Opinion
7:21-CV-78-D
02-24-2022
PHILLIP L. POOLE, Plaintiff, v. NAOMI POOLE, et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Brian S. Meyers, United States Magistrate Judge.
This pro se case is before the court on the motion by plaintiff Phillip L. Poole (“plaintiff” or “Poole”) to proceed in forma pauperis [D.E. 1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). It is also before the court on plaintiff's complaint for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and injunctive relief. [D.E. 10]. The motions were referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) for a memorandum and recommendation, and for a frivolity review. See [D.E. 5, 11]. The court finds that plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of his inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis will be ALLOWED. However, based on the court's frivolity review and for the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff's complaint [D.E. 1-1] be DISMISSED.
Consistent with the recommendation that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's complaint for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and injunctive relief [D.E. 10], as well as plaintiff's pending proposed sealed motion to request immediate protection from serious harm [D.E. 4], be DENIED AS MOOT. Absent this recommendation that the motions be denied as moot, for the reasons stated below, the undersigned still recommends that these motions [D.E. 4, 10] be DENIED as frivolous and without merit.
ORDER ON IN FORMA PAUPERIS MOTION
To qualify for in forma pauperis status, a person must show that he “cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the information in the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the court finds that plaintiff has adequately demonstrated his inability to prepay the required court costs. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [D.E. 1] is therefore ALLOWED.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION ON FRIVOLITY REVIEW
I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS
A. Plaintiff's complaint and related filings
Plaintiff filed two separate complaints as attachments to his motion to proceed in forma pauperis filed on April 28, 2021. [D.E. 1-1, 1-2]. Each complaint consists of a complaint formwith handwritten answers in which plaintiff appears to assert the same or similar claims against, and seek the same or similar relief from, his former spouse Naomi Poole and others for conspiring to violate plaintiff's personal and parental rights through the use of false statements and affidavits. See generally, id. The court construes the second complaint form [D.E. 1-2] as additional pages to plaintiff's complaint [D.E. 1-1], rather than a separate and individual complaint.
The first complaint form [D.E. 1-1] is the Administrative Office of the United States Courts' form entitled “Pro Se 1 (Rev. 12/16) Complaint for a Civil Case.” This form instructs plaintiff to “[a]ttach additional pages if needed.” [D.E. 1-1] at 5. The second complaint form [D.E. 1-2] is the general pro se complaint form found on the website for this court.
Plaintiff also filed a letter with the court on April 29, 2021 [D.E. 4] requesting “immediate protection from serious harm” ([D.E. 4] at 1-2). Attached to the letter are twenty-five pages of various documents ostensibly in support of plaintiff's request therein, his complaint, or both. [D.E. 4] at 3-27. As an initial matter, this filing was placed on docket by the Clerk of the Court as a proposed sealed motion due to the sensitive nature of some of the information included within the document. See generally, id. The filing consists of medical records, state court records, and other documents that contain personal identifying information and the names of minors. Id. The undersigned, having reviewed its contents, RECOMMENDS this filing be placed under seal by order of the court, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2 and Local Civil Rule 79.2.
B. Plaintiff's allegations and claims
In his complaint [D.E. 1-1, 1-2] and the ostensible supporting filings [D.E. 4], plaintiff appears to assert claims alleging that Naomi Poole conspired with others to (1) wrongfully, involuntarily confine plaintiff to a mental facility through the use of false statements and affidavits, and (2) to deprive plaintiff of his parental rights to custody of his children and his right to a fair trial through the use of false statements and affidavits. See [D.E. 1-1] at 5; [D.E. 1-2] at 2-3. Specifically, plaintiff alleges the following:
[O]n Sept 2 Naomi Poole conspired with Glendolene Poole to have the Plaintiff wrongfully confined to a mental facility with false statement. October Naomi Poole conspired with other to deprive me of a fair trial + Custody Right by swearing false affidavits[.][D.E. 1-1] at 5. Additionally:
From 8-1-20 Naomi Poole is engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to deprive me of my parental rights and as a trained [sic] over the last 3 years she has fraudulently obtained multiple warrants. However in August after returning home from MN egaged [sic] my mother, and pressured her into helping her have me involuntarily commited [sic] despite good reports from doctors - Naomi then engaged Dawn Nelson, Christy Donaldson, Deborah Damm to write false statement + fabrications to assist Naomi in this endeavor + has used her affiliations with Government to terrorize me[.][D.E. 1-2] at 2-3.
Plaintiff specifies the following claims against the named defendants: (1) Naomi Poole, Christy Donaldson, Deborah Damm, and Violet Dawn Nelson committed “conspiracy against rights;” (2) Naomi Poole, Glendolene Poole, Christy Donaldson, and Violet Dawn Nelson committed “affidavit fraud;” (3) Christy Donaldson, Deborah Damm, Violet Dawn Nelson committed “civil defamation of character;” and (4) Naomi Poole committed assault and battery. [D.E. 1-2] at 2.
Plaintiff states that he asserts his claims generally pursuant to diversity of citizenship alleging that defendant Christy Donaldson is a citizen of Florida, Deborah Damm is a resident of Minnesota, and that Dawn Violet Nelson, Glendolene Poole, and Naomi Poole are residents of North Carolina. [D.E. 1-1] at 3-4.
Plaintiff asserts diversity jurisdiction as the basis of the court's jurisdiction in this matter. See [D.E. 1-1] at 3; [D.E. 1-3] at 1. Diversity jurisdiction arises only “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different states[.]” Glynn v. SavaSeniorCare Consulting, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-193-FL, 2021 WL 647373, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 28, 2021) (alterations in original) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)). Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead diversity jurisdiction in his complaint, as he requests relief only in the amount of $25,000. See [D.E. 1-1] at 5 (seeking $5,000 in damages against each of five Defendants); [D.E. 1-2] at 3 (same); [D.E. 1-3] at 1 (demanding a total of $25,000 in civil cover sheet). However, in his motion for temporary restraining order [D.E. 10], Plaintiff appears to change his position relating to subject matter jurisdiction. In this motion, Plaintiff states that jurisdiction is based on both diversity jurisdiction and “Federal Question - Civil Rights.” [D.E. 10] at 4, 7. Plaintiff further states that his basis for federal question jurisdiction is under the “General Welfare provision, supremacy clause, 14th Amendment, [and] Article 24 U.N. Rights of the Child.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff also increases the relief he requests from $25,000 to $250,000. Id. at 9. Even if the court were to find that this motion properly amends Plaintiff's complaint, it is unclear whether Plaintiff has established that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. Yet, because the undersigned finds that there is no subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims for the independent reasons set forth below, whether or not Plaintiff's complaint has been amended is not addressed herein.
The relief sought by plaintiff is: (1) that defendants are charged with, and prosecuted for, a conspiracy against plaintiff's rights and fraud; (2) “a restraining order to remove all false affidavits;” and (3) $5,000 per defendant for pain and suffering. [D.E. 1-1] at 5. Plaintiff further states in his complaint that he seeks “immediate injunction barring the State of North Carolina from using any statements by Naomi or others + removed full criminal investigation if the Court sees fit”; a “full restoration of all rights”; and an “injunction declaring all warrants or judgement [sic] obtained by Naomi Poole.” [D.E. 1-2] at 3.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR FRIVOLITY REVIEW
After allowing a party to proceed in forma pauperis, as here, the court must conduct a frivolity review of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In such a review, the court must determine whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant, and is thereby subject to dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992) (standard for frivolousness). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
In evaluating frivolity specifically, a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are held to “less stringent standards” than those drafted by attorneys. White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, the court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff's contentions as true. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. The court is permitted to “pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Such baseless claims include those that describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 328. Provided that a plaintiff's claims are not clearly baseless, the court must weigh the factual allegations in plaintiff's favor in its frivolity analysis. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. The court must read the complaint carefully to determine if a plaintiff has alleged specific facts sufficient to support the claims asserted. White, 886 F.2d at 724.
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . [and] a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), (2). Case law explains that the factual allegations in the complaint must “‘state[ ] a plausible claim for relief' that ‘permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct' based upon ‘its judicial experience and common sense.'” Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). Likewise, a complaint is insufficient if it offers merely “labels and conclusions, ” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, ” or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A court may also consider subject matter jurisdiction as part of the frivolity review. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[d]etermining the question of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is often the most efficient procedure”); Cornelius v. Howell, No. 3:06-3387-MBS-BM, 2007 WL 397449, at *2-4 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2007) (discussing the lack of diversity jurisdiction during frivolity review as a basis for dismissal). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are empowered to act only in those specific situations authorized by Congress.” Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir. 1968). The presumption is that a federal court lacks jurisdiction in a particular case unless it is demonstrated that jurisdiction exists. Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 336 (1895). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction rests on the party invoking jurisdiction, here the plaintiff. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction . . . is on the plaintiff, the party asserting jurisdiction.”). The complaint must affirmatively allege the grounds for jurisdiction. Bowman, 388 F.2d at 760. If the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
Having found that plaintiff is financially eligible to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must now undertake a frivolity review of this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court shall dismiss a case if the action is: “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The court finds that each of plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal under 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) on one or more of the following grounds: (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (2) the Younger abstention doctrine, and (3) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Each ground is addressed in turn below.
A. Rooker-Feldman doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from sitting “in direct review of state court decisions.” D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-84 (1983). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself.” Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)). This doctrine also prohibits a district court from reviewing constitutional claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision. Shooting Point, LLC v. Cumming, 368 F.3d 379, 383 (4th Cir. 2004). “A federal claim is ‘inextricably intertwined' with a state court decision if ‘success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.'” Id. (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)); see also Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that a federal claim is “‘inextricably intertwined” where “in order to grant the federal relief sought, the federal court must determine that the [state] court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render the judgment ineffectual'” (quoting Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997))).
In other words, Rooker-Feldman applies “when the federal action ‘essentially amounts to nothing more than an attempt to seek review of [the state court's] decision by a lower federal court.'” Davis v. Durham Mental Health Devel. Disabilities Substance Abuse Area Auth., 320 F.Supp.2d 378, 388 (M.D. N.C. 2004) (quoting Plyer v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 733 (4th Cir. 1997)). “[T]he key inquiry is not whether the state court ruled on the precise issue raised in federal court, but whether the ‘state-court loser who files suit in federal court seeks redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself.'” Willner v. Frey, 243 Fed.Appx. 744, 747 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Davani, 434 F.3d at 718). “‘[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.'” Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)).
Here, both claims asserted by plaintiff in his complaint appear to be related to state court matters. First, plaintiff claims that he was deprived of a fair trial and custodial rights. This claim appears directly related to a child custody matter in the state court referenced by plaintiff. Second, plaintiff claims that he was wrongfully confined and that defendant Naomi Poole improperly sought and was awarded a protective order against plaintiff. This claim again appears to relate to plaintiff's child custody matter, as well as the issuance of a protective order by a state district court.
In support of his claims, Plaintiff refers directly to numerous state court case matters upon which his claims are based. See [D.E. 10] at 1, 9 (citing to a rule “50-B order” issued by state court Judge Robinson, and what appear to be North Carolina state court case numbers “NC File 21CR 053436 and associated order 21-CV-001282[, ]” and “18-CVD-1119”). However, it is unclear exactly what documents pertain to each claim alleged by Plaintiff. To the extent that any North Carolina state court matter relevant to plaintiff's claims remains pending in state court, it is addressed in Section III.B below.
Determination of plaintiff's claims in the instant case in his favor would necessarily require this court to find that the state court proceedings were conducted in an improper manner, produced an improper result, or both. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this court from making such a determination. Plaintiff, of course, retains access to the state court for pursuit of his claims. See Oliver v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 312 F.Supp.3d 515, 525 (E.D. Va. 2018) (dismissing on basis of Rooker-Feldman plaintiff's claims that the state board “wrongly applied the ADA in deciding the merits of his petition for accommodations” even where plaintiff did not specifically present ADA-specific or constitutional arguments to the state board but could have raised those arguments on appeal to state court), app. dismissed, 2018 WL 6192209 (4th Cir. 23 July 2018); see also Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 79 F.3d 1143, 1996 WL 97105, at *3 (5th Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, the court concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to the claims asserted by plaintiff that involve any past state court decisions or matters inextricably intertwined with those decisions, and consequently, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over them. It is RECOMMENDED that his claims be DISMISSED as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
B. Younger abstention doctrine
Next, to the extent that any of plaintiff's state court matters remain pending, and thus, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply as discuss above, such claims would be prohibited by the Younger abstention doctrine.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), established the principle that federal courts should not intervene in state court criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975). “Younger and ‘its progeny espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.'” Beam v. Tatum, 299 Fed.Appx. 243, 245 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982)). Abstention is required where “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding brought prior to substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2) implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests; and (3) provides adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges.” Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2006).
Here, it appears that at least some of the state court proceedings plaintiff discusses may be ongoing and were pending at the time plaintiff filed his complaint, such as plaintiff's custody dispute with named defendant Naomi Poole. Thus, the first prong of Younger is met. Next, the second prong is met as “the States' interest in administering their [] justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Thomas v. Equitable Life Mortg. and Realty Investors, No. 3:13-130-CMC-PJG, 2013 WL 2352589, at *8 (D.S.C. 29 May 2013) (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986)). Finally, the third prong is met because plaintiff has an adequate state forum to pursue his claims relating to his custodial rights. See Thomas, 2013 WL 2352589, at *8 (denying a plaintiff's request to enjoin a state court foreclosure action, stating “that ordinarily a pending state [proceeding] provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”) (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975))).
The court concludes that the doctrine of abstention under Younger deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction and provides an additional ground for dismissal of this case as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), on the basis of the Younger abstention doctrine.
C. Failure of plaintiff's complaint to state claim
Finally, to the extent that either the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or Younger abstention doctrine does not apply to any of plaintiff's claims, and thus, subject matter jurisdiction exists - the deficient pleading of the claims in the complaint [D.E. 1-1, 1-2], as supplemented by the ostensibly supporting documents [D.E. 4], would subject the complaint to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
While pro se litigants are entitled to leniency, such leniency is not without bounds. See Holder v. U.S. Marshals Office, No. 5:16-CV-00145-FL, 2016 WL 3919502, at *1 (E.D. N.C. 17 May 2016) (“[T]he principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits.”), mem. & recomm. adopted, 2016 WL 3920213 (July 15, 2016). The court finds plaintiff's statement of his claims to be insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. For example, the first claim alleges that at least two of the defendants “conspired . . . to have the plaintiff wrongly confined to a mental facility with false statement.” [D.E. 1-1] at 5. However, plaintiff fails to allege the specific circumstances surrounding this alleged misconduct or indicate the legal claims arising from it. Plaintiff's second claim asserts that named defendant “Naomi Poole conspired with other to deprive me of a fair trial + custody right by swearing false affidavits.” Id. Again, plaintiff fails to allege any specific circumstances about this claim or indicate any specific legal claims arising from it.
The court therefore concludes that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and RECOMMENDS that this case also be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IV. PLAINTIFF'S REMAINING MOTIONS
In addition to his motion to proceed in forma pauperis [D.E. 1] discussed above, plaintiff has submitted two additional motions for the court's consideration - a “Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Injunctive Relief” [D.E. 10], and a letter attaching twenty-five pages of various records which the court construes as a proposed sealed motion for “immediate protection from serious harm” [D.E. 4]. Absent the above recommendation that these motions be denied as moot, for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that each motion [D.E. 4, 10] be DENIED as frivolous and without merit.
As detailed above, the undersigned recommends this motion [D.E. 4] be placed under seal by order of the court.
In plaintiff's complaint for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and injunctive relief [D.E. 10], filed on July 9, 2021, plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1512, 1513 and Rules 11 and 60. Plaintiff alleges that on April 26, 2021, Naomi Poole fraudulently claimed “to be a domestic violence victim and conspired with District Judge Robin Robinson to commit fraud upon the court by procuring a 50-B order with no credible evidence for the purpose of terrorizing” plaintiff. [D.E. 10] at 1. He states this deprived him of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Constitution of the United States and to a fair trial concerning the custody of his children. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when, on May 26, 2021, Naomi Poole lied to a state magistrate judge regarding plaintiff threatening her, and the judge issued an arrest warrant for plaintiff as a result. Id. Finally, plaintiff alleges that on May 28, 2021, Naomi Poole committed parental kidnapping by moving his minor children to an unknown location, thereby by depriving plaintiff of his time with his children in violation of a state custody order. Id.
Plaintiff provides no further reference for “Rules 11 and 60.”
In his motion [D.E. 10], plaintiff requests two different, yet overlapping, sets of relief. First, Plaintiff requests: (1) “A TRO be issued against Naomi Poole and the New Hanover county Magistrates office directing law enforcement to locate the minor children of [plaintiff] and return to his custody pending final disposition of this case”; and (2) “nullification of NC File 21CR053436 and associated order 21-CV-1282 as acts of fraud on the court so that plaintiff may proceed to issue necessary notifications to Naomi Poole without fear of illegal reprisal . . . .” See [D.E. 10] at 1. Second, Plaintiff requests: (1) relief of a restraining order on the State of North Carolina ordering a stay of all proceedings; (2) custody case no. 18-CVD-1119 be removed to U.S. Courts; (3) immediate custody of the minor children SP, LP and MP, until proceedings decided; and (4) immediate arrest of Naomi Poole for criminal fraud and obstruction of justice and that she be detained until the United States Attorney determines a course of action. Id. at 3.
Although this filing includes allegations occurring after his complaint was filed, it appears to be based largely in the same factual underpinnings as plaintiff's complaint. That is, plaintiff appears to again allege that Naomi Poole conspired with others to: (1) wrongfully, involuntarily confine plaintiff to a mental facility, and (2) to deprive plaintiff of his parental rights to custody of his children and his right to a fair trial through the use of false statements and affidavits. Each of these allegations also appears to be again related to either ongoing or completed state court matters. Id. at 1 (citing to a “50-B order” issued by a state district court, an arrest warrant issued by a state court, documents filed relating to a custody matter pending in state court, and a state court order relating to Plaintiff's custody).
Plaintiff's proposed sealed motion for “immediate protection from serious harm” [D.E. 4] appears to ostensibly provide supporting information for the claims alleged in his complaint. In this motion, plaintiff appears to seek unspecified personal protection for plaintiff and his children as he pursues the claims alleged in his complaint.
Notwithstanding the above recommendation that these motions be denied as moot, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's complaint for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and injunctive relief [D.E. 10] and proposed sealed motion to request immediate protection from serious harm [D.E. 4] be DENIED as frivolous and without merit. Similar to plaintiff's allegations addressed in Section III above, plaintiff's claims here are prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Younger Abstention Doctrine, and plaintiff fails to state any claim upon which relief may be granted.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's complaint [D.E. 1-1] be DISMISSED as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's complaint for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and injunctive relief [D.E. 10], as well as plaintiff's proposed sealed motion to request immediate protection from serious harm [D.E. 4], be DENIED AS MOOT.
Absent the recommendation that the motions [D.E. 4, 10] be denied as moot, the undersigned would still recommend that both motions [D.E. 4, 10] be DENIED as frivolous and without merit for the reasons set forth above.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on plaintiff or, if represented, his counsel. Plaintiff shall have until March 10, 2022 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If plaintiff does not file written objections by the foregoing deadline, plaintiff will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding District Judge as described above, and the presiding District Judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review, subject to the District Judge's consideration of any separate memorandum plaintiff files on the issue of entry of a pre-filing injunction. In addition, plaintiff's failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar plaintiff from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
SO ORDERED.