Although all divisions of circuit court have concurrent jurisdiction in juvenile matters, it is the intent of the law to encourage coordination among divisions, not conflict. Ponce v. Children's Home Society, 97 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1957). (b) Allows transfer prior to adjudication where witnesses reside in another part of the state, thereby avoiding hardship and excessive costs.
Here, the court had subject matter jurisdiction as it is without question that the circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all adoption matters. See § 63.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (“[A] proceeding for adoption may be commenced by filing a petition ... in the circuit court.”); see also, e.g., Ponce v. Children's Home Soc'y, 97 So.2d 194, 197 (Fla.1957) ; Dep't of Health, Office of Vital Statistics v. Adoption of Gilli, 746 So.2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Likewise, we disagree that the judgment of adoption is void. “A void judgment is so defective that it is deemed never to have had legal force and effect.
"* * * As a general rule where a juvenile court has assumed jurisdiction over a dependent child as in the case at bar, a circuit court judge, although he may have the power to do so, should not entertain a petition for adoption of such child until the juvenile court has made a permanent commitment of the child to a licensed placement agency pursuant to Sec. 39.11, or otherwise relinquished jurisdiction." Ponce v. Children's Home Society of Florida, (Fla. 1957) 97 So.2d 194, 197; See also Perdue v. Perdue, (Fla.App. 1963) 155 So.2d 665. It is our view that for the reasons hereinabove stated the Circuit Court of Duval County has the jurisdiction and authority to render the judgment appealed herein even though the children involved stand permanently committed on the record to a licensed child placing agency for subsequent adoption.
"7. That the paramount issue before this Court is the best interests of the child sought to be adopted. From the evidence produced before this Court, it appears without question that the Petitioners were devoted to this child during the entire time they had custody of him; that they afforded him as much care and attention as could have been expected of natural parents and that this care and attention was obviously given, not for the financial return which the Petitioners expected to receive from the Department, but on account of their love for the child; that from the evidence produced before this Court, it appears that it would be contrary to the best interests of this child to deny the petitioners the right to legally adopt him." See Ponce v. Children's Home Society of Florida, Fla. 1957, 97 So.2d 194; In Re McDonald's Adoption, 1954, 43 Cal.2d 447, 274 P.2d 860. The record shows that the court below carefully considered the contentions raised by respondent-appellant and took the best interests of the child, Baby Boy Byrd, as the paramount issue before it. The trial court, after careful consideration, granted the petition for adoption allowing the petitioners to adopt the said minor child.
Furthermore, adoption proceedings are entirely separate and distinct statutory proceedings and are neither connected with nor controlled by prior custody awards entered by another court. Modacsi v. Taylor, Fla.App. 1958, 104 So.2d 664. In Ponce v. Children's Home Society of Florida, Fla. 1957, 97 So.2d 194, an infant child had been adjudged dependent by a juvenile court and committed temporarily to the Children's Home Society of Florida. Subsequently the Ponces filed a petition for adoption in the circuit court.
Cf. Conrad v. Rose, Fla.App. 1965, 173 So.2d 762 (juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine whether child was dependent to extent of not receiving proper legal support under out-of-state custody-support order). See also Ponce v. Children's Home Society of Florida, Fla. 1957, 97 So.2d 194, 197: "While there is no doubt of the jurisdiction of circuit court over adoption, great caution should be observed by a circuit judge in the exercise of that jurisdiction to see that there is no conflict between his court and that of the juvenile court with respect to dependent children. As a general rule where a juvenile court has assumed jurisdiction over a dependent child * * * a circuit court judge, although he may have the power to do so, should not entertain a petition for adoption of such child until the juvenile court has made a permanent commitment of the child to a licensed placement agency * * * or otherwise relinquished jurisdiction.
The defendant in both his answer and his counterclaim raises this issue of lack of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court over the persons of the said children and further alleges in his answer that there has been no change in the circumstances of the parties that would warrant a change or modification of the Juvenile Court's awarding to him of the custody of the children. In our opinion, the instant case is governed by the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Ponce v. Children's Home Society of Florida, 97 So.2d 194 (1957), involving an analogous situation. In that case a husband and wife, in whose home a dependent child had been placed for care by a child placement agency, filed a petition in the circuit court to adopt the child.