11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A). Courts often refer to this test as a "balance sheet" test. See Porter v. Yukon Nat'l Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 357 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 56 B.R. 339, 385 (Bankr.D.Minn. 1985), aff'd in relevant part, 850 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1988). At issue here is the solvency of the debtor's assets on the dates of the loan payments to Scientific. Courts often utilize the well-established bankruptcy principles of "retrojection" and "projection," which provide for the use of evidence of insolvency on a date before and after the preference date as competent evidence of the debtor's insolvency on the preference date.

Trustee's Br. in Supp. of Trustee's MSJ at 45. Porter v. Yukon Nat'l Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 356 (10th Cir. 1989) ("We therefore reject at the outset the Bank's suggestion that the trustee failed to carry his burden simply because he did not introduce expert testimony of the kind relied upon by the Bank."). 71.

Bankruptcy Code § 547(b), 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), provides that a trustee may avoid the transfer of a debtor's interest in property: (1) to a creditor; (2) for an antecedent debt; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) within ninety days of the filing of a petition for relief in bankruptcy; (5) that enables the creditor to receive more than the creditor would receive if the transfer had not been made and the debtor's estate were liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.Porter v. Yukon National Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 356 (10th Cir.1989)(emphasis added). See also, In re Johnson Memorial Hosp., Inc., 470 B.R. 119, 123 (Bankr.D.Conn.

Bankruptcy Code § 547(b), 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), provides that a trustee may avoid the transfer of a debtor's interest in property: (1) to a creditor; (2) for an antecedent debt; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) within ninety days of the filing of a petition for relief in bankruptcy; (5) that enables the creditor to receive more than the creditor would receive if the transfer had not been made and the debtor's estate were liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Porter v. Yukon National Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 356 (10th Cir.1989)(emphasis added). See also, In re Johnson Memorial Hosp., Inc., 470 B.R. 119, 123 (Bankr.D.Conn.2012) (" hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation ..." ); In re Frankum, 453 B.R. 352, 367 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.2011) (" .... the ‘ hypothetical Chapter 7 test.’

Because the value of property varies with time and circumstances, the finder of fact must be free to arrive at the "fair valuation" defined in section 101(26) by the most appropriate means. Porter v. Yukon National Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 357 (10th Cir.1989).         The Court must also consider the liability side of the balance sheet in the insolvency analysis and the range of issues which may be presented.

Here, unlike in Massey, the accounts were pledged as security on an antecedent loan, and the deposit itself would render BOTW fully secure. Cf. Smith, 265 F.3d at 964 ("[P]ayments that change the status of a creditor from partially unsecured to fully secured at the time of petition may be preferential."); Porter v. Yukon Nat'l Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 359 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding transfer preferential where "the effect of the transfer was to change the status of the Bank from that of a partially unsecured creditor to that of a fully secured creditor"). It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court instructs us to look to the "actual effect" of the deposit in bankruptcy, Palmer Clay Prods. Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227, 229, 56 S.Ct. 450, 80 L.Ed. 655 (1936), and as explained further below, the deposit would deplete the estate's assets. The concurrence is simply incorrect in stating that the deposit "made no difference to the bank's security position."

As the bankruptcy court in this case noted, payments that change the status of a creditor from partially unsecured to fully secured at the time of petition may be preferential. See Porter v. Yukon Nat'l Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 359 (10th Cir. 1989). Moreover, a transfer may be avoided when the creditor is fully secured at the time of payment, but is undersecured on the petition date.

Because the value of property varies with time and circumstances, the finder of fact must be free to arrive at the "fair valuation" defined in Section(s) 101[(32)] by the most appropriate means.Porter v. Yukon Nat'l Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 357 (10th Cir. 1989). In light of the circumstances of this case, and our reading of the record and the Bankruptcy Court's opinion, we conclude that the finding that Roblin was insolvent at the time of the April 1985 payment is not clearly erroneous.

Because no financial statements were introduced into evidence, neither the rate nor the amount of depreciation can be determined. While the Debtor's insolvency does not have to be established through documentary evidence, see Porter v. Yukon Nat'l Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 356-57 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that insolvency does not have to be proved by a "thoughtful, well-documented analysis of Debtor's assets and liabilities"), such evidence would have helped the court to determine the fair market value of the assets. The estate representative's counsel declined to introduce such evidence, even though the accountant offered the 1988 unaudited financial statements and the general ledger to the court.

Trustee maintains the transfers changed the status of the bank "from that of a partially unsecured creditor to that of a fully secured creditor." Porter v. Yukon Nat'l Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 359 (10th Cir. 1989). Thus, trustee claims she may recover any transfer to the extent it improved Zions' secured position during the preference period.