Pope v. State

30 Citing cases

  1. Schade v. State

    512 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1973)   Cited 77 times
    Concluding that mental illness is one of several factors which must be weighed in determining whether a confession is voluntary

    "Insanity, as the word is used in these instructions, means such a diseased and deranged condition of the mental facilities of a person as to render him incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his act and of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to the act with which he is charged." For a full discussion, see Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1970) (dissenting opinion). "Mental illness and mental abnormality, in whatever form either may appear, are not necessarily the same as legal insanity.

  2. Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage Sch. Dist

    631 P.2d 67 (Alaska 1981)   Cited 19 times
    In Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage School District, 631 P.2d 67, 70 (Alaska 1981), parents of the school-age children sued to enjoin the School District from closing two elementary schools.

    Id. at 276 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 803-04 (Alaska 1970), reh. denied, 480 P.2d 697 (Alaska 1971); Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 346 (Alaska 1969). This conclusion effectuates the purpose of Civil Rule 42(c)(3) and preserves the separate identity of the Niebert lawsuit.

  3. Ripley v. State

    590 P.2d 48 (Alaska 1979)   Cited 14 times
    Rejecting the defendant's argument that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion when it did not require the jury to rehear a witness's cross-examination when the jury only requested playback of that witness's direct testimony

    The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in admitting certain unspecified incriminating statements Ripley made to the police dispatcher and later to the officer on the scene. The trial court believed that Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1970), was controlling and accordingly denied Ripley's motion to suppress these statements. On appeal, Ripley contends that since the investigation had focused on her as soon as she began her conversation with the dispatcher, she was entitled to a Miranda warning at that point, and that all subsequent statements were illegally tainted and should have been suppressed.

  4. Anderson v. State

    555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976)   Cited 21 times
    Holding officer's use of flashlight to aid observation was not a search

    We must first resolve the following issue: Did a search occur when the officers lifted the slides to the light or were the slides, and their contents, within the plain view of the officers? Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Davenport, 510 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1973); Bell v. State, 482 P.2d 854 (Alaska 1971); Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1970); Klockenbrink v. State, 472 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1970); Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968). If the slides were seized in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, any evidence derived therefrom would also be inadmissible as a "fruit of the poisoned tree".

  5. Cook v. Rowland

    49 P.3d 262 (Alaska 2002)   Cited 12 times
    Addressing motion for relief under subsection (b) when litigant alleged he failed to respond to summons because he was suffering from two gunshot wounds, recovering from surgery, and under influence of pain medication

    As we stated in Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt,See Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570, 574 (Alaska 1969) ("In short, when a proper affidavit has been timely filed, the judge involved is without power or jurisdiction to take any further action in the proceeding."); see also McCracken v. State, 521 P.2d 499, 510 (Alaska 1974); Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 804 (Alaska 1970). 451 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1969).

  6. Palmer v. State

    604 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1979)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that when advice to a DWI suspect regarding availability of additional testing is not statutorily mandated, it is not required as a matter of constitutional due process

    Therefore, I conclude that this questioning falls under the on-the-scene questioning exception to the Miranda rule. This court discussed the parameters of that exception in Ripley v. State, 590 P.2d 48 (Alaska 1979), and Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1970). The purpose of the exception is to facilitate the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime.

  7. Hensel v. State

    604 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1979)   Cited 45 times
    Holding that conflict between "fairly evenly balanced" expert testimony is "for the superior court to resolve"

    All of the cases cited by Hensel for the proposition that the state must prove lack of diminished capacity beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has introduced some evidence of diminished capacity involved trial proceedings. See McKinney v. State, 566 P.2d 653 (Alaska 1977); Alto v. State, 565 P.2d 492 (Alaska 1977); Dolchok v. State, 519 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1974); Johnson v. State, 511 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1973); Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 806-14 (Alaska 1970) (Connor, J., dissenting). AS 12.45.083 is contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  8. Hunter v. State

    590 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1979)   Cited 103 times
    In Hunter, we adopted an objective "reasonable person" test, holding that "custody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived.

    Like many courts, we have not before explicitly delineated a test for custodial interrogation, but our previous decisions are consistent with a reasonable person standard. In Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 805 (Alaska 1970), this court said: See Peterson v. State, 562 P.2d 1350, 1361-62 (Alaska 1977) (defendant not in custody until his formal arrest; before that, police had done nothing to restrict defendant's freedom); J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1977) (juvenile in custody during questioning — foster parent told defendant not to leave home, defendant was questioned there by foster parent, social worker and police officer, confronted with marijuana found in his jacket, and left in the custody of police officer); cf. Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 642 n. 9 (Alaska 1977) (defendant, not formally arrested, was in custody because he was not free to leave, the defendant had been frisked and, at one point, handcuffed).

  9. Alto v. State

    565 P.2d 492 (Alaska 1977)   Cited 20 times
    In Alto, 565 P.2d at 498, we held that the state could rely on its cross-examination to sustain its burden of proving sanity once the issue had been raised by sufficient evidence.

    "[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." 10 Cl. Fin. at 210, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722, cited in Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 808 (Alaska 1970) (dissenting opinion). This court, in Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1973) abandoned the M'Naghten Rule and adopted a new test following the enactment of AS 12.45.083.

  10. McCracken v. State

    521 P.2d 499 (Alaska 1974)   Cited 35 times
    In McCracken v. State, 521 P.2d 499, 501-04 (Alaska 1974), and Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025, 1031-32 (Alaska 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), we held that defendants have a right to counsel at pre-trial lineups.

    In Pope v. State, this court explained the rationale of the five-day limit in the following terms: 478 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1970). [T]he granting of the five-day period is to allow a party or his attorney an opportunity to investigate the judge to whom the case is assigned and if necessary file the requisite affidavit for disqualification, thus avoiding the waste of judicial time which would result if an affidavit or disqualification were not filed until the date of trial because this would mean that the case would have to be continued until another judge could be assigned and the disqualified judge would not be ready at that time to start the trial of another action. (478 P.2d at 804.)