Dobson, supra; Delta Cascade II, 260 Ga. at 100. See DeKalb County v. Chamblee Dunwoody Hotel P'ship, 248 Ga. 186, 190 ( 281 S.E.2d 525) (1981); Koppar Corp. v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539, 540 ( 272 S.E.2d 272) (1980); Westbrook v. Board of Adjustment, 245 Ga. 15, 16-17 ( 262 S.E.2d 785) (1980).Dobson, supra; Chamblee Dunwoody Hotel P'ship, 248 Ga. at 189.
Holy Cross Lutheran Church, 257 Ga. at 23; Gradous, 256 Ga. at 472. See Delta Cascade, 260 Ga. at 100; Chamblee Dunwoody Hotel Partnership, 248 Ga. at 189; Koppar v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539, 540 ( 272 S.E.2d 272) (1980). Furthermore, the majority opinion states that if "the evidence conflicts as to the impact of the use on the public health and welfare, the trial court does not clearly err by concluding the property owner" has shown the classification is insubstantially related to the public interest.
Delta Cascade, 260 Ga. at 100. See Chamblee Dunwoody Hotel Partnership, supra,; Koppar Corp. v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539, 540 ( 272 S.E.2d 272) (1980); Westbrook v. Bd. of Adjustment, 245 Ga. 15, 16-17 ( 262 S.E.2d 785) (1980).Chamblee Dunwoody Hotel Parttnership, 248 Ga. at 189.
If the property owner carries this burden then the city must come forward with evidence justifying the zoning, i.e., it must show the zoning is reasonably related to the public health, safety, morality, or general welfare. DeKalb County v. Flynn, supra, p. 680; Koppar Corp. v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539, 540 ( 272 S.E.2d 272) (1980)." Flournoy v. City of Brunswick, 248 Ga. 573 ( 285 S.E.2d 16) (1981). "
"`A zoning ordinance is presumptively valid, and this presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.'" Guhl v. Holcomb Bridge Rd. Corp., 238 Ga. 322, 323 ( 232 S.E.2d 830) (1977); Koppar Corp. v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539 ( 272 S.E.2d 272) (1980). We find that the plaintiff has met his burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the zoning classification as to his tract.
The added expense and inconvenience is not enough upon which to declare the ordinance unconstitutional as an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power. See, Koppar Corp. v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539, 540 ( 272 S.E.2d 272) (1980); Flournoy v. City of Brunswick, supra, p. 574 (1981); City of Smyrna v. Parks, 240 Ga. 699, 703 ( 242 S.E.2d 73) (1978). 3.
1. The burden is on the person attacking a zoning ordinance to show that it is unconstitutional. Koppar Corp. v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539 ( 272 S.E.2d 272) (1980). The ordinance under review in this case is not unconstitutional on its face.
If the property owner carries this burden then the city must come forward with evidence justifying the zoning, i.e., it must show the zoning is reasonably related to the public health, safety, morality, or general welfare. DeKalb County v. Flynn, supra, p. 680; Koppar Corp. v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539, 540 ( 272 S.E.2d 272) (1980). In this case, only the appellants have offered any evidence.
This is proof that the developer "is simply being deprived of a more profitable use ... and ... that is not enough to declare the zoning unconstitutional." Koppar Corp. v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539, 540 ( 272 S.E.2d 272) (1980). The trial court did not err in denying all relief.
Secondly, as we have said many times, "It is not sufficient to show that a more profitable use could be made of the property." Avera v. City of Brunswick, 242 Ga. 73, 75 ( 247 S.E.2d 868) (1978); Guhl v. Par-3 Golf Club, Inc., 238 Ga. 43 (1) ( 231 S.E.2d 55) (1976); Smisson Gardens, Inc. v. Doles, 244 Ga. 468, 470 ( 260 S.E.2d 865) (1979); Westbrook v. Board of Adjustment, 245 Ga. 15, 16-17 ( 262 S.E.2d 785) (1980); Koppar Corp. v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539 ( 272 S.E.2d 272) (1980). Land value depends upon land use and in a zoning contest the more intense use sought by the landowner invariably would increase the value of the land in question.