Opinion
Civil Action No: 99-0199 Section: "R" (3)
August 17, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Milliken Michaels, Inc. petitions this Court for an order declaring that plaintiff's Terry Porter, Karen Robinson, and Eldridge Thompson are liable for attorneys' fees incurred by MM while litigating the Title VII employment discrimination claims brought by the plaintiffs. For the following reasons, the Court denies defendant's motion to confirm liability for attorneys' fees.
I. Background
Porter, Robinson, and Thompson, all African-American employees at MM's Metairie, Louisiana branch office, filed this action seeking to enforce their constitutional rights pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:331 (West 2001).
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that they were placed on probation for failing to meet sales quotas while white salespersons were either not disciplined or transferred to various other divisions. They also alleged that they were paid less than white employees with less job experience, that potential clients were transferred away from them, and that they were denied employment opportunities routinely given to white employees. Plaintiffs also claimed that MM fostered a hostile work environment.
All three discrimination claims were dismissed on summary judgment. MM's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Eldridge Thompson was granted as unopposed. MM's motions for summary judgment against plaintiffs Terry Porter and Karen Robinson were granted after this Court found that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case for their claims of discrimination, disparate treatment, or hostile work environment.
Defendant MM now petitions this Court for an order assigning liability for attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs under Section 706(k) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Louisiana's anti-discrimination law also permits granting attorney's fees to the prevailing party. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:303(B).
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
It is the general rule in the United States that in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants are liable for their own attorney's fees. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 415, 98 S. Ct. 694, 696 (1978) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612 (1975)). Congress has, however, provided limited exceptions to this rule under selected statutes protecting particular federal rights. See id. Some of these statutes make fee awards mandatory for a prevailing plaintiff. Some make fee awards permissive but limit the parties. who can recover to prevailing plaintiffs. See id. at 415-16, 98 S.Ct. at 696. Many of these statutes, however, provide the district court with a great deal of flexibility and discretion in awarding attorney's fees to either a prevailing plaintiff or a prevailing defendant. Section 706(k) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act falls squarely within this last category. Section 706(k) provides:
In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
Under § 706(K), a prevailing plaintiff is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 417, 98 S.Ct. at 698. However, the policy considerations which support granting fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not present when there is a prevailing defendant. As such, a district court may grant a prevailing defendant attorney's fees only when the court in its discretion finds that plaintiff's action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in bad faith." Id. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. See also Little v. Southern Electric Steel Co., 595 F.2d 998, 1002-03 (5th Cir. 1979).
The Supreme Court emphasized that district courts need not conclude that simply because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail her action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 417, 98 S.Ct. at 698. The Court cautioned district courts against engaging in that type of "hindsight logic" because it could discourage all but the most airtight of claims and undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII. Id.
The Louisiana anti-discrimination statute similarly authorizes granting a defendant attorney's fees only upon the finding that a plaintiff's claim was frivolous. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 303(B) ("A plaintiff found by a court to have brought a frivolous claim under this Chapter shall be held liable to the defendant for reasonable damages incurred as a result of the claim, reasonable attorney fees, and court costs.")
B. MM's Claim for Attorneys' Fees
MM argues that it is entitled to attorney's fees and costs because the claims presented by Porter, Robinson, and Thompson were unable to survive a motion for summary judgment. In its motion to confirm liability of attorney's fees, MM states, "In summary, plaintiffs had no case when the lawsuit was filed, completed no discovery to determine if facts existed to support their barren claims, and ultimately, could not even convince the Court that a prima facie case existed for their 'shotgun allegations.'" (Def. Mot. Compel Att'ys Fees at 8.) However, the bulk of MM's claim for attorneys' fees is based on their dissatisfaction with the way in which plaintiffs conducted their case rather than on the legitimacy of the claims themselves.
Indeed, the argument offered by MM asks this Court to engage in precisely the type of post hoc reasoning the Supreme Court cautioned against in Christiansburg. Christiansburg makes it clear that a district court must not rely solely on the ultimate outcome of the litigation as the standard for whether attorney's fees should be awarded. 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 699 (citing Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2nd Cir. 1976)) (stating that awards of attorney's fees should not be granted to a prevailing defendant routinely or simply because he succeeds).
Although plaintiffs in this case were ultimately unsuccessful in defeating summary judgment, there is little in the record that shows that their claims were unreasonable, without foundation, frivolous, or vexatious when filed. Porter, Robinson, and Thompson complained of discrimination, disparate treatment, and a hostile work environment. It is undisputed that these types of claims are recognized under the Civil Rights laws.. Plaintiffs initially filed complaints with the EEOC. They then came before this Court with accusations of unfair treatment, unequal pay and the use of racial slurs at the workplace. Plaintiffs attempted to. support their claims of disparate pay by requesting evidence during discovery regarding the pay of similarly situated salespersons. (Def.'s Sec. Suppl. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Porter, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff Robinson testified to and defendants did not dispute that one incident involving racial epithets in the workplace did occur. Defendants were able to convince the Court that summary judgment was appropriate by setting forth evidence showing that the person who used the slur was reprimanded and by presenting case law showing that one use of racial slurs was not enough support a hostile workplace claim. (Def.'s Supp. Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Robinson, at 16.) While the record is clear that summary judgment in this case was warranted, it is far from clear that these claims were without foundation or frivolous.
As the Supreme Court stated in Christiansburg, "[n]o matter how honest one's belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable." 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S.Ct. at 700. In this case, plaintiffs were simply unable to support their claims with evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment. For the Court to assess attorney's fees against these plaintiffs simply because they proved unsuccessful would add substantially to the risks of litigation while also undercutting the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of Title VII. Accordingly, defendant's motion for attorneys' fees is denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendant's motion to confirm liability for attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 706(k) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Section 303(B) of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Statute.