However, because he did not prove that his income would never recover, his request for a permanent reduction of his maintenance obligation was properly denied ( see Pintus v. Pintus, 104 A.D.2d 866, 869). If respondent's extreme financial hardship persists at the end of the period for which he has been granted a downward modification, he may make a further application for such relief. Contrary to respondent's assertion, the court has the authority to increase the duration of a maintenance obligation ( see e.g. Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][9][b]; Popack v. Popack, 179 A.D.2d 746, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 754). However, the Hearing Examiner's assumption that Sheila gave up marital property or "perks" in return for longer or higher maintenance, which formed the basis for his decision to extend respondent's maintenance obligation, is not supported by the record.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a hearing on the issue of an award of an attorney's fee, if any, to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court erred in awarding the plaintiff an attorney's fee in the sum of $23,157.28 without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. Under the circumstances of this case, a hearing was necessary both to explore the relative financial circumstances of the parties (see Kiprilova v. Kiprilov, 255 A.D.2d 362), and to afford the defendant a "meaningful way of testing the [attorney's] claims relative to time and value" (Price v. Price, 113 A.D.2d 299, affd 69 N.Y.2d 8; see also Green v. Green, 288 A.D.2d 436; Nee v. Nee, 240 A.D.2d 478; Popack v. Popack, 179 A.D.2d 746). FEUERSTEIN, J.P., KRAUSMAN, McGINITY and MASTRO, JJ., concur.

The retroactive features reflected the court's response to the inadequacy of the pendente lite award, which created a financial hardship for the wife and necessitated that she expend sums included in her distributive award for the benefit of the children (see, Harmon v Harmon, 173 A.D.2d 98). We further find that the court acted within its discretion in ordering the husband to maintain life insurance naming the wife as beneficiary to ensure that his child support and maintenance obligations would be satisfied (see, Popack v Popack, 179 A.D.2d 746; Lauricella v Lauricella, 143 A.D.2d 642). The preeminent concern in custody matters is the best interests of the children (see, Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167; Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89; Setty v Koeneke, 148 A.D.2d 520).

Similarly, the court did not err in determining that First American was entitled under the terms of the agreement to deduct from the deposited funds its counsel fees in connection with this action. However, since the award of counsel fees was contested, we find that the court erred in arbitrarily setting the award at $2,000 without explanation and without holding a hearing with respect to the reasonable value of the attorneys' services (see, e.g., Popack v Popack, 179 A.D.2d 746; Gutin v Gutin, 155 A.D.2d 586; P L Group v Garfinkel, 150 A.D.2d 663). We therefore remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for an evidentiary hearing on the reasonable value of the services provided by First American's attorneys. We further note that, since this is a declaratory judgment action, the court, upon remittal, should enter an appropriate judgment declaring the rights of the parties.