Poole v. State

11 Citing cases

  1. Gibson v. State

    580 So. 2d 739 (Miss. 1991)   Cited 11 times

    1988); Hampton v. State, 498 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss. 1986); Poole v. State, 291 So.2d 723, 726 (Miss. 1974). Gibson complains that the photographs are not the best evidence.

  2. People v. Griffin

    46 Cal.3d 1011 (Cal. 1988)   Cited 94 times
    In People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103] (Griffin I), we affirmed the judgment as to defendant's guilt of these offenses and the related special circumstance and personal-use findings, but reversed the sentence of death because the trial court committed error under People v.Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430], by giving the so-called Briggs Instruction.

    The Colorado Supreme Court has held that the state is not prevented from performing scientific tests that destroy evidence, though such destruction cannot be condoned when it is unnecessary. ( People v. Gomez (1979) 198 Colo. 105 [ 596 P.2d 1192, 1197]; accord, People v. Garries (Colo. 1982) 645 P.2d 1306; see also People v. Dodsworth (1978) 60 Ill. App.3d 207 [ 376 N.E.2d 449] [state must prove some justification for destructive testing]; People v. Taylor (1977) 54 Ill. App.3d 454 [ 369 N.E.2d 573] [state has heavy burden of showing destruction of evidence during testing is necessary]; Poole v. State (Miss. 1974) 291 So.2d 723, 725 [no due process violation if it was reasonably necessary for state to consume evidence in testing it]; Lee v. State (Alaska 1973) 511 P.2d 1076, 1077 [no due process violation in consumption of heroin in testing unless deliberate attempt to suppress exculpatory evidence]; see also State v. Asherman (1984) 193 Conn. 695 [ 478 A.2d 227, 246-247] [no due process violation in consumption of blood samples in testing in absence of showing that consumption unnecessary]; State v. Kersting (1981) 50 Or. App. 461 [ 623 P.2d 1095, 1103-1104] [defendant may show due process violation in state consumption of evidence in testing by showing retest would have been possible but for state's test and by challenging state's test results by attack on manner of test].) The court, faced with unnecessarily duplicative color, chromotography, ultraviolet and microcrystalline tests for the presence of heroin which destroyed the sample, affirmed an order suppressing the evidence.

  3. Jones v. State

    523 So. 2d 957 (Miss. 1988)   Cited 93 times
    Holding that the "sentence-doubling provision of § 41-29-147 . . . need not recite that the prior convictions were had pursuant to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act [§ 41-29-1, et seq.], since that statute applies where the defendant has a prior conviction under any state or federal statute relating to narcotic drugs"

    However, this case is distinguishable from Love, because the substance requested was unavailable to the state, as well as to the defendant, at the time of the request. This case is more analogous to the case of Poole v. State, 291 So.2d 723 (Miss. 1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 1019, 95 S.Ct. 492, 42 L.Ed.2d 292. In Poole the defendant was convicted of selling LSD. The tablet of LSD which was seized from him was consumed during testing.

  4. Hampton v. State

    498 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1986)   Cited 12 times
    In Hampton, the arresting officer testified that Hampton was impaired, just as the narcotics officer did here. Hampton, 498 So.2d at 385.

    Hampton next argues that the fact the state laboratory used the entire amount of the Talwin in making its test deprived him of an independent analysis, and therefore the test results should not have been admitted into evidence. There is no merit to this assignment: Poole v. State, 291 So.2d 723 (Miss. 1974); Jackson v. State, 243 So.2d 396 (Miss. 1970).

  5. Coyne v. State

    484 So. 2d 1018 (Miss. 1986)   Cited 22 times
    In Coyne v. State, 484 So.2d 1018 (Miss. 1986), the Court held, "Where the State is unable to comply with a request for production of evidence because of its unavailability, the State must show that it has acted reasonably and in good faith in the premises." Id. at 1021.

    However, this case is distinguishable from Love, because the substance requested was unavailable to the state, as well as to the defendant, at the time of the request. This case is more analogous to the case of Poole v. State, 291 So.2d 723 (Miss. 1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 1019, 95 S.Ct. 492, 42 L.Ed.2d 292. In Poole the defendant was convicted of selling LSD. The tablet of LSD which was seized from him was consummed during testing.

  6. Washington v. State

    478 So. 2d 1028 (Miss. 1985)   Cited 31 times
    Holding the trial court properly rejected the defendant's proposed instruction that the jury could infer untested tissue samples would have been exculpatory because the defendant failed to show intentional spoilation

    Regarding an insufficiency of substance for analysis, this Court has held that due process does not require dismissal of the charges where the state is unable to comply with defendant's motion because the substance was exhausted in the process of analysis. Poole v. State, 291 So.2d 723 (Miss. 1974). In this case there is no evidence that Herring's tests were unauthorized or that the state was negligent.

  7. State v. King

    187 Conn. 292 (Conn. 1982)   Cited 86 times
    In King, the defendant claimed that pursuant to General Statutes § 54–57, only offenses of the “same character” may be joined for trial.

    " Id., 416. See also Lee v. State, 511 P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1973) (heroin); State v. Herrera, 365 So.2d 399 (Fla.App. 1978) (heroin); Poole v. State, 291 So.2d 723 (Miss.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019, 95 S.Ct. 492, 42 L.Ed.2d 292 (1974) (LSD); State v. Teare, 135 N.J. Super. 19, 342 A.2d 556 (1975) (preservation of test ampoules in breathalyzer test for alcohol in blood); cf. People v. Taylor, 54 Ill. App.3d 454, 369 N.E.2d 573 (1977). Stolman, testifying with reference to the hypodermic needles, syringes, etc. that were introduced into evidence, said that they did not presently contain any of the substances or residue of any of the substances the state laboratory testing found because "they were all extracted to determine whether any drug was present or not."

  8. State v. Herrera

    365 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 21 times
    Observing that, even in the absence of a due process violation, the State's failure to notify a defendant prior to the consumption of evidence during testing would leave the credibility of the analyst "open to question before a trier of fact"

    In that connection, however, the weight of authority in the country is that the destruction of suspect contraband drugs unavoidably consumed during chemical testing by a state chemist does not constitute an act of suppression of evidence by the state sufficient to trigger a due process violation. Partain v. State, 238 Ga. 207, 232 S.E.2d 46 (1977); Poole v. State, 291 So.2d 723 (Miss. 1974); Lee v. State, 511 P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1973); State v. Lightle, 210 Kan. 415, 502 P.2d 834 (1972). Contra: State v. Gaddis, 530 S.W.2d 64, 69 (Tenn.

  9. People v. Dodsworth

    60 Ill. App. 3d 207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 18 times
    In Dodsworth, the court applied the Taylor standard and held that a due process violation occurs when the State unnecessarily destroys alleged contraband, thereby preventing a defendant from conducting independent testing, and admits into evidence the results of the State's tests.

    One finds that the highest courts in several states have determined that the exhaustion of the supply of a narcotic or controlled substance is not a valid basis for excluding the State's analysis of the samples available as a denial of due process. Lee v. State (Alas. 1973), 511 P.2d 1076; State v. Cloutier (Me. 1973), 302 A.2d 84; Poole v. State (Miss. 1974), 291 So.2d 723; State v. Lightle (1972), 210 Kan. 415, 502 P.2d 834. In terms of the consideration of the record, the principal opinion has departed from the literal reading of the stipulation as to defendant's admission of the nature of the substance.

  10. People v. Taylor

    54 Ill. App. 3d 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 37 times
    In Taylor, after the trial court denied the defendant's motion to exclude testimony regarding the chemical testing, he was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance.

    See, e.g., State v. Cloutier, 302 A.2d 84 (Me. 1973); Lee v. State, 511 P.2d 1076 (Alas. 1973); State v. Lightle, 210 Kan. 415, 502 P.2d 834 (1972); Poole v. State, 291 So.2d 723 (Miss. 1974). • 2 We hold, therefore, that defendant in the instant case was denied due process of law and the opportunity for meaningful confrontation of the witnesses against him by the State's unnecessary destruction of the allegedly prohibited substance which he allegedly delivered to agents of the State, and that his conviction must be reversed.