In 1993, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a three-week delay in presenting wiretap recordings to a judge for sealing violated § 2518(8)(a). SeePorter v. State , 209 Ga.App. 27, 432 S.E.2d 629, 630–32 (1993). In that case, however, the state "offered no explanation for the delay" except for the testimony of the lead investigator, who said that he "was unaware that federal law required that the tapes be submitted immediately to the court for sealing."

Because no tampering with the disks occurred here, the primary purpose of Section 2518(8)(a) has been achieved. Mr. Bourassa cites Porter v. State, 432 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) to support his suppression argument (see Def.'s Post-Hr'g Br. [713], at 14-15), but this case does not control as "federal law determines the admissibility in federal criminal cases of communications intercepted by a state or local officer." United States v. Mathis, 96 F.3d 1577, 1584 (11th Cir. 1996).

Id. Defendants cite state cases in which the courts granted motions to suppress based on failures to seal the wiretap recordings, King v. State, 262 Ga. 147, 414 S.E. 2d 206, 207 (Ga. 1992), and Porter v. State, 209 Ga. App. 27, 432 S.E. 2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (see Doc. 270 at 29-32), but as discussed above, federal law determines whether evidence is admissible in a federal criminal prosecution. Moreover, the undersigned finds the cited cases distinguishable.

After hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court denied the motion for discharge and acquittal, leading to this appeal. We will not consider additional arguments in the state's brief that were raised for the first time on appeal. See Porter v. State, 209 Ga. App. 27 (1), n. 3 ( 432 SE2d 629) (1993). We conclude that the trial court erred in denying Gifford's motion for discharge and acquittal on statutory speedy trial grounds.

Supervising the investigative activities of police officers that result in the referral of cases for prosecution and reviewing those matters with other law enforcement personnel must, as a practical matter, fall within the general oversight authority of the state's attorney as the chief law enforcement officer in the county. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Cnty. of Passaic, 340 Fed.Appx. 833, 838 (3d Cir.2009) (holding that county prosecutors were absolutely immune from suit for decisions relating to training of police officers); Porter v. State, 209 Ga.App. 27, 432 S.E.2d 629, 632 (1993) (noting that district attorney as “chief law enforcement officer of the county” was responsible “to ensure that [police] personnel [were] properly trained and that they follow the law”); Gerofsky v. Passaic Cnty. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 376 N.J.Super. 405, 870 A.2d 704, 711 (Ct.App.Div.2005) (observing that county prosecutor is generally considered “the chief law enforcement officer in the county” with “broad supervisory authority over the operations of municipal police departments” (quotation omitted)); see also 24 V.S.A. § 361(a) (setting forth state's attorney's general responsibility for prosecution of all offenses within his or her county and “all matters and causes cognizable by the supreme and superior courts in behalf of the state”); In re Wakefield, 107 Vt. 180, 189, 177 A. 319 (1935) (“A State's attorney in this State is not merely a prosecuting officer in the county in which he is elected. He is also an officer of the State, in the general matter of the

Supervising the investigative activities of police officers that result in the referral of cases for prosecution and reviewing those matters with other law enforcement personnel must, as a practical matter, fall within the general oversight authority of the state's attorney as the chief law enforcement officer in the county. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Cnty. of Passaic, 340 F. App'x 833, 838 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that county prosecutors were absolutely immune from suit for decisions relating to training of police officers); Porter v. State, 432 S.E.2d 629, 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that district attorney as "chief law enforcement officer of the county" was responsible "to ensure that [police] personnel [were] properly trained and that they follow the law"); Gerofsky v. Passaic Cnty. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 870 A.2d 704, 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (observing that county prosecutor is generally considered "the chief law enforcement officer in the county" with "broad supervisory authority over the operations of the municipal police departments" (quotation omitted)); see also 24 V.S.A. § 361(a) (setting forth state's attorney's general responsibility for prosecution of all offenses within his or her county and "all mattersandcases cognizable by the supreme and superior courts in behalf of the state"); In re Wakefield, 107 Vt. 180, 189, 177 A. 319, ___ (1935) ("A state's attorney in this state is not merely a prosecuting officer in the county in which he is elected. He is also an officer of the state, in the general matter of the

If anything, a higher duty of compliance rests on those whose responsibility it is to enforce the law than on the general populous. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 264 Ark. 391, 395, 572 S.W.2d 389, 391 (1978) (holding that the rules of criminal procedure should be common knowledge to law-enforcement and judicial officers who have the duty and responsibility to authorize searches); Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 823 A.2d 696 (2003); Porter v. State, 209 Ga. App. 27, 432 S.E.2d 629 (1993) (holding that police, district attorney, and judge are charged with knowledge of law, particularly when dealing with constitutional rights); Doctor v. State, 596 So.2d. 442 (Fla. 1992) (holding that law-enforcement officers are charged with knowledge of the law and reasonable officer knows statutory legal requirements and procedures). Finally, the State argues that even if the officers' reliance on the standing order did not constitute objectively reasonable conduct, they relied in good faith on the order and, therefore, the circuit court erred in suppressing the evidence seized in the inventory search incident thereto.

If anything, a higher duty of compliance rests on those whose responsibility it is to enforce the law than on the general populous. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 264 Ark. 391, 395, 572 S.W.2d 389, 391 (1978) (holding that the rules of criminal procedure should be common knowledge to law-enforcement and judicial officers who have the duty and responsibility to authorize searches); Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 823 A.2d 696 (2003); Porter v. State, 209 Ga. App. 27, 432 S.E.2d 629 (1993) (holding that police, district attorney, and judge are charged with knowledge of law, particularly when dealing with constitutional rights); Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d. 442 (Fla. 1992) (holding that law-enforcement officers are charged with knowledge of the law and reasonable officer knows statutory legal requirements and procedures). Id. at 645-66, 210 S.W.3d at 99.