Opinion
22-15239
11-17-2022
ALI R. POORSINA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW PENN FINANCIAL, LLC, DBA Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, Inc.; BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FDBA Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders of CWABS Inc., Asset Backed Certificates, Series IM1- 2005, Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted November 14, 2022 [**] San Francisco, California
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 3:21-cv-05001-LB for the Northern District of California Laurel D. Beeler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Before: RAWLINSON and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE, [***] District Judge.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Ali Poorsina (Poorsina) alleged that Appellees were liable for breach of contract because they erroneously determined that Poorsina was not eligible for a loan modification. Poorsina also alleged that Appellees violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) in denying a loan modification and wrongfully foreclosing on his property. The district court dismissed Poorsina's claims as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
Poorsina appeals the district court's denial of his two requests for leave to file motions for reconsideration. "We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion." Berman v. Freedom Fin. Network, LLC, 30 F.4th 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
"Because the notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days after the judgment entered on December 2, 2021," we limited "the scope of this appeal . . . to review of the January 18, 2022 and February 2, 2022 post-judgment orders."
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Poorsina's requests for leave to file motions for reconsideration. Although Poorsina maintains that the district court should have reconsidered its prior dismissal of his claims because Poorsina mentioned the date of the foreclosure of his property in his motion for reconsideration, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Poorsina was attempting to relitigate issues already resolved by the district court.
Poorsina also does not demonstrate any clear error warranting reconsideration. The district court properly determined that Poorsina's breach of contract and UCL claims accrued "on December 7, 2016, when the defendants denied the loan modification based on an alleged glitch in their software." See Wind Dancer Prod. Grp. v. Walt Disney Pictures, 10 Cal.App. 5th 56, 73 (2017) (explaining that "[g]enerally, in both tort and contract actions, the statute of limitations begins to run upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action. The cause of action ordinarily accrues when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done and the obligation or liability arises.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). California imposes a four-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims and violations of the UCL. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337(a); see also Cal. Bus. &Prof. Code § 17208. Even assuming that the claims did not accrue until May 4, 2017, when the notice of default was filed, Poorsina filed his complaint in federal court on June 29, 2021, beyond the four-year statutes of limitations. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Poorsina's requests for leave to file motions for reconsideration to challenge its correct determination regarding the accrual of Poorsina's claims and the running of the applicable statutes of limitations. See School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that "[r]econsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law") (citation omitted).
Poorsina confirms that his challenge to the district court's denial of his motions for reconsideration is limited to his assertion that the district court clearly erred in determining the limitations period.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Poorsina's motions, we need not address Appellees' alternative contention that Poorsina lacked standing to pursue his claims under the UCL.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**]The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
[***] The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.