standing when he fell does not take the case out of the operation of that rule.
Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence of a causal relation between the employment and the injury sufficient to justify a submission of the issue to the jury.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Court of Common Pleas affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., MATTHIAS, HART, ZIMMERMAN, STEWART, BELL and TAFT, JJ., concur.