Ponton v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ

2 Citing cases

  1. Tyska v. Board of Education

    117 Ill. App. 3d 917 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 27 times

    ( Stahelin.) Although the application of equitable estoppel against a public body is generally disfavored and should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances ( Ponton v. Illinois State Board of Education (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 907, 909, 379 N.E.2d 1277), the doctrine may be applied where, under all the facts and circumstances, the acts of the public body have created a situation where it would be inequitable or unjust to permit it to negate what it has done or permitted to be done. Pioneer Processing, Inc.; Stahelin; City of Quincy v. Sturhahn (1960), 18 Ill.2d 604, 165 N.E.2d 271.

  2. Premier Electrical Constr. v. Bd. of Educ

    388 N.E.2d 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 12 times

    Such facts do not support the existence of a contract implied-in-fact. • 4, 5 Premier also contends that because the Board's own failure to review its survey prevented the formal action by the Board, the Board is estopped from claiming that it did not accept Premier's bid. While the doctrine of estoppel may be applied against school boards ( Stahelin v. Board of Education (2d Dist. 1967), 87 Ill. App.2d 28, 39, 230 N.E.2d 465), it should be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances and may not be used to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public ( Ponton v. Illinois State Board of Education (1st Dist. 1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 907, 909, 379 N.E.2d 1277; Anderson v. Board of Trustees (4th Dist. 1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 937, 939, 372 N.E.2d 718). Such extraordinary circumstances do not exist in the instant case.