Opinion
No. 1-17-1336WC
03-09-2018
ABEL PONCE, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, (Classic Party Rental, Appellee).
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 16-L-50413 Honorable Daniel J. Kubasiak, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Harris, and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The Commission did not abuse its discretion in equally apportioning attorney fees in workers' compensation case between law firm originally hired by claimant and successor law firm. ¶ 2 This appeal involves the allocation of attorney fees. Claimant, Abel Ponce, hired the law firm of Kenneth B. Gore, Ltd., n/k/a/ DePaolo, Zadeikis & Gore, Ltd. (DZG firm), to represent him in a workers' compensation claim. Almost two years later, claimant discharged the DZG firm and hired in its stead the Lulay Law Offices (Lulay). Thereafter, the DZG firm filed with the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) a petition for fees and costs pursuant to sections 16 and 16a of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/16, 16a (West 2010)). Claimant's case was eventually settled, with the settlement contract providing for attorney fees in the amount of $4,487.58. In ruling on the DZG firm's petition for fees and costs, the Commission entered an order equally apportioning the attorney fees between the DZG firm and Lulay. On judicial review, the circuit court of Cook County confirmed the decision of the Commission. Lulay now appeals, arguing that the Commission's allocation of fees was erroneous and that the DZG firm was not entitled to any compensation. We affirm.
¶ 3 II. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Claimant alleged that he injured his right knee on June 22, 2011, while working for respondent, Classic Party Rentals. On or about August 26, 2011, claimant retained the DZG firm to represent him in a lawsuit against respondent. On September 15, 2011, the DZG firm filed an application for adjustment of claim on claimant's behalf. In July 2013, claimant hired Lulay to assume representation of his interests in the workers' compensation case. On July 31, 2013, Lulay wrote a letter to the DZG firm informing it of claimant's decision and requesting its cooperation in transferring representation to Lulay. On August 14, 2013, the DZG firm filed with the Commission a petition for fees and costs pursuant to sections 16 and 16a of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16, 16a (West 2010)). ¶ 5 Meanwhile, claimant and respondent executed a settlement contract lump sum petition and order in which they agreed to settle the underlying workers' compensation claim for $22,437.94. The settlement contract provided for attorney fees in the amount of 20% of claimant's award, or $4,487.58. The Commission approved the settlement contract on March 17, 2015. Noting that Lulay and the DZG firm were unable to agree upon a division of the attorney fees, the Commission ordered the attorney fees to be held in Lulay's client trust account until final adjudication or other resolution of the DZG firm's fee petition. Ultimately, the DZG firm's petition for fees proceeded to a hearing before Arbitrator Lynette Thompson-Smith on April 20, 2015. ¶ 6 The sole witness at the hearing was Mark DePaolo of the DZG firm. DePaolo testified that he has been licensed to practice law in Illinois since 1979 and concentrates his practice in the field of workers' compensation law. DePaolo estimated that since 1979, he has tried "hundreds" of workers' compensation cases before the Commission, the circuit court, and the appellate court. DePaolo also recounted that he has been called as an expert witness in workers' compensation cases in the circuit court of Cook County. A fee case recently settled in Cook County set DePaolo's fee at $350 per hour for workers' compensation work. ¶ 7 DePaolo testified that he undertook professional responsibility for claimant's case. DePaolo stated that the DZG firm represented claimant from August 20, 2011, through August 5, 2013. At the time he hired the DZG firm, claimant had already undergone surgery to his right knee and had been returned to light-duty work. Claimant expressed concern that he was not improving as much as he thought he should. ¶ 8 Although DePaolo does not keep records of his time expenditures during the normal course of business, he was able to reconstruct the time expended on the case from notes, correspondence, pleadings, and other materials. To this end, DePaolo executed an affidavit itemizing the time expended on claimant's case while the DZG firm handled claimant's file. DePaolo attached to the affidavit supporting documentation and materials. DePaolo testified that the time accounted for in the affidavit was an "extremely conservative" itemization and included only the "bare minimum" of what he could document. DePaolo stated that he did not include charges for any task which he could not substantiate. ¶ 9 DePaolo documented a total of 12.55 hours on claimant's case. DePaolo testified as follows regarding the time expended on claimant's case. On August 26, 2011, claimant's case was opened. This involved interviewing claimant, preparing the application for adjustment of claim, obtaining medical authorizations, mailing documents, docketing the case in the DZG firm's computer system, and filing documents. DePaolo attributed three hours to these tasks. On September 16, 2011, DePaolo received a computer-generated notice from the Commission that the case was assigned to Arbitrator Brian Cronin. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to entering this information into the DZG firm's computer system. On September 28, 2011, DePaolo received a form letter from the insurance adjuster. He attributed 0.1 hours to reviewing the letter. ¶ 10 On October 4, 2011, DePaolo spent half an hour reviewing claimant's file. He testified that there appeared to be "some difficulty brewing," so medical records and bills were ordered. On October 11, 2011, DePaolo, with the assistance of a translator, spoke by telephone with claimant. Claimant was still working light duty but described increasing difficulty with his knee. Claimant questioned whether the light-duty job he was performing was within his physical restrictions. DePaolo advised claimant of respondent's obligation under the law to provide light-duty work within claimant's issued restrictions. Claimant reiterated his concerns in a telephone call on December 1, 2011. DePaolo attributed 0.3 hours to these telephone calls. ¶ 11 On December 22, 2011, the insurance adjuster contacted DePaolo to advise him that claimant had missed eight sessions of physical therapy. According to DePaolo, the adjuster made "the typical veiled threats" regarding terminating claimant's benefits. DePaolo contacted claimant, who explained that he had missed physical therapy due to a lack of transportation. At that time, DePaolo obtained a commitment from claimant to attend physical therapy. DePaolo then called the adjuster to tell her that claimant would attend physical therapy. DePaolo attributed 0.25 hours to these telephone calls. ¶ 12 By February 9, 2012, DePaolo had received claimant's medical records. Based upon his review of those records, DePaolo did not believe the case was going very well. As a result, DePaolo had a medical chronology prepared. DePaolo attributed 0.5 hours to the review of the medical chronology. On March 13, 2012, DePaolo spoke by telephone with claimant. Claimant informed DePaolo that his treating physician indicated that he would need a second surgery. DePaolo did not have this information from the physician, so he requested updated medical records. On March 15, 2012, claimant's medical chronology was updated. DePaolo attributed 0.2 hours to speaking with claimant and requesting his updated medical records on March 13, 2012, and another 0.2 hours to updating the medical chronology on March 15, 2012. On April 11, 2012, the adjuster notified DePaolo that it was scheduling an independent medical examination (IME) for claimant with Dr. Mark Hutchinson. On April 12, 2012, DePaolo called claimant to explain the IME process. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to the communication with the adjuster on April 11, 2012, and another 0.1 hours to the telephone call on April 12, 2012. ¶ 13 DePaolo later learned that claimant's surgery would not be authorized. Accordingly, on May 14, 2012, DePaolo sent correspondence to the adjuster and requested a hearing before Arbitrator Cronin at the Commission's July 5, 2012, call date. DePaolo attributed 0.2 hours to these tasks. On May 17, 2012, DePaolo received an appearance from respondent's law firm, Power & Cronin. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to reviewing the appearance from respondent's law firm. ¶ 14 On June 5, 2012, DePaolo had a telephone conversation with claimant's treating physician. The physician told DePaolo that claimant's surgery was denied in response to the IME. DePaolo had yet to receive the IME report, so he contacted the adjuster. The adjuster claimed that DePaolo knew about the IME. DePaolo requested the IME from the adjuster. DePaolo attributed 0.25 hours to these communications. ¶ 15 On June 7, 2012, DePaolo spoke with claimant by telephone to confirm that he wanted the surgery recommended by his treating physician. In addition, DePaolo called the adjuster to again request the IME report. DePaolo attributed 0.25 hours to these telephone calls. DePaolo testified that it looked like claimant's case would be going to trial, so on June 7, 2012, he also reviewed the record to determine which exhibits he wanted to submit. DePaolo attributed 0.25 hours to the record review. On June 14, 2012, DePaolo sent medical records to the insurer at its request. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to this work. ¶ 16 On June 15, 2012, DePaolo received the IME report. After reviewing the report, DePaolo sent it to claimant's treating physician for his opinion. DePaolo then called claimant to update him on the status of the case. DePaolo attributed 0.25 hours to these tasks. On June 25, 2012, DePaolo forwarded records to claimant's treating physician. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to this task. ¶ 17 On July 5, 2012, claimant's bills were "updated because it looked like they were not being paid correctly." DePaolo attributed 0.25 hours to this task. Also on July 5, 2012, the parties appeared before Arbitrator Cronin. At that time, the arbitrator indicated that he had to recuse himself because his brother is a partner in Power & Cronin, respondent's law firm. DePaolo testified that he and the attorney for respondent's law firm agreed to waive the conflict, but the arbitrator stated he would be uncomfortable proceeding and that he would enter an order of recusal. DePaolo attributed 0.25 hours to the appearance before Arbitrator Cronin. ¶ 18 On July 25, 2012, DePaolo received a utilization review report from respondent's law firm. DePaolo reviewed the report and determined that it was not certified, it did not appear to comply with peer-review, and it had not been performed by an orthopedic surgeon. DePaolo attributed 0.2 hours to examining the utilization review report. On August 6, 2012, DePaolo wrote a letter to opposing counsel noting the deficiencies in the utilization review report and informing counsel that he was filing a petition for penalties on the matter (see 820 ILCS 305/16, 19(k), 19(l) (West 2010)) because he felt that their continued refusal to authorize surgery was unreasonable. Also on August 6, 2012, DePaolo filed a petition for medical care pursuant to section 8(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2010)) and a petition for immediate hearing pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2010)). DePaolo attributed 0.25 hours to these tasks. On August 15, 2012, DePaolo received a response to the section 19(b) petition from opposing counsel. DePaolo spent 0.1 hours reviewing the response. Also on August 15, 2012, DePaolo wrote a letter to opposing counsel. DePaolo spent 0.1 hours drafting the letter. ¶ 19 On August 23, 2012, DePaolo received notice for a second IME with Dr. Hutchinson. After reviewing the document, DePaolo provided notice of the IME to claimant and forwarded the expense check to him. DePaolo attributed 0.2 hours to accomplishing these tasks. On September 4, 2012, DePaolo spoke by telephone to attorney Andrew Luther of Power & Cronin. DePaolo attributed 0.2 hours to the phone call. Luther informed DePaolo that Dr. Hutchinson felt that claimant had failed to exhaust conservative care and recommended further physical therapy instead of surgery. At that time, Arbitrator Cronin was still assigned to the case even though DePaolo had motioned the case for hearing. DePaolo testified that he felt "trapped *** between two things." He explained that he did not believe that an independent medical examiner should take control of a claimant's treatment, but because the case had not been reassigned, the trial could not proceed. ¶ 20 On September 21, 2012, DePaolo spoke to opposing counsel by telephone. Opposing counsel told DePaolo that physical therapy would be authorized. DePaolo attributed 0.2 hours to this conversation. On September 25, 2012, DePaolo received a notice of recusal from Arbitrator Cronin. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to reviewing the notice. Also on September 25, 2012, DePaolo talked to the treating physician regarding whether physical therapy would be in claimant's best interest. Ultimately, the treating physician agreed to physical therapy. DePaolo attributed 0.25 hours to his contact with the treating physician. On October 11, 2012, DePaolo spoke with claimant and noted that he was starting physical therapy. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to this conversation. On December 10, 2012, DePaolo requested updated medical records because claimant had just completed physical therapy. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to this task. ¶ 21 On January 28, 2013, DePaolo received a motion for trial from opposing counsel. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to reviewing the motion. On January 30, 2013, DePaolo received another motion for trial. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to reviewing the document. On February 12, 2013, DePaolo wrote a letter to opposing counsel noting that the additional physical therapy had failed and demanding authorization for surgery. DePaolo attributed 0.2 hours to preparation of the letter. ¶ 22 On March 7, 2013, DePaolo had a telephone conversation with claimant. At that time, claimant continued to have significant complaints and requested surgery. Moreover, according to DePaolo, claimant seemed distraught and in the need of counseling. DePaolo attributed 0.2 hours to this conversation. On March 18, 2013, DePaolo received another IME notice from opposing counsel for an examination with Dr. Hutchinson. In response, DePaolo notified claimant and forwarded him an expense check. DePaolo attributed 0.2 hours to these tasks. On April 1, 2013, DePaolo followed up with claimant to ensure that he attended the IME. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to this task. On May 1, 2013, DePaolo contacted opposing counsel because he had yet to receive the IME report. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to this task. On June 10, 2013, DePaolo received and reviewed the IME report from Dr. Hutchinson. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to this task. ¶ 23 On July 16, 2013, DePaolo drafted a letter to opposing counsel after opposing counsel, in a letter dated June 7, 2013, had requested "a settlement demand." DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to that task. DePaolo noted that the Commission still showed Arbitrator Cronin as the arbitrator on the case. Accordingly, on July 25, 2013, opposing counsel, with DePaolo's agreement, drafted a letter to Arbitrator Cronin requesting another recusal order so that the matter could be reassigned and the parties could obtain a trial date. DePaolo attributed 0.2 hours to this work. On July 29, 2013, DePaolo received a second notice of recusal from Arbitrator Cronin. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to the review of that document. On July 30, 2013, DePaolo was notified that the case was reassigned to Arbitrator Thompson-Smith. DePaolo attributed 0.1 hours to reviewing the notice. On August 5, 2013, DePaolo received correspondence dated July 31, 2013, from Lulay indicating that claimant wished to discharge the DZG firm. DePaolo stated that the DZG firm never received any payment for the time worked on claimant's workers' compensation case. ¶ 24 On cross-examination, Lulay had DePaolo review each of the dates on the affidavit and indicate which of the corresponding tasks he personally performed. DePaolo testified that even if he did not personally perform a particular task, it was done under his direction, control, and supervision. For instance, DePaolo admitted making some of the telephone calls documented in his affidavit, but was unable to recall whether he made each individual phone call listed or whether someone from his office made the call at his direction. He also explained that his assistant prepares the medical chronology, but he reviews it for accuracy. Lulay also extensively questioned DePaolo regarding his strategy for handling claimant's case. For instance, Lulay repeatedly asked DePaolo how his decisions established that he was pursuing a course of surgery for claimant. ¶ 25 The arbitrator, citing Alvarado v. Industrial Comm'n, 216 Ill. 2d 547 (2005), determined that she lacked jurisdiction over the petition for fees and that the matter should have been heard by a Commissioner. In an order entered May 27, 2016, the Commission ordered that the attorney fees be apportioned equally between the DZG firm and Lulay. In support of its finding, the Commission explained as follows:
"In the Affidavit filed by Attorney DePaolo, *** he purports to 'conservatively' reconstruct 10.55 hours [sic] of time spent in the preparation and prosecution of [claimant's] case against respondent Classic Party Rentals. At hearing Attorney DePaolo was extensively examined by his counsel and cross-examined by *** Attorney Lulay. The Commission notes that Attorney DePaolo was frustrated in his ability to move the case forward by a delay in arbitrator reassignment after Arbitrator Brian Cronin recused himself from the case due to being related to a partner in the law firm that represented respondent in the underlying case. The matter was eventually assigned to Arbitrator Lynette Thompson-Smith.
Attorney Lulay defends against the fee petition asserting that no value or benefit inured to [claimant] as the result of Attorney DePaolo's representation and that therefore his fee petition is without merit. Nevertheless, by June 7, 2013, Attorney DePaolo had moved the matter forward to the point where respondent's counsel in the underlying matter wrote to Attorney DePaolo soliciting a settlement demand in hopes of resolving the claim.
Lulay Law Offices filed their [sic] substitution of attorneys and undertook professional responsibility for the file on July 31, 2013. The underlying case was settled 20 months later on March 17, 2015.
Having carefully reviewed the pleadings, the transcript of hearing on the fee petition conducted April 20, 2015, and the exhibits admitted into evidence, it appears that
Attorney DePaolo and Attorney Lulay spent approximately the same amount of time in the matter."The Commission ordered that Lulay pay to the DZG firm the sum of $2,243.79, representing half of the attorney fees received in this matter. On judicial review, the circuit court of Cook County confirmed the decision of the Commission. This appeal ensued.
Although the record contains an entry on the Commission's docket regarding the filing of the fee petition, a copy of the petition itself was not made part of the record on appeal.
In an affidavit, DePaolo stated that his billing rate was set at $300 per hour. He clarified at the hearing that it was actually $350 per hour.
Although DePaolo testified that a total of 12.55 hours was spent on claimant's case and the total time documented in DePaolo's affidavit is listed as 12.55 hours, a calculation of the time spent on each individual task listed in the affidavit actually yields a total of 10.75 hours. --------
¶ 26 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 On appeal, Attorney Lulay argues that the Commission erred in apportioning the attorney fees equally between his firm and the DZG firm. As a threshold matter, the parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review. Lulay contends that the standard of review applicable to the Commission's award of attorney fees is the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. The DZG firm asserts that the Commission's award of attorney fees should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. ¶ 28 In DeSalvo v. Industrial Comm'n, 307 Ill. App. 3d 628, 633-34 (1999), this court noted that the reported decisions on attorney fee awards in workers' compensation cases have utilized both the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard and the abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., Stephens v. Industrial Comm'n, 284 Ill. App. 3d 269, 275 (1996) (determining that the reasonableness of the amount of attorney fees is a question of fact which will not be overturned unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence); Augustine v. Industrial Comm'n, 239 Ill. App. 3d 561, 573-74 (1992) (holding that an award of attorney fees under section 16a(B) of the Act was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, but also stating that there was nothing in the record to show that the Commission abused its discretion in setting attorney fees); Spinak, Levinson & Associates v. Industrial Comm'n, 209 Ill. App. 3d 120, 127 (1990) (concluding that Commission did not abuse its discretion in determining counsel was not entitled to an award for extraordinary services). Observing, however, that the abuse-of-discretion standard is generally applied to a review of judicially awarded attorney fees in other contexts, we found the abuse-of-discretion standard applicable in the workers' compensation field as well. DeSalvo, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 633-34 (citing various cases, including In re Marriage of Minear, 181 Ill. 2d 552, 562 (1998) (dissolution of marriage proceeding), Raintree Health Care Center v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 173 Ill. 2d 469, 494 (1996) (human rights action); Pitts v. Holt, 304 Ill. App. 3d 871, 872 (eviction proceeding)). We acknowledged that "there may be disputed questions of fact in connection with the award of attorney fees," but concluded that the issue of attorney fees is more properly judged on an abuse-of-discretion standard. DeSalvo, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 634; see also Spinak, Levinson & Associates, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 127. ¶ 29 We see no reason to depart from our holding in DeSalvo. Indeed, we question the continuing viability of the Augustine and Stephens cases referenced in DeSalvo, which purport to apply the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. In this regard, we note that the precise standard of review applied in Augustine is not clear. Although the Augustine court initially states in its analysis that the award of attorney fees to claimant's counsel was "not against the manifest weight of the evidence," it later states that nothing in the record suggests that the Commission "abused its discretion" in setting the award of attorney fees. Augustine, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 574. Moreover, the case cited by the Augustine court in support of the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, Paganelis v. Industrial Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 468, 483-84 (1989), is not an attorney-fees case. While Stephens is less ambiguous—it clearly applies the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard—it relies on Augustine as its sole authority for that standard. Stephens, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 275. Additionally, neither Augustine nor Stephens provide any analysis in support of their use of the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. In contrast, the DeSalvo court found the abuse-of-discretion standard appropriate by examining how Illinois courts reviewed attorney fee cases in other contexts. See Clay v. County of Cook, 325 Ill. App. 3d 893, 899 (2001) (rejecting Augustine and Stephens in part because they provide no analysis in support of the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard). Given the foregoing, we agree with the DZG firm that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to a review of the Commission's award of attorney fees in this case. An abuse of discretion occurs when the Commission's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the Commission. Oliver v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2015 IL App (1st) 143836WC, ¶ 50. We now turn to the merits. ¶ 30 Under Illinois law, a client may discharge his attorney at any time, with or without cause. Rhoades v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 78 Ill. 2d 217, 227-28 (1979). An attorney who enters into a contingent fee agreement with a client and is later discharged is entitled to payment based on a theory of quantum meruit as a reasonable fee for services rendered prior to discharge. Rhoades, 78 Ill. 2d at 227-30. The factors in determining reasonable attorney fees under the doctrine of quantum meruit include the time and labor required in a case, the attorney's skill and standing, the nature of the cause and the novelty and difficulty of the subject matter, the degree of responsibility in managing the cause, the usual and customary charge in the community, and the benefits resulting to the client. Johns v. Klecan, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1019 (1990). ¶ 31 Lulay disputes the Commission's decision to equally apportion the attorney fees in this case. Initially, Lulay asserts that the Commission did not apply the factors set forth in Johns in assessing the value, if any, of the DZG firm's services. Rather, Lulay contends, the Commission apportioned the attorney fees in this case by comparing the amount of time each firm spent on claimant's case. Lulay argues this approach was improper because there was no evidence presented of the work done by his firm and because Illinois law precludes courts from apportioning fees using the so-called "comparison/apportionment approach." ¶ 32 Although the Commission did not expressly discuss each of the Johns factors, Lulay cites no authority for the proposition that it is required to do so. Further, Lulay has not provided any evidence from the record establishing that the Commission failed to consider any of the Johns factors. To the contrary, the Commission states in its decision that it had reviewed the complete hearing transcript and the pleadings filed on behalf of both of the parties. Among those pleadings is a document filed by Lulay entitled "Motion to Adjudicate/Dismiss Prior Petitioner's Attorney's Claim for Attorney Fees." In that motion, Lulay expressly discusses the doctrine of quantum meruit and the Johns factors. ¶ 33 Moreover, at the hearing in this matter, DePaolo's testimony touched upon the Johns factors. DePaolo testified regarding his skills and standing as well as the usual and customary charge in the community. He stated that he has been licensed to practice law in Illinois since 1979 and concentrates his practice in the field of workers' compensation. DePaolo estimated that since 1979, he has tried "hundreds" of workers' compensation cases before the Commission, the circuit court, and the appellate court. DePaolo noted that he has been called as an expert witness in workers' compensation cases in the circuit court of Cook County. He also observed that a fee case recently settled in Cook County set his fee at $350 per hour for workers' compensation work. ¶ 34 In addition, there was evidence regarding the time and labor expended on claimant's case, the nature of the cause, the novelty and difficulty of the subject matter, and the degree of responsibility in managing the case. In this regard, DePaolo observed that the DZG firm represented claimant for approximately 23 months. During this time, DePaolo took professional responsibility for claimant's file. DePaolo noted that at the time claimant hired the DZG firm, he had already undergone surgery to his right knee and had been returned to light-duty work, but had expressed concern that he was not improving as much as he should have. DePaolo testified that he does not keep records of his time expenditures during the normal course of business, but he was able to reconstruct the time expended on claimant's case from notes, correspondence, pleadings, and other materials. Although DePaolo's affidavit and testimony established that the DZG firm spent 10.75 hours on claimant's case, DePaolo categorized this as an "extremely conservative" itemization including only the "bare minimum" of what he could document. DePaolo noted, for instance, that he did not bill for tasks that he could not substantiate. DePaolo then testified regarding each time entry on his affidavit. DePaolo testified that each task on the affidavit was performed by him personally or under his direction, control, and supervision. Among the tasks identified by DePaolo were interviewing claimant, completing the application for adjustment of claim, obtaining medical authorizations, mailing documents, docketing the case in the DZG firm's computer system, filing documents, reviewing claimant's file, updating claimant regarding the status of the case, communicating with the adjuster and opposing counsel, preparing a medical chronology, and appearing before the arbitrator. The Commission also observed that DePaolo encountered difficulty in moving the case forward due to a delay in getting the case reassigned after Arbitrator Cronin recused himself. In addition, the Commission addressed whether claimant derived any value or benefit as a result of the DZG firm's representation. Specifically, the Commission pointed out that by June 7, 2013, DePaolo had moved the matter forward to the point where respondent's counsel in the underlying matter wrote to DePaolo soliciting a settlement demand in the hope of resolving the claim. ¶ 35 As the evidence set forth above demonstrates, even if the Commission did not expressly discuss each of the Johns factors, the Commission had before it substantial relevant information and it reviewed that information under the standards established in Johns. In light of the foregoing, we cannot say that the Commission's award of attorney fees in this case was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the Commission. Accordingly, we find that the Commission's decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion. ¶ 36 Despite the foregoing, Lulay insists that the DZG firm's services did not benefit claimant. In this regard, Lulay contends that the DZG firm failed to pursue claimant's surgery, opting instead to negotiate a settlement against claimant's wishes. However, there is nothing in the record to support Lulay's contention that the DZG firm ignored claimant's desire for surgery. DePaolo was keenly aware of claimant's desire for surgery as evidenced by his communications with claimant and claimant's treating physician. DePaolo testified, however, that he encountered difficulty in moving the case forward due to a delay in getting the case reassigned after Arbitrator Cronin recused himself. DePaolo explained that opposing counsel wanted to move forward with conservative treatment in the form of physical therapy as recommended by Dr. Hutchinson, the independent medical examiner. Although DePaolo did not believe that an independent medical examiner should take control of a claimant's treatment, he testified that he could not proceed to trial because the case had not been assigned to a new arbitrator. Lulay also ignores DePaolo's letter to opposing counsel after the course of physical therapy proved unsuccessful, in which he demanded authorization for surgery. In short, the record does not support Lulay's contention that the DZG firm ignored claimant's desire for surgery. ¶ 37 Lulay also claims that the Commission improperly apportioned attorney fees by comparing the amount of time each firm spent on claimant's case. Lulay's position in this regard is twofold. First, Lulay argues this approach was improper because there was no evidence presented of the work done by it. Second, citing Susan E. Loggans & Associates v. Estate of Magid, 226 Ill. App. 3d 147 (1992), Lulay contends that Illinois law precludes courts from apportioning fees using the so-called "comparison/apportionment approach." Regarding Lulay's former argument, we note that Attorney Lulay specifically stated at the hearing on the fee petition that he was offering certain evidence "to show the work that [he] did on the file." To this end, he introduced correspondence between him and respondent's attorney regarding the efforts he expended in this case, including a demand for surgery. Obviously, these documents do not account for all of the work performed by Lulay on claimant's case. Nevertheless, they refute Lulay's claim that there was no evidence in the record of the work done by him. Regarding Lulay's second argument, we initially note that while the Loggans court did express a preference for the method articulated in Johns for determining attorney fees for a fired lawyer, it does not stand for the proposition that Lulay is entitled to the entire attorney fee award. Susan E. Loggans & Associates, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 161-65. In any event, to the extent that it would be improper for the Commission to consider the amount of time each law firm spent on claimant's case, we emphasize that we review the result to which the Commission came rather than its reasoning and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. General Motors Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 179 Ill. App. 3d 683, 695 (1989). As noted above, the Commission had substantial relevant information before it and reviewed that information under the standards established in Johns. Accordingly, we find no error on this basis. ¶ 38 Lulay next contends that the DZG firm did not perform any substantive legal work or advocacy towards resolving claimant's case. According to Lulay, the work performed by the DZG firm was "purely reactive" in that it never initiated any affirmative efforts, but only responded to IME notices, letters from opposing counsel, and defense motions. However, Lulay's suggestion that the DZG firm simply bided its time waiting for a settlement offer is contradicted by the evidence of record. The DZG firm initiated claimant's case in August 2011 by interviewing claimant, completing his application for adjustment of claim, and obtaining medical authorizations. The case was assigned to Arbitrator Cronin. As the case was progressing, claimant was receiving conservative treatment. Indeed, DePaolo's intervention prevented the adjuster from withholding benefits based on non-compliance with therapy, secured authorization for additional therapy, and ensured that the case was reassigned to another arbitrator so that the parties could move the matter to trial. Moreover, DePaolo, unhappy with the progress of the case, filed a petition for medical care pursuant to section 8(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2010)), a petition for immediate hearing pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2010)), a petition for fees pursuant to section 16 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16 (West 2010)), and a petition for penalties under sections 19(k) and 19(l) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(k), (l) (West 2010)). In February 2013, DePaolo wrote a letter to opposing counsel noting that conservative treatment had failed and requesting authorization for surgery. In July 2013, DePaolo responded to opposing counsel's request to commence negotiations. The record also contains evidence that DePaolo communicated with claimant and claimant's treating physician regarding the status of his case. In short, the evidence belies Lulay's argument that the work performed by the DZG firm was "purely reactive." ¶ 39 Lulay also complains that the 10 hours of work claimed by the DZG firm cannot be attributed to an attorney because neither the affidavit nor DePaolo's testimony makes it evident who performed any of the work. However, DePaolo testified on cross-examination that all of the time entries on the affidavit were work that he personally performed or were performed under his direction, control, and supervision. Lulay cites no authority for the proposition that work done by a law firm's staff is not compensable. See Ashby v. Price, 112 Ill. App. 3d 114, 122-23 (1983) (finding that attorney was entitled to compensation for his services and services of his associates). Lulay also notes that counsel for DePaolo claimed a rate of $350 per hour, but contends this cannot be paid for support staff time. Although Attorney Lulay questioned DePaolo on cross-examination regarding the context of the fee award used to establish the $350 hourly fee, he never challenged the hourly fee as unreasonable. In any event, a calculation of the attorney fee award divided by the number of hours claimed by DePaolo reveals an hourly wage much lower than $350 ($2,243.79/10.75 hours=$208.72 per hour). Moreover, DePaolo testified that the hours documented were extremely conservative, thereby netting a lower hourly rate. ¶ 40 Finally, Lulay argues that the Act prescribes that an attorney practicing before the Commission can only be paid a fee if his services "resulted in actual compensation to the [claimant]" by "resolving a disputed matter." Lulay maintains that the DZG firm did neither and therefore cannot collect a fee. However, as the Commission determined, the DZG firm moved the matter forward to the point where respondent's counsel in the underlying matter wrote to DePaolo soliciting a settlement demand in the hope of resolving the claim. In fact, the claim was eventually settled by Lulay. A reasonable person could conclude DePaolo's work provided the basis for this settlement. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the DZG firm's efforts did not result in actual compensation to claimant. Accordingly, we reject Lulay's argument on this point.
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County which confirmed the decision of the Commission equally apportioning the attorney fees in this case between the DZG firm and Lulay. ¶ 43 Affirmed.