Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BS119509, David P. Yaffe, Judge.
Charles J. Post, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, Robert E. Kalunian and Albert Ramseyer, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Appellant.
SUZUKAWA, J.
In this action for writ of mandate and declaratory relief, plaintiff, a taxpayer over the age of 55, purchased a new or replacement home in Los Angeles County. One year later, plaintiff sold his former home in Marin County for $42,000 less than the purchase price of the replacement home. The substantive issue is whether the higher cost of the replacement home precludes the transfer of the former home’s base year property value under Propositions 60 and 90. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 2, subd. (a); Rev. & Tax. Code, § 69.5, subd. (a); see Wunderlich v. County of Santa Cruz (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 680, 690-691.) However, we decline to reach the merits of the appeal or cross-appeal based on the procedural rule that where a taxpayer has an adequate remedy at law of paying the tax that is due and filing a claim for tax refund, courts have repeatedly denied mandamus, injunctive, declaratory, or other equitable relief. (Flying Dutchman Park, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1135; § 4807.) We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in granting declaratory relief and we reverse the judgment.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code.
BACKGROUND
Following the November 1986 approval of Proposition 60, qualified homeowners over the age of 55 may transfer their base year property value to a replacement dwelling of equal or lesser value that was purchased within the same county within two years of the sale of the original property. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 2, subd. (a); § 69.5, subd. (a)(1).) Upon the November 1988 enactment of Proposition 90, this right was extended to replacement dwellings purchased in other counties that have adopted local ordinances allowing such transfers. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 2, subd. (a); § 69.5, subd. (a)(2); Wunderlich v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 690-691.)
In this case, plaintiff Charles J. Post, a taxpayer over the age of 55, owned a former principal residence in Marin County that had an assessed value of $598,265. In October 2005, Post placed the Marin County home for sale at a listing price of $2.05 million, which was later reduced to $1.75 million.
According to the complaint, Post and his wife, who is not a party to this action, are trustees of the Phelan-Post Living Trust, which held title to their former residence in Marin County and their current home in Los Angeles County.
Before the Marin County home was sold, Post purchased a replacement home in Los Angeles County in March 2006 for $1,384,500. The assessed value of the replacement home was $1,411,680.
In March 2007, Post sold the Marin County home for $1,342,500. Accordingly, the purchase price of the new home exceeded the sale price of the former home by $42,000.
In June 2007, Post filed a claim under Propositions 60 and 90 with the Los Angeles County Assessor’s Office to transfer the assessed value of the Marin County home to the Los Angeles County home. After the claim was denied, Post appealed to the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board. The assessment appeals board denied the claim on the ground that the purchase price of the new home exceeded the sale price of the former home.
In March 2009, Post filed the present action for writ of mandate and declaratory relief against the assessor and the assessment appeals board, seeking to overturn the denial of his claim. Post alleged that the assessor and the assessment appeals board had “failed to consider changes in the market value of the Marin County property between its sale and the purchase of its replacement” as required by section 69.5, subdivision (g)(7). Post argued that when a replacement home is purchased prior to the sale of the original home in a declining real estate market, the values of the two properties should be compared on the same date, namely the date on which the replacement home was purchased. Post contended that the evidence would show that, when the replacement home was purchased, the value of the original home exceeded the purchase price of the replacement home.
In opposition, the assessor argued that the relief requested in the complaint was barred by Post’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies by paying the tax and filing a claim for tax refund. (Citing County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 654, 672 [the special procedure allowing a taxpayer to pay the disputed tax under protest and to sue for a refund is an adequate remedy at law].) The assessor also defended the denial of the claim, which we will not address in this opinion.
The trial court, which granted declaratory relief but not a writ of mandate, implicitly overruled the assessor’s procedural objection. The trial court agreed with Post that the two property values should be compared on the same date, but selected the date of sale rather than the date of purchase. The trial court stated in relevant part: “Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of mandate that he seeks, which is to compel the county assessor to assess his original home in Marin County as of a date a year [before] he sold the home. Petitioner is entitled to a declaration of rights from the court that he is entitled to the benefits of Revenue & Taxation Code section 69.5(a)(1) if he can show to the satisfaction of the assessor that his condominium unit that he purchased on March 28, 2006, for $1,384,500.00, declined in value to $1,342,500.00 or less, on March 23, 2007, the date that he sold his original home in Marin County.”
This was not the relief that was requested below. Post stated below that he was not seeking a reduction in the assessed value of the new home: “Petitioner could not sensibly ask for a reduced assessment where that assessment is based on the purchase price he willingly paid. Nor does Petitioner argue the Assessor[’s] valuations are inflated.”
Both sides appealed from the judgment. The assessor contends on appeal that the claim was properly denied and, in any event, the “sole legal avenue for resolving tax disputes is a postpayment refund action.” (State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 633, 638.) Post argues in the cross-appeal that the two properties should be valued on the date the replacement home was purchased rather than the date the original home was sold. Because we conclude that the action is barred by Post’s failure to file a claim for tax refund, we do not reach the merits of the dispute.
DISCUSSION
“‘The rule in this state is that injunctive and declaratory relief will not be granted where there is a plain, complete, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. [Citation.]... Any remedy that allows a taxpayer to challenge a tax already collected, and to press any constitutional claims he or she may have, has been found to constitute “‘a plain, speedy and efficient remedy, ’” barring equitable relief.’ (Flying Dutchman Park, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco[, supra, ] 93 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1138.)” (Rickley v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013.)
Section 4807 states in relevant part: “No injunction or writ of mandate or other legal or equitable process shall issue in any suit, action, or proceeding in any court against any county, municipality, or district, or any officer thereof, to prevent or enjoin the collection of property taxes sought to be collected.” In light of Post’s failure to file a claim for tax refund, we conclude the judgment for declaratory relief is barred by section 4807.
In State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.3d 633, the Supreme Court construed a similar provision to mean that “[a] taxpayer may not go into court and obtain adjudication of the validity of a tax which is due but not yet paid. [¶] The important public policy behind this constitutional provision ‘is to allow revenue collection to continue during litigation so that essential public services dependent on the funds are not unnecessarily interrupted.’ (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 27 Cal.3d 277, 283.)” (Id. at p. 638, construing Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 32 [“No legal or equitable process shall issue in any proceeding in any court against this State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax. After payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest, in such manner as may be provided by the Legislature.”]; see also Flying Dutchman Park, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135 [“California courts have repeatedly denied mandamus, injunctive and declaratory relief where a taxpayer has failed to pay an assessed tax before filing a refund action.”].)
In Schoderbek v. Carlson (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1027 (Schoderbek II), the courtfaced a similar situation. The plaintiffs had filed a putative class action complaint against a county tax assessor and others for mandamus, injunction, and declaratory relief in order to ascertain the correct definition of the term “full cash value” as used in Proposition 13. (Id. at pp. 1032-1033.) After the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, the plaintiffs appealed. In opposition to the appeal, the defendants argued that the relief requested in the complaint was barred by section 4807. In an earlier appeal, the appellate court had reached the same conclusion, stating that mandamus and injunctive relief are not available “when a taxpayer has an adequate remedy at law - a claim for refund followed by a suit for refund. [Citations.]” (Schoderbek v. Carlson (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1037-1038, disapproved on another ground in Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 792; see Schoderbek II, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 1032.)
Nevertheless, the court in Schoderbek II reached the merits of the appeal after broadly construing the complaint’s prayer for damages to encompass a request for refund of taxes paid. (152 Cal.App.3d at p. 1032 [“Therefore, as suggested by respondents, we will treat the prayer for damages in the complaint as a claim for refund. Having thus resolved the procedural obstacles to a resolution of this dispute, we deal with the merits of appellants’ claims.”]; cf. § 5097, subd. (b) [application for a reduction in an assessment shall constitute a sufficient claim for a refund if the applicant states in the application that the application is intended to constitute a claim for refund].)
In this case, we find no basis for broadly construing either the claim for transfer of base year property value, the appeal before the assessment appeals board, or the complaint’s prayer for relief to include a request for refund of taxes paid. Each of the proceedings was directed solely at obtaining a transfer of base year value, as opposed to the recovery of damages or a refund of taxes paid. Although the complaint contains a generic prayer for costs and “such other and further relief that the Court may deem just, ” it is too vague to encompass a request for damages.
Post’s assertion that he “does not seek to prevent or enjoin the collection of taxes” is unavailing. The sole purpose of comparing the two property values on the same date is to show that the value of the original home exceeded the purchase price of the replacement home, thereby permitting the transfer of the former home’s base year property value, which will reduce the property tax assessment on the new home. We have little difficulty concluding that granting the requested relief would prevent or enjoin the collection of taxes.
Finally, Post’s reliance on Sunrise Retirement Villa v. Dear (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 948 and Mission Housing Development Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 522 is misplaced. Sunrise Retirement Villas arose under section 51.5, which requires the assessor to correct errors in the tax roll that are not based on judgment as to value. This case is clearly distinguishable because the alleged error concerns judgment as to value. Mission Housing Development Co. is also distinguishable because it arose in an action for refund of property taxes.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the cross-appeal is dismissed as moot. The assessor is awarded his costs.
We concur: WILLHITE, Acting P.J., MANELLA, J.