A similar contrast can be made between the present case and Trans-Cold Express, Inc. v. Arrow Motor Transit, Inc. (75th Cir. 1971), 440 F.2d 1216, where an investigator employed by the plaintiffs interviewed the defendant and his father without proper notice. In Poor v. DiMucci Home Builders, Inc. (1982), 103 Ill. App.3d 543, 431 N.E.2d 1338, the defendant entered the plaintiffs' lots and made soil borings without application to the court or notice to the plaintiffs. In addition to the same grounds discussed for Bruske and Trans-Cold, Poor is distinguishable from the present case because the Car-X shops were open for business to customers such as plaintiffs' investigators, while the lots in Poor were private residences.
The same is not true, however, concerning the trial court's barring of Carroll's testimony of her observations of Mondelli. Where a violation of the rules discussed above occurs, an appropriate sanction is exclusion of the evidence improperly obtained. ( Bruske v. Arnold (1969), 44 Ill.2d 132; Fair Automotive Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Service Systems, Inc. (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 763; Poor v. Di Mucci Home Builders, Inc. (1982), 103 Ill. App.3d 543.) Clearly, as previously discussed, Carroll's conversation with Mondelli had no probative value, and we simply do not comprehend plaintiffs' and the trial court's position that it tainted "everything that occurred during that meeting." As defendants point out, even if Carroll's conversation with Mondelli constituted improper conduct, she could have testified to her observations without reference to the conversation and, according to the case law cited above, we believe the improper evidence — the conversation — should only have been excluded.
• 5 The decision to admit or exclude improperly obtained evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. (See Poor v. Di Mucci Home Builders, Inc. (1982), 103 Ill. App.3d 543, 431 N.E.2d 1338.) We do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the Mt. Sinai testimony.