Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3034-12T1
08-14-2014
JOSEPH POST, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Joseph Post, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lucy E. Fritz, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Yannotti and Maven. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. Joseph Post, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lucy E. Fritz, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Joseph Post, an inmate currently confined in New Jersey State Prison in Trenton where he is serving a life sentence, appeals from the February 5, 2013 final decision of the Department of Corrections (Department), which found he had committed prohibited act .802/.754. We affirm.
The record on appeal demonstrates that as part of a lengthy investigation conducted by the Special Investigations Division (SID) of the Department, Post was charged in 2012 with committing prohibited act .802/.754, attempting to give money or anything of value to, or accepting money or anything of value from, a member of another inmate's family or another inmate's friend with an intent to circumvent any correctional facility or Departmental rule, regulation or policy or with an intent to further an illegal or improper purpose, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). The investigation revealed that in December 2010 and May 2011, Post engaged in a conspiracy with his mother to send two money orders in the amount of $300 each to inmate William Navarro's girlfriend.
On these facts, the hearing officer adjudicated Post guilty of the charges, and imposed sanctions of ninety days administrative segregation and sixty days loss of commutation time. Following an administrative appeal, the assistant superintendent upheld the decision and sanctions imposed by the hearing officer. This appeal followed in which Post contends no exceptional circumstances existed to justify the delay in charging him. We find insufficient merit in this argument to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D) and (E). We only add the following comments.
Our scope of review is limited, and Post's claim must be analyzed in accordance with that standard. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011); Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. 2010). "In order to reverse an agency's judgment, an appellate court must find the agency's decision to be 'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or . . . not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580 (1980)). The burden is on Post to demonstrate grounds for reversal. See Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that "[t]he burden of showing the agency's action was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious rests upon the appellant"), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 469 (1994).
After an assessment of the record, we conclude that Post received all of the substantive and procedural due process to which he was entitled under the principles of McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 195 (1995), and Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). Post was given written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing, he was provided with counsel substitute, he was offered the opportunity to call and confront witnesses, and the hearing officer delivered to Post a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the discipline.
In accordance with the regulations, the disciplinary report shall be served upon the inmate within forty-eight hours after the violation unless there are exceptional circumstances, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.2, and the disciplinary hearing shall be held within seven calendar days of the alleged violation unless such hearing is prevented by exceptional circumstances, unavoidable delays or reasonable postponements. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.8(b). In this instance, the ongoing SID investigation, involving inmates and civilians, was an exceptional circumstance justifying the delays under the cited regulations. Post has not shown he was prejudiced by the delay. We conclude dismissal of the disciplinary charges is unwarranted.
Affirmed.