Opinion
Case No. 1:00cv 694.
March 26, 2001.
OPINION
This is a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by a pro se plaintiff against a Kalamazoo County circuit judge. Plaintiff's complaint arises from the entry of an order dated July 18, 2000, by Judge Richard Ryan Lamb prohibiting plaintiff from entering judges' offices and other nonpublic areas of the Kalamazoo County Courthouse and requiring plaintiff to file pleadings in the area of the Clerk's Office open to the general public. The order was entered in the case of Posluns v. Kimbrel, file no. C98-3201 CZ, a civil action prosecuted by plaintiff pro se, over which Judge Lamb is presiding. Plaintiff's complaint in the present action asserts that the entry of the order abridged numerous of plaintiff's federally guaranteed rights, including his right to due process of law, access to the courts, and free expression.
Presently pending before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), in which defendant seeks dismissal on the basis of the abstention doctrine recognized in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and related doctrines. Plaintiff has filed a lengthy responsive brief in which, among other arguments, plaintiff vehemently asserts that he has "not pled a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action." (Plf. Brief, docket # 9, at 14-16). Upon review of plaintiff's complaint, the court determines that defendant's motion to dismiss should be granted, on two separate and independent grounds.
Applicable Standard
Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The standards applicable to a motion to dismiss are well settled. Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. See Lawrence v. Chancery Court of Tennessee, 188 F.3d 687, 691 (6th Cir. 1999); Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998). The court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether it is established beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 223 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 2000); Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). While this standard is decidedly liberal, it requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Advocacy Org. for Patients and Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 176 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1443 (2000); Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 649 (6th Cir. 1999). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See Murphy v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. (In re Sofamor), 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Leisure v. FBI of Columbus, Ohio, 2001 WL 111644, at * 1 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2000). "To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio Nat'l Ass'n, 214 F.3d 776, 779 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1082 (2001). Further, as plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint must be given a liberal reading, and is not held to the standard applicable to complaints drafted by trained legal counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); see also Jinadu v. Fitzgerald, No. 99-4259, 2000 WL 1359640, at * 1 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 2000) ("The less stringent standard for pro se plaintiffs does not compel the court to conjure up unpleaded facts to support conclusory allegations."). Applying these standards, the court concludes that defendant's motion must be granted.
Discussion 1.
Although plaintiff is proceeding pro se, both his complaint and his brief demonstrate a rather extensive familiarity with the law. Plaintiff is obviously experienced in pro se litigation, or has received formal or informal training in the law. Plaintiff's pro se status entitles him to a liberal construction of his pleadings. It does not, however, absolve him from compliance with basic procedural requirements. See Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2000).
One such requirement is that a complaint set forth "a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). Plaintiff attempts to do this in paragraph 16 of his complaint, in which he alleges that his case arises under the Michigan and United States Constitutions and asserts that jurisdiction is conferred on the court by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1346, and 5 U.S.C. § 702. None of these statutes confers jurisdiction over the claims pleaded in plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff's invocation of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 and 5 U.S.C. § 702 is utterly frivolous. Section 1346 creates jurisdiction in the district courts over certain claims against the United States of America. The United States is not a defendant to this case. Similarly, 5 U.S.C. § 702 creates an avenue for judicial review of certain actions of federal agencies. Judge Lamb is not an agency of the federal government. Section 1331 creates jurisdiction in the district court to entertain actions arising under the federal Constitution or laws. It is elementary that the provisions of the Bill of Rights, which plaintiff attempts to invoke in this case, are applicable only to the federal and state governments and persons acting under color of law, and not to those of private persons or entities. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the very statute enacted by Congress to allow lawsuits against persons (such as state judges) alleged to have deprived a plaintiff of federal rights under color of state law. See Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff, however, specifically and repeatedly denies any intention of bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Consequently, the court is left without a basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction. Although this issue was not raised by defendant, the federal courts have an obligation to raise a lack of jurisdiction sua sponte. See Halbert v. Yousif (In re Yousif), 201 F.3d 774, 775 (6th Cir. 2000); Millers Cove Energy Co. v. Moore (In re Millers Energy Co.), 128 F.3d 449, 450-51 (quoting Ford v. Hamilton Investments, Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 257 (6th Cir. 1994)). In light of plaintiff's disavowal of any claim under the only statute that entitles him to sue in federal court, this court must conclude that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim as pleaded.
2.
The jurisdictional defect noted in section 1 above would be curable by an amendment invoking the court's jurisdiction under the proper statute. The court will therefore proceed to analyze the grounds for dismissal raised in defendant's motion. The principal ground for dismissal invoked by defendant is the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under Younger and its progeny, a federal court must abstain from hearing challenges to a state court's exercise of its jurisdiction in civil cases if the state's interest is so important that exercising federal jurisdiction would disrupt the comity between the federal and state courts. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
Under Younger, a federal court should abstain whenever it determines (1) that state proceedings are pending; (2) that the state proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) that the state proceedings will afford the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. See GTE Mobilnet of Ohio v. Johnson, 111 F.3d 469, 480 (6th Cir. 1997); Nilsson v. Rupert, Bronson Chicarelli Co., 888 F.2d 452, 454 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Evans v. Yarbrough, No. 003588, 2000 WL 1871706, at * 1 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2000). Despite plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, this court finds that each of the Younger criteria is met.
First, there are pending proceedings in the state courts. Judge Lamb's order was entered in the context of a civil action, Posluns v. Kimbrel, which was and is pending in the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court. Judge Lamb's order is in the nature of an injunction entered in a matter over which Judge Lamb has continuing jurisdiction. As the Sixth Circuit has noted: "It seems elementary that Younger abstention applies to federal claims which seek to review compliance with pending state court injunctive orders over which the state has retained jurisdiction." Hayse v. Wethington, 110 F.3d 18, 20 (6th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court's decision in Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975), supports this conclusion. In Huffman, like the instant case, the Supreme Court addressed a contention "not that the state proceeding had not begun, but that it had ended by the time the District Court complaint was filed." 420 U.S. at 607. In Huffman, as in the present case, the state trial court had ruled, but the case continued to pend in the state trial and appellate courts. The Huffman Court noted that
[v]irtually all of the evils at which Younger is directed would inhere in federal intervention prior to completion of state appellate proceedings, just as surely as they would if such intervention occurred at or before trial. Intervention at the later stage is if anything more highly duplicative, since an entire trial has already taken place, and it is also a direct dispersion on the capabilities and good faith of state appellate courts.Id. at 608. The Supreme Court reasoned that if federal courts are to extend comity to state-court decisions on federal questions, it is appropriate to wait for the resolution in the state appellate courts, because appellate courts are particularly suited to hearing constitutional questions. Id. at 609. Relying on Huffman and like cases, the Sixth Circuit in Hayse found that the federal courts should abstain from adjudicating a claim of alleged deprivation of the right of access to the courts arising from a continuing injunction issued by a state court. 110 F.3d at 21. Hayse governs the present case and requires a finding that claims arising from Judge Lamb's unappealed order in an unresolved circuit court matter involve proceedings "pending" in the state courts within the meaning of Younger.
Second, this court must determine whether this case implicates an important state interest. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11-13. Again, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hayse provides the starting point for analysis. In that case, the Court of Appeals recognized the state's "vital interest in ascertaining that a state court judgment or injunction is enforced." 110 F.3d at 21. The Michigan state courts would have no smaller interest in the present case. To the contrary, the state judicial system has a paramount interest in a judge's ability to regulate proceedings and conduct within the courthouse. Certainly, a judge's decision completely barring access to judicial relief can implicate federally guaranteed rights. See Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1989). But Judge Lamb's order, on its face, does not appear to implicate such rights. It merely requires that plaintiff file his papers in the appropriate office and that he not attempt to enter judge's chambers, administrative areas, and other nonpublic offices in the courthouse. Nothing in Judge Lamb's order appears to limit plaintiff's ability to file papers in the appropriate fashion or to appear in court for legitimate purposes. Consequently, Judge Lamb's order implicates the vital interest of the judiciary (whether state or federal) in maintaining order and security in the courthouse while safeguarding legitimate rights of access.
Finally, plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional challenges in the state courts. Plaintiff has the right to take an appeal when Judge Lamb files a final judgment disposing of the case. See MICH. CT. R. 7.204. If plaintiff believes that more immediate appellate relief is necessary, he can apply for leave to appeal immediately. See MICH. CT. R. 7.205. Unlike the federal system, in which interlocutory orders are generally not immediately appealable, the Michigan system allows an aggrieved litigant to seek leave to appeal any order upon a showing that "the appellant would suffer substantial harm by awaiting final judgment before taking an appeal." MICH. CT. R. 7.205(B)(1); see People v. Tryer, 189 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1971). The Sixth Circuit has affirmed dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) under the Younger abstention doctrine where, as here, a plaintiff fails to show "that the Michigan courts cannot or will not provide an adequate opportunity" to raise constitutional claims. Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 106 (6th Cir. 1994).
The federal district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over the trial courts of the states. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); Bodell v. McDonald, No. 00-5679, 2001 WL 137557, at * 2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2001); Evans, 2000 WL 1871706, at * 2. In the vast majority of cases, a person aggrieved by the entry of an order in state civil proceedings must apply for relief to the state appellate courts and, if necessary, to the Supreme Court of the United States. Federal court lawsuits for injunctive relief brought against state judges in pending matters undermine the balance of the federal system and risk the introduction of chaos into the state judicial system. The Younger abstention doctrine was designed to forestall such evils.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court determines that Younger abstention is appropriate. Defendant's motion to dismiss will therefore be granted.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the opinion filed this date:
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris (docket # 5) be and hereby is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and hereby is DISMISSED.