Opinion
Nos. 05-11-00053-CR, 05-11-00054-CR
Opinion Filed October 28, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F09-60880-H, F09-72922-H.
Before Justices MOSELEY, LANG, and MYERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Markevi Daileon Porter appeals from his convictions for robbery and criminal mischief. In a single issue, appellant contends his guilty pleas were involuntary. We affirm the trial court's judgments. The background of the case and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to robbery and criminal mischief of property valued at $1,500 or more but less than $20,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 28.03(a)(1), (b)(4)(A), 29.02(a)(2) (West 2011). After finding appellant guilty and a prior felony conviction true, the trial court assessed punishment at twenty-five years' imprisonment for the robbery conviction and two years' confinement in state jail for the criminal mischief conviction. Appellant contends his guilty plea in each case was not "knowingly and voluntarily entered" because he believed the trial court would grant him probation and the opportunity for drug and mental health treatment. The State responds that appellant failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the record shows appellant freely and voluntarily entered his pleas of guilty. When considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we must examine the entire record. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam). If the trial court properly admonished a defendant before a guilty plea was entered, there is a prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. See id. Here, the record shows the trial court properly admonished appellant both orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (West Supp. 2010); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). During the plea hearing, appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictments and the punishment range for the offenses. Moreover, appellant's signed judicial confessions that he committed the offenses as alleged in the indictments were admitted into evidence. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (it is well settled that a judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon a guilty plea). Nothing in the record shows appellant believed he would necessarily receive probation and drug or mental health treatment. Although appellant asked the trial court for probation and treatment, the fact that he received greater punishment than he hoped for does not render his pleas involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). We conclude appellant entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily. We resolve appellant's sole issue against him. We affirm the trial court's judgments.