POLOTAYE v. STAMFORD ZBA

Full title: WILLIAM F. POLOTAYE et al. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF…

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford

Date published: Sep 6, 2011

2011 Ct. Sup. 19289 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011)

Opinion

No. FST CV 08-4015507 S

September 6, 2011

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

KEVIN TIERNEY, Judge Trial Referee.

This is an administrative appeal to the Superior Court from the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford upholding the issuance of a zoning permit by the Stamford Zoning Enforcement Officer. The zoning permit was issued to the defendant, the City of Stamford, for the construction of improvements to a municipally-owned park known as West Beach Park, which included the conversion of two existing natural turf athletic fields to artificial turf and the reconstruction and repaving of one parking lot. Return of Record #3, #10 and #24. A substantial amount of time was spent at the four trial days concerning the format, accuracy and completeness of the Return of Record in this case as well as Return of Record in the companion Zoning Board administrative appeal, FST CV 08-4015041 S. In May 2009 the court ordered that both appeals be consolidated and a single brief be filed in both administrative appeals. A separate Memorandum of Decision has been issued in the companion Zoning Board administrative appeal.

The first named plaintiff, William F. Polotaye, testified and offered his property deed as well as two versions of a subdivision map. Trial Exhibits: Ex. 1, Ex. 2 and Ex. 3. Ex. 2 was a certified copy of the subdivision map recorded in the Stamford land records. Ex. 3 was a blown-up version of Ex. 2 with Mr. Polotaye's property colored yellow adjacent to West Beach Park colored green. His property is immediately adjacent to West Beach Park but over 600 feet from the area of proposed park improvements. He testified that he has been the owner of his property continuously since 1977. In paragraph 10 of his complaint he claims statutory aggrievement as an abutter. The court finds that William F. Polotaye is statutorily aggrieved. "In the case of a decision by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, `aggrieved person' includes any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board." Gen. Stat. § 8-8(a)(1); Caltabiano v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 662, 663, 670 (1989).

There are only nine plaintiffs in this Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) administrative appeal. The other eight named plaintiffs are Rosalie Mastropaolo, Giuseppe Masone, Angela Masone, Mimoza E. Noga, Pjerin Noga, Mark Blechman, Miralley Blecbman and MM Shippan, LLC. In paragraphs 10 and 11 of their complaint these eight plaintiffs claim both statutory aggrievement and classical aggrievement. None of the above plaintiffs testified during the trial. Karen Murphy, who is a named plaintiff in the companion case, FST CV 08-4015041 S, testified. She testified that she owns property at 68 Saddle Rock Road, Stamford, Connecticut located one mile from West Beach Park. Karen Murphy is not a named plaintiff in the summons of this instant case nor in the December 9, 2008 complaint itself although she claims in the Appeal to the Zoning Board of Appeals, Schedule A paragraph 2, that she is "an intervenor in the proceedings before this Zoning Board of Appeals as well. Karen Murphy is an aggrieved persons entitled to bring this appeal because she is an intervenor in this proceeding before this Board under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-19, and her use of West Beach Park, which is greater than that of most residents of the City of Stamford, has been specially and injuriously affected by the decisions of the ZEO."

The testimony of Karen Murphy and the trial exhibits that she offered in support of that testimony attempted to show that the above named eight plaintiffs all own property abutting West Beach Park. Trial Ex. 4 is entitled "Abutters Report;" colored in yellow are the names of the eight plaintiffs. Ex. 5 is a similar report with similar yellow markings which appears to be dated July 19, 2010, the day before the trial commenced. Karen Murphy testified that she obtained Ex. 4 and Ex. 5 from the City of Stamford Assessor's office and she marked them in yellow. Ex. 6A, Ex. 6B, Ex. 6C, Ex. 6D, and Ex. 6E are certified copies of deeds in the names of the eight plaintiffs each with the certificate dated July 19, 2010 issued by the Town Clerk of the City of Stamford. These five deeds were respectively dated October 17, 1997, October 4, 1966, July 20, 2000, July 20, 1999 and June 23, 1999. Ex. 7 is a map prepared by Karen Murphy purportedly showing the location of the properties of the eight plaintiffs. West Beach Park is marked yellow and some residential properties adjacent to West Beach Park are marked pink. The individual residential properties of the plaintiffs are not delineated in Ex. 7. Ex. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are maps that have been colored showing respectively the individual properties of Rosalie Mastropaolo, Giuseppe and Angela Masone, Mimoza E. and Pjerin Noga, Mark B. and Miralle Y. Blechman and MM Shippan, LLC. The Blechmans names slightly vary in the deed and complaint. Ex. 9 and Ex. 10 are copies of the same subdivision map as Ex. 2 and Ex. 3 with West Beach Park in green and certain lot numbers in yellow for the Noga and Masone lots. The other three maps are site plans recorded in the Stamford land records with West Beach Park in green, the property borders in orange and on Ex. 8 a house or condominium building in yellow. These site plans appear to conform to the legal descriptions contained in the five Ex. 6 deeds. Ex. 13 are certified copies of five field cards from the City of Stamford Assessor's office. The print date of each field card is September 23, 2010. These five field cards contain an address and the names of the eight plaintiffs under the section "CURRENT OWNER" "Giuseppe Masone TR and Angela Masone TR" is listed as "Current Owner" of 64 Rippowam Road. This court finds that TR means Trustee. Exhibits 1 through 13 were also offered at trial in the companion consolidated Zoning Board administrative appeal, FST CV 08-4015041 S.

The plaintiffs have the burden of proving aggrievement. Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493 (1978). These eight named plaintiffs, in order to establish statutory aggrievement, must demonstrate the continuing ownership of "land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board." Gen. Stat. § 8-8(a)(1); Goldfeld v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Greenwich, 3 Conn.App. 172, 177 (1985); Pollio v. Conservation Commission, 32 Conn.App. 109, 113 (1993). "In order to retain standing as an aggrieved person, a party must have and must maintain a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the appeal throughout the course of the administrative appeal." Id. 113; Bethlehem Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 58 Conn.App. 441, 444 (2000); Craig v. Maher, 170, Conn. 8, 9 (1977) ("sustain that interest throughout the course of the appeal.")

It would appear simple for the above named eight plaintiffs to prove statutory aggrievement. They would come to court on any of the initial trial days July 20, 2010, September 24, 2010, and November 10, 2010 and testify that they have continuously owned real property abutting West Beach Park from the date of the commencement of the zoning proceedings to the date of trial. The plaintiff, William F. Polotaye, did just that and the court has found him statutorily aggrieved. For some reason, neither offered nor explained to this court, none of the other eight plaintiffs appeared in court ready to testify. The deeds only show ownership at one point in time. The assessor's records are insufficient to establish continuing ownership of the abutting property. The Masones apparently transferred their property to a Trust, a separate entity that is not a party to this administrative appeal. In Pollio v. Conservation Commission, the court examined the title documents submitted and those documents did not show continuing ownership throughout the application and appeal process. Id. 115. So to the documents in evidence only demonstrate ownership at best at two points in time, not the continuous ownership necessary to establish statutory aggrievement. The court finds that the eight plaintiffs, Rosalie Mastropaolo, Giuseppe Masone, Angela Masone, Mimoza E. Noga, Pjerin Noga, Mark Blechman, Miralley Blackman and MM Shippan, LLC are not statutorily aggrieved in accordance with Gen. Stat. § 8-8(a)(1). Crawford v. Ledyard Zoning Board of Appeals, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket Number CV 09-5013858 (March 1, 2011, Purtill, J.T.R.).

These eight plaintiffs allege statutory aggrievement because they claim to be "owners of land that abuts or is within a radius of 100 feet of the land involved in the decisions of the Board," in the December 9, 2008 complaint. They did not allege aggrievement by reason of any other statute including the environmental intervenor statute, Gen. Stat. § 22a-19. These eight plaintiffs cannot be aggrieved under the environmental intervenor statute because: (1) aggrievement on this ground has been rejected by appellate courts; Jaeger v. Connecticut Siting Council, 52 Conn.Sup. 14, 25 affirmed 128 Conn.App. 243 (2011); (2) the plaintiffs have not alleged such a statutory standing in this appeal to the Superior Court; (3) the plaintiffs have not claimed such statutory standing in their briefs; (4) the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they filed a "verified pleading" as required by Gen. Stat. § 22a-19(a); and (5) these eight plaintiffs admitted in pleadings that they are not intervenors. #109.00, page 7. The court finds that these eight named plaintiffs have not proven statutory aggrievement and the court further finds that these eight named plaintiffs are not statutorily aggrieved.

Classical aggrievement requires a twofold showing. "[F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all the members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that the specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Douglas v. Planning Zoning Commission, 127 Conn.App. 87, 97 (2011).

. . . The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron, 295 Conn. 802, 810 (2010); Sheridan v. Planning Board of the City of Stamford, 159 Conn. 1, 13 (1969). Proof of classical aggrievement requires a significant evidentiary record. Abel v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 297 Conn. 414, 437, fn.19 (2010). No evidence was offered at trial that any of these eight plaintiffs were classically aggrieved. The court finds that these eight plaintiffs are not aggrieved parties since they are neither statutorily aggrieved or classically aggrieved.

Karen Murphy and William F. Polotaye signed and filed the Appeal with the Zoning Board of Appeals appealing the September 19, 2008 decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer. Return of Record #1. No other person or entity signed the appeal to the ZBA. The court has already found that William F. Polotaye is an aggrieved party. The court will now discuss the status of Karen Murphy. An examination of the pleadings revealed that she was not named as a plaintiff when this administrative appeal was filed with the Superior Court. Only the previously mentioned nine plaintiffs were named as plaintiffs. Karen Murphy was not joined as a party in this administrative appeal at any time thereafter. Karen Murphy is a named plaintiff in the companion Zoning Board administrative appeal, FST CV 08-4015041 S.

The plaintiffs claimed in their initial brief dated June 18, 2009 that: "The plaintiffs in appeal CV 08-4015507 are the same eleven (11) plaintiffs who are prosecuting the first appeal." #104.20, page 2. That claim was repeated in Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Appeals: "The eleven plaintiffs in these appeals pointed out in their first brief . . ." #109.00, page 4. "Two of the eleven plaintiffs ("Save West Beach Park" and Karen Murphy) appeared before the Boards below to oppose the defendants' applications" #109.00, page 5. "Nine of the eleven plaintiffs in these appeals are not intervenors." #109.00, page 7. The defendants filed a Memo in Opposition dated September 20, 2010 just in this ZBA administrative appeal stating: "The plaintiffs were allowed to intervene under 22a-19 C.G.S and present arguments only as to the environmental impact of the artificial turf field. All of the arguments and procedural defects cannot be considered by this court in this appeal." The parties' briefs paint a confusing picture as to the intevenor status of the nine named plaintiffs in this ZBA appeal as well as Karen Murphy and Save West Beach Park, who are not named plaintiffs in this ZBA appeal but are named plaintiffs in the Zoning Board appeal.

In addition Karen Murphy and William F. Polotaye in Schedule A of their 80-page appeal in this Administrative appeal stated: "The Applicant Karen Murphy is a resident and property owner in the City of Stamford, a person who enjoys using West Beach Park in Stamford and an intervenor at the proceedings before this Zoning Board of Appeals, as well," and "Karen Murphy is an aggrieved person entitled to bring this appeal because she is an intervenor in this proceeding before this Board under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-19." Return of Record #1; Plaintiffs' Appeal to Zoning Board of Appeals, Schedule A, paragraph 2. Upon reading these claims the court carefully reviewed the entire court file, the Edison computer printout of the pleadings, this court's trial notes and the entire Return of Record in this ZBA administrative appeal. Although Karen Murphy did not state in Schedule A paragraph 2 under what authority she was "an intervenor in the proceedings before this Zoning Board of Appeals" since she was an environmental intervenor in the companion Zoning Board administrative appeal, this court assumes that the intervention was under the authority of Gen. Stat § 22a-19(a). ". . . any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct which has, or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonable polluting, impairing or destroying in the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state." No such verified pleading is contained in the court pleading file, the ZBA Return of Record nor the evidence at trial. Schedule A was just signed by Karen Murphy and William F. Polotaye and was not verified. In addition, Karen Murphy did not file a direct lawsuit against the defendants pursuant to Gen. Stat. § 22a-16.

After conducting this review the court assigned this matter for the continuation of the trial, which continued trial was held on April 28, 2011. The plaintiffs were offered the opportunity to present further evidence of the status of the other two claimed plaintiffs in this ZBA administrative appeal: Karen Murphy and Save West Beach Park. The plaintiffs declined the court's offer. The parties examined the court file and ZBA Return of Record in order to locate documents that support Karen Murphy's status as a party or intervenor. No such documents were pointed out to this court. The parties submitted a Stipulation on May 10, 2010 that addressed whether or not there were eleven parties in this ZBA administrative appeal: "There are nine plaintiffs in this case, specifically, William F. Polotaye, Rosalie Mastropaolo, Giuseppe Masone, Angela Masone, Mimoza E. Noga, Pjerin Noga, Mark Blechman, Miralley Blechman and MM Shippan, LLC." Stipulation May 10, 2011, paragraph 1.

On May 10, 2011 the parties, by their counsel of record, filed a Stipulation which stated in paragraph 2: "Karen Murphy and Save West Beach Park were intervenors under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-19 in the proceedings below, which were conducted before the Zoning Board of Appeals. Their intervention petition appears in Return of Record Item #1, Schedule A herein." The court accepts this Stipulation confirming that all parties understand that Karen Murphy and Save West Beach Park are claiming intervention status under Gen. Stat. § 22a-19 in the ZBA administrative appeal. This Stipulation does not state that the parties are agreeing that Karen Murphy and Save West Beach are named parties in this ZBA administrative appeal, that they are intervening parties or that they have properly intervened. The Stipulation is limited to stating what the legal claims of Karen Murphy and Save West Beach Park are in this ZBA administrative appeal and does not resolve their legal status. The legal status of Karen Murphy and Save West Beach Park as claimed intervenors are therefore before this court for this court's determination as to standing as an aggrieved party.

The court finds that Karen Murphy cannot be aggrieved under the environmental intervenor statute because: (1) aggrievement on this ground has been rejected by appellate courts: Jaeger v. Connecticut Siting Council, supra, 52 Conn.Sup. 25, affirmed 128 Conn.App. 243 (2011); (2) she has not alleged such statutory standing in this appeal to the Superior Court; (3) she has not claimed such statutory standing in her briefs; (4) she is not named as a plaintiff in the summons; (5) she is not named as a party in the complaint; (6) she has not demonstrated that she filed a "verified pleading" as required by Gen. Stat. § 22a-19(c); and (7) she admitted in pleadings that she is not an intervenor in this ZBA administrative appeal. #109.00, page 7. Karen Murphy has claimed intervenor status in the companion Zoning Board administrative appeal, is a named party in the Zoning Board administrative appeal and has pointed out a verified petition in the Return of Record #7 in the Zoning Board administrative appeal. By filing a single brief, the parties have conflated the intervenor status of both Karen Murphy and Save West Beach Park. Based on the summons, the pleadings, the Return of Record in this ZBA administrative appeal and the evidence at trial, the court finds that Karen Murphy is not an intervenor party in this ZBA administrative appeal.

If Karen Murphy was an intervenor she would only be permitted to raise environmental issues in this ZBA appeal. "An intervenor's standing pursuant to § 22a-19 strictly is limited to challenging only environmental issues covered by the statute, and `only those environmental concerns that are within the jurisdiction of the particular administrative agency conducting the proceeding into which the party seeks to intervene.'" Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 148 (2002). There were no environmental issues in this ZBA administrative appeal. This court therefore finds that Karen Murphy is not a named party, an intervenor party nor is she an aggrieved person.

Save West Beach Park is one of the eleven plaintiffs in the companion Zoning Board administrative appeal, FST CV 08-4015041 S. Save West Beach Park was not named as one of the nine plaintiffs in this ZBA administrative appeal. The court could not locate any pleadings in the court file where Save West Beach Park was joined as a party and counsel on the April 28, 2011 trial date did not point to any such documents in the file. Save West Beach Park did not sign the appeal. There is no verified pleading granting Save West Beach Park intervenor status under Gen. Stat. § 22a-19(a) in the ZBA court file and the ZBA Return of Record and none was offered at trial. Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, supra, 259 Conn. 161-66. Save West Beach Park is not mentioned in the 80-page Appeal. Robert Unell spoke at the ZBA November 5, 2008 public hearing: "And on behalf of Save West Beach Park and the applicants, Mr. Unell will briefly summarize only the Zoning Board of Appeals has an obligation and a duty to reverse the action and decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer to grant a zoning permit for the West Beach soccer complex project." Return of Record #42, page 2. Mr. Unell presented a letter to the ZBA. Return of Record #26. There was no further discussion of the organization, membership or status of Save West Beach Park presented before the ZBA. The November 5, 2008 letter contains no heading, does not mention Save West Beach Park in the body of the letter and does not indicate the nature of the entity Save West Beach Park. The November 5, 2008 letter is unsigned and the purported person who should have signed the letter is left unstated. The letter concludes: "Very truly yours, Save West Beach Park." Return of Record #26.

No evidence was offered at trial about Save West Beach Park and how this plaintiff was formed and organized. The plaintiffs' brief is silent on that subject. The plaintiffs' oral argument did not discuss that subject. Paragraph 3 of the September 29, 2008 complaint in the companion ZB case alleges the status of Save West Beach park. The defendants have not judicially admitted those allegations. The defendants' April 29, 2009 Answer to paragraph 3 of the plaintiffs' complaint states: "The Defendants have no knowledge and leave Plaintiffs to their proof." #109.00.

The plaintiff, Save West Beach Park, must establish by evidence its legal status. The statute, although permitting any person to intervene only permits a "legal entity" to intervene. ". . . any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may intervene as a party . . ." Gen. Stat. § 22a-19(a). The use of the adjective "legal" in the list of non-persons who may intervene, applies to each of the named non-persons. A partnership must be a legal entity. A corporation must be a legal entity. An association must be a legal entity. An organization must be a legal entity. If that were not the requirement, the word "legal" in the statute would have no meaning, since any entity whether legally organized and existing or not would have standing. The legislature could not have meant the word "legal" to be read out of the statute. Every word in this statute is presumed to have meaning. Vibert v. Board of Education, 260 Conn. 167, 176 (2002). "It is well established that, in construing statutory language, [n]o part of a legislative enactment is to be treated as insignificant or unnecessary, and there is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase . . . and no word in a statute is to be treated as superfluous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, 227 Conn. 518, 528, 631 A.2d 1149 (1993); see also Vibert v. Board of Education, 260 Conn. 167, 176, 793 A.2d 1076 (2002) (every word in statute presumed to have meaning)"; Komondy v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 127 Conn.App. 669, 686-87 (2011); HVT, Inc. v. Law, 300 Conn. 623, 641 (2011).

By its terms, § 22a-19 specifically determines both (1) the parties that may intervene and (2) the proceedings into which those parties may intervene. Under both of these prongs, the legislature employed broad and all-inclusive language. With regard specifically to the parties permitted to intervene, the legislature designated an all encompassing list of all possible legal entities: partnerships, corporations, persons, associations, organizations, other legal entities and political subdivisions of the state and instrumentalities and agencies thereof. In addition, the repeated use in § 22a-19 of the word "any" — e.g., "any administrative, licensing or other proceeding." "any judicial review thereof," "any political subdivision of the state," "any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof." "any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or Other legal entity" — indicates an intention to allow the broadest possible range of parties to intervene in an expansive spectrum of proceedings. "Although the word `any' sometimes may, because of its context, mean `some' or `one' rather than `all,' `[i]ts meaning in a given statute depends on the context and subject matter of the law.'" Commission on Human Rights Opportunities v. Board of Education, 270 Conn. 665, 707, 855 A.2d 212 (2004); accord King v. Board of Education, 203 Conn. 324, 334, 524 A.2d 1131 (1987) (as used, "`any' means `all' or `every'"); see Commission on Human Rights Opportunities v. Board of Education, supra, 707 ("[w]e think that [the] repeated use [of `any'] here in the context of a remedial statute counsels a broad, rather than a narrow, meaning'); see also McManus v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 229 Conn. 654, 663, 642 A.2d 1199 (1994) ("environmental statutes are remedial in nature and should be construed liberally to accomplish their purposes").

Avalonbay Communities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission of the Town of Stratford, 280 Conn. 405, 413-14 (2006) (Municipality entitled to intervene).

It is elemental that in order to confer jurisdiction on the court the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is he or it must be a person in law or a legal entity with legal capacity to sue . . . An estate is not a legal entity. It is neither a natural nor artificial person, but is merely a name to indicate the sum total of the assets and liabilities of the decedent or incompetent . . . Not having a legal existence, it can neither sue nor be sued." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, supra, 3 Conn.App. 598, 600 (1985).

Various entities have been declared not to be legal entities. CT Page 19300 SCG Capital Corp Profit Sharing Trust v. Green, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket Number CV 09-5005319 S (March 25, 2010, Sferrazza, J.) [ 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 555] (a common-law trust is not a legal entity and possesses no capacity to sue); Isaacs v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 3 Conn.App. 598-600 (1985) (an estate is not a legal entity and suit must be brought by the fiduciary of the estate); Groton Open Space Association v. Groton, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket Number CV 08-4008020 (February 9, 2011, Purtell, J.T.R.) (although referred to as an association, the plaintiff did have standing since it was a non-profit corporation established for conservation and environmental preservation in Southeastern Connecticut); a trade name has no standing to sue. Coldwell Banker v. Compu Sci, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket Number HHD-CV-03 0825180 S (November 12, 2010, Sheldon, J.) [ 51 Conn. L. Rptr. 10]; Elementary School Building Committee of the Town of Fairfield v. Placko, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket Number FBT CV 02-0398 162 S (February 21, 2003, Rush, J.) [ 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 168] (a building committee appointed by the Town Board of Education was not a legal entity that could sue).

There was no evidence of the nature of Save West Beach Park. There was no proof that it was on file with any governmental filing agency such as the Connecticut Secretary of State, Connecticut Department of Revenue Services, or Town Clerk of the City of Stamford. No list of members, officers or membership requirements were presented to the ZBA or this court. If Save West Beach Park was a group of individuals engaged in a long standing Friday night poker game it could call itself an association but that does not make the Friday night poker group a legal entity for the purposes of intervening under Gen. Stat. § 22a-19. The court finds that Save West Beach Park is not a "legal entity" and thus cannot satisfy the requirements of aggrievement and standing of Gen. Stat. § 22a-19.

There was no evidence at trial about Save West Beach Park's use of West Beach Park. Save West Beach Park has failed to prove classical aggrievement. Citizens Against Overhead Powerline Construction v. Connecticut Siting Council, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket Number CV 10-6004927 S (March 24, 2001, Cohn, J.) [ 51 Conn. L. Rptr. 882].

The only mention of Save West Beach Park is in the transcript of Mr. Unell's presentation before the ZBA. Save West Beach Park appears to be some sort of an association, whose organization and makeup is a mystery to this court. Does Save West Beach Park have to meet the associational standing test?

In evaluating the standing of an association, we have adopted the federal test for associational standing articulated in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). "Under that test, [a]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Associated Builders Contractors v. Hartford, 251 Conn. 169, 185, 740 A.2d 813 (1999).

Fort Trumbull Conservancy v. Alves, 279 Conn. 430, 435-36 (2001).

The plaintiffs have the burden of proof as to aggrievement. Neither party brief or argued associational standing. This court therefore is not going to consider the issue of whether Save West Beach Park has or needs to establish associational standing.

The court finds that Save West Beach Park is not a party in this ZBA administrative appeal and it is not an intervenor party in this ZBA administrative appeal for the same seven enumerated reasons just stated as to Karen Murphy's intervenor status. Save West Beach Park has claimed intervenor status in the companion Zoning Board administrative appeal, is a named party in the Zoning Board administrative appeal and has pointed out a verified petition in Return of Record #7 in the Zoning Board administrative appeal. The single brief has also conflated the intervenor status of Save West Beach Park. If Save West Beach Park was an intervenor, it could only raise environmental issues in this ZBA appeal. Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, supra, 259 Conn. 148. There are no environmental issues in this ZBA administrative appeal. The court therefore finds that Save West Beach Park is not a named party, is not an intervenor party, is not a legal entity nor is it aggrieved.

The court finds that the plaintiff, William F. Polotaye, timely appealed from the decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer to the Zoning Board of Appeals and timely and in a procedurally proper manner appealed from the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals to the Superior Court.

When the Zoning Board of Appeals reviews a decision of a zoning enforcement officer, the zoning board of appeals acts in quasi-judicial capacity. Lawrence v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Conn. 509, 514 (1969). The zoning board of appeals has the authority to interpret the town's ordinances and zoning regulations and apply them to a given situation. Stern v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 140 Conn. 241, 245 (1953). The zoning board of appeals holds a de novo hearing on the review of zoning enforcement officer's decision. The Superior Court reviews the decision of the zoning board of appeals based upon the record. Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 226 Conn. 80, 90-91 (1993). The court cannot make its own determination of a question of fact and cannot substitute its judgment for the board. Horn v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 18 Conn.App. 674, 676 (1989)." Where it appears that an honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised after a full hearing, courts should be cautious about disturbing the decision of the local authority." McMahon v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 433, 438 (1953). "Where a zoning authority has stated the reasons for its action, a reviewing court may only determine if the reasons given are supported by the record and are pertinent to the decision." Torsiello v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 3 Conn.App. 47, 50 (1984). If the trial court finds that there is substantial evidence to support any one of the Board's reasons for its decision, the Board's decision must be sustained. Municipal Funding LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 270 Conn. 447, 453 (2004); Jaser v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 43 Conn.App. 545, 547-48 (1996). The burden rests with the plaintiffs to prove the impropriety of the Board's actions. Wood v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 258 Conn. 691, 698 (2001).

On September 19, 2008 the defendant, City of Stamford, requested the Stamford Zoning Enforcement Officer to issue a zoning permit for its proposed improvements to West Beach Park. The City used the preprinted form "Application for Zoning Approval City of Stamford." Return of Record #24. The Stamford Zoning Board approved the City's Coastal Area Management application on September 15, 2008: "CAM Approval Yes [X] No [ ] Application #CSPR #838." Return of Record #24. The improvements were to convert two existing natural turf athletic fields to two artificial turf athletic fields and to realign and repave an existing parking lot. Return of Record #16. The "Application for permission to:" section of the form was filed in handwriting stating: "Install synthetic turf soccer fields, drainage system, landscaping, parking lot, bleachers and chain link fence." No change of use, change of zone or the construction of any building was proposed. The property was zoned P-Park District and the existing uses were in conformity with that zone. The existing uses were to continue. The Zoning Enforcement Officer issued the zoning permit by signing the Department Approval for Building Permit form on September 19, 2008 on the preprinted line: "Zoning." Return of Record #24. On October 6, 2008 the plaintiff, William F. Polotaye, appealed the decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer issuing the zoning permit to the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford, where it was assigned application #089-08. Return of Record #1. Karen Murphy also signed the appeal documents but she is not a party in this administrative appeal.

The standard three-page Application form was submitted along with a five-page document entitled "Schedule A Appeal from the Decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer to the Zoning Board of Appeals." Both the Appeal form and Schedule A were signed William F. Polotaye and Karen Murphy. Five errors by the Zoning Enforcement Officer were alleged in paragraph 15 of the five-page Schedule A. A signed Waiver of Time Requirement for Public Hearing was submitted. Return of Record #2. Attached to the October 6, 2008 Appeal form was a three-page document prepared by the plaintiffs entitled Exhibit I. Also attached to the October 6, 2008 Appeal was a two-page document prepared by the plaintiffs entitled Exhibit II. All the above documents are in Return of Record #1. Exhibit II attached 13 documents consisting of four documents relating the issuance to the City of Stamford of Building Permit BP-2008-0811 in regards to this project, three letters, two letters with attachments, September 29, 2008 e-mails, a document entitled "Background information on this Project," "Master Plan Information" and "Minutes of the Board of Finance Meeting held on February 13, 2008." All of these documents are in Return of Record #3 through #13. The court finds that this Appeal to the Zoning Board of Appeals dated October 6, 2008 consists of documents 1 through and including 13 in the Return of Record #102.10 (1 through 13). Although the preprinted Application form is three-pages and contains a section entitled "DECISION OF THE ZONING ENFORCEMENT OFFICER dated 9/19/2008 is appealed because:" with space on the form for stating the claimed errors of the Zoning Enforcement Officer, the plaintiffs filed this 80-page Appeal. This 80-page Appeal is a large portion of the total Return of Record. "If you look at this appeal, it is quite lengthy, probably one of the most lengthy appeals I have ever had of my decision." Return of Record #42, page 21, comments of James J. Lunney, III, Zoning Enforcement Officer of the City of Stamford.

The Zoning Board of Appeals held a public hearing on November 5, 2008, and denied the plaintiffs application at a November 19, 2008 public hearing. Return of Record #42 and #43.

Despite the numerous claims made in the 80-page Appeal in Return of Record #1-13, the plaintiffs offered only one reason at the November 5, 2008 hearing for the reversal of the issuance of the zoning permit by the Zoning Enforcement Officer: "The City in its zeal to install artificial turf soccer fields in West Beach Park, et al., willfully disregarded the City Charter requirement that capital projects of this nature be referred to the Planning Board of the City for a report." Return of Record #26 (November 5, 2008 letter to the Zoning Board of Appeals). The November 5, 2008 transcript of the Zoning Board of Appeals public hearing contains the following statement on behalf of the plaintiffs. "I am going to just make a statement based on that letter." Return of Record #42, page 3.

The plaintiff's presentation before the Zoning Board of Appeals did not discuss the organization and membership of Save West Park Beach nor refer to the subjects contained in the 18 numbered paragraphs of Schedule A of the Application in Return of Record #1. None of the plaintiffs' exhibits submitted to the ZBA address any issue other than the Planning Board referral/report requirement of the Stamford Charter. The plaintiffs' ZBA presentation was recorded on pages 2 through 19 of Return of Record #42.

James J. Lunney, III, the Stamford Zoning Enforcement Officer, prepared a five-page Memorandum dated October 29, 2008 that discussed paragraph by numbered paragraph the 18 paragraph Schedule A in the Appeal filing contained in Return of Record #1. The five-page memorandum was submitted by Mr. Lunney to the ZBA. Return of Record #21. Mr. Lunney addressed each of the 18-numbered paragraphs in plaintiffs' Schedule A orally paragraph by numbered paragraph. This oral presentation is contained in the remainder of the ZBA transcript. Return of Record #42, pages 19-46. There was no rebuttal by the plaintiffs.

This court concludes that the plaintiffs by filing the November 5, 2008 letter and by limiting its presentation to only the City Charter issue, abandoned all claims contained in their 80-page Appeal and all of the legal claims contained in paragraph 12 of their complaint in this administrative appeal except for the Charter argument. Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 634-35 (2005). It was not necessary for Mr. Lunney to either submit a written response to any issue other than the Charter nor to respond orally to any issue other than the Charter. His memorandum was prepared a week before the ZBA's November 5, 2008 hearing. This court is convinced that Mr. Lunney wanted to make sure that he covered all legal and factual issues raised by the plaintiffs. The court having reviewed the entirety of the allegations of paragraph 12 of the plaintiffs' appeal to this court, the court finds that the Charter issue is raised in paragraph 12(a) and 12(b). All other legal and factual claims contained in the remainder of paragraph 12 either do not refer to the Charter issue or are repetitious of the claims made in paragraph 12(a) and 12(b).

The plaintiffs' Appeal contains twelve reasons why the Zoning Board of Appeals "erred and acted illegally." The court will address each of the twelve reasons alleged in paragraph 12 of the plaintiffs' complaint despite the finding by this court that all but those contained in paragraph 12(a) and 12(b) were abandoned by the plaintiffs at the November 5, 2008 public hearing.

(a) Because the Project had never been referred to the Planning Board of the City of Stamford for a report, the Zoning Enforcement Officer of the City had no valid authority to issue the permit.

(b) Because the Project had never been referred to the Planning Board of the City of Stamford for a report, the defendant City had no authority to even apply for the zoning permit in the first place.

These two claims all relate to paragraph 6 of the plaintiffs' appeal: "At no time prior to and up through November 19, 2008 was the Project referred to the Planning Board of the City of Stamford for a report." The plaintiffs claim this failure to refer and obtain a report from the Planning Board violates the Charter of the City of Stamford and is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties separately briefed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in this case and in the companion Zoning Board case. The court will treat paragraphs 12(a) and (b) as related to the Charter issue. The plaintiffs' briefs and oral argument treated these two subparagraphs as being only related to the Charter.

In their initial brief on this issue, the plaintiffs did not claim any lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants did not defend on the basis of a subject matter jurisdiction claim. The plaintiffs' initial brief addressed the jurisdiction issue as follows: "The conduct of the Zoning Enforcement Officer in granting a permit for the project before it was referred [to] the Stamford Planning Board for a report was illegal, and the Zoning Board of Appeals should have sustained the plaintiffs' appeal from the issuance of the permit." (#104.20, page 20.)

On July 20, 2010, the first day of trial, the plaintiffs noted that this claim raises a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This court ordered further briefing on the issue. The plaintiffs' Reply Brief addresses the jurisdiction issue as follows: "The two zoning agencies lacked jurisdiction because the Charter of the City of Stamford directed that no City agency had power to act until the municipal improvement proposal which is the subject of these appeals was `referred to the Planning Board for a report.' Stamford City Charter, § C6-30-13." (#109.00, page 4.)

The plaintiffs now state that this argument raises lack of subject matter jurisdiction: that the Zoning Enforcement Officer had no subject matter jurisdiction to either consider or grant the zoning permit and that the Zoning Board of Appeals had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear and uphold the decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer. Both parties submitted separate briefs on the jurisdictional issues prior to the completion of the trial. The plaintiffs' subject matter jurisdiction claim is that the Charter of the City of Stamford Sec. C6-30-13 was not complied with by the City and therefore there is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs acknowledge that there is no Connecticut case supporting their claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "There are no reported decisions in Connecticut that undersigned counsel can locate that state explicitly that a failure to properly refer a municipal improvement project to a Planning Board, as required by Stamford Charter § C6-30-13 or Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-24, deprives subsequent reviewers of `subject matter jurisdiction' over the project." Plaintiffs' Brief #112.00, page 5. The plaintiffs cite cases from Ohio, New York, Michigan and Kentucky supporting their position. The plaintiffs do direct this court to Connecticut cases that compliance with Gen. Stat. § 8-24 is mandatory, and failure to comply with Gen. Stat. § 8-24 invalidates its action. Trivalent Realty Co. Inc. v. Westport, 2 Conn.App. 213, 217-18 (1984); Jeschor v. Guilford, 143 Conn. 152, 158 (1956); Sheehan v. Altschuler, 148 Conn. 517, 523-26 (1961); Leoni v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 21 Conn.App. 77, 84 (1990).

The section of the Stamford Charter at issue is contained in the Public Works section of the Charter and not in the zoning section. Supplement to Return of Record #116.00. The section heading states: "Procedure for Reviewing Public Works Proposals." It was promulgated in 1953 as Special Act 619 in Sec. 523 and was amended by a November 7, 1995 referendum. The language remains more or less the same since 1953.

No action shall be taken by the City on any proposal involving the location, acceptance, widening, narrowing or extension of streets, bridges, parkways and other public ways; the location, relocation, acquisition of land for, abandonment, sale or lease of airports, parks, playgrounds and other municipally-owned properties, schools and other public buildings; the extent and location of public utilities and terminals, whether publicly or privately owned, for light, water, power, transit and other purposes; and the extent and location of public housing projects and the redevelopment, reconditioning or improvement of specific areas as defined herein above until it has been referred to the Planning Board for a report. The failure of said Board to report within sixty days after the date of official submission to it shall be taken as approval of the proposal. In case of the disapproval of the proposal by said Board, the reasons for disapproval shall be recorded and transmitted to the Board of Representatives. A proposal disapproved by the Planning Board shall thereafter only be adopted by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Board of Representatives.

Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13.

The plaintiffs claim that at no time was a formal request made to the Planning Board for approval specifically under Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13 by the City of Stamford and no report was ever issued by the Planning Board on this project in accordance with Sec. C6 30-13. The court has not been able to locate such a Planning Board referral or such a Planning Board report in the Return of Record of this appeal. The plaintiffs' August 16, 2010 brief contains the following statement of fact: "The defendants do not dispute that no coastal site plan application was ever submitted to the Stamford Planning Board for review and consideration." (#112.00, page 3.) The defendants have not pointed out to this court any such formal review or report by the Planning Board either in the Return of Record or at trial. The defendants do claim that this project was reviewed previously by the Planning Board at separate hearings. The defendants make four arguments in their combined brief submitted in their two consolidated administrative appeals: (1) the Planning Board reviewed and approved this project previously; (2) the language of Charter Sec. C6-30-13 does not apply to this project on city owned land that will continue to be used for the same park/recreation purposes, (3) a Coastal Management Act application is to be filed with only one agency, the Zoning Board by statute and regulation; and (4) the Planning Board referral or report is directory, not mandatory.

No Connecticut court has discussed Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13 in this context. Two trial court injunction decisions affirmed by one Appellate Court decision did discuss the claim that failure to refer and obtain approval from the Planning Board was a jurisdictional defect. Both these injunction lawsuits were dismissed based on the plaintiffs' lack of taxpayer standing and Save West Beach Park's lack of classical aggrievement. Karen Murphy was a plaintiff in both cases and both cases involved the project at issue. Karen Murphy v. City of Stamford, et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket Number, CV 08-4024500 S (June 9, 2008, Frankel, J.); Save West Beach Park, et al. v. City of Stamford, et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket Number CV 08-4024470 S (June 9, 2008, Frankel, J.) (Both of these lawsuits sought to enjoin the City of Stamford from installing artificial turf fields at West Beach Park and claimed a violation of Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13); Murphy v. City of Stamford, 115 Conn.App. 675, 679, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 902 (2009) (Affirming the dismissal in Murphy v. Stamford, et al., CV 08-4024500 S in a Per Curiam decision released on July 14, 2009).

In the project involved in this lawsuit, the City wished to convert two existing grass athletic fields to two artificial turf playing fields as well as reconfigure and repave an adjacent parking lot. Return of Record #16, #33 and #34. The Zoning Enforcement Officer issued a zoning permit on September 19, 2008 at the request of the City made after the Zoning Board approved the City's CAM application on September 15, 2008. The companion Zoning Board administrative appeal involves the CAM approval.

The court will now review the four arguments offered by the defendants on the issue of jurisdiction of the Zoning Enforcement Officer and the Zoning Board of Appeals:

(1) "The Stamford Planning Board reviewed and approved this project previously."

The parties requested the court to consolidate these two administrative appeals for trial and further requested at a single brief be filed in both cases. There are two separate lawsuits: two separate administrative appeals before two different municipal boards. The Return of Record before the Zoning Board is massive. Counsel in their briefs and oral argument conflate the facts that are contained in both Returns of Record to the effect of creating a single Return of Record. If that is the parties intent, it is error for this court to consider in an administrative appeal facts contained in a Return of Record presented before another administrative agency. "The court files in any actions consolidated pursuant to this section shall be maintained as separate files and all documents submitted by counsel or the parties shall bear only the docket number and case title of the file in which it is to be filed." P.B. § 9-5(c). This rule does not state that the pleadings in one file become the pleadings in the other file, when both files are consolidated. This rule does not state that Returns of Record in administrative appeals, customarily coded in by the clerk as a pleading with a designated computer pleading number, creates one single Return of Record where two administrative appeals are consolidated. It was imprudent for the parties to request consolidation, for the court to order consolidation and a single brief on May 9, 2009 and for this court to confirm consolidation by its own order. This court is only considering the Return of Record in this Zoning Board of Appeals administrative appeal. The information in the ZBA Return of Record is thin on the issue of how many times and what dates the Planning Board approved this project. "There was a majority . . . a super majority of the board of reps approved the project. That's true, no question about it." Return of Record #42, page 6. "The reason I was given by the City is that the City approved the . . . the board of reps approved this project by a super majority of two thirds, that does not give them authority to go forward." Return of Record #42, page 17. "He indicated to me that the monies for these fields were in the budget that was approved by his board, the board he is a liaison with, the Planning Board." Return of Record #42, page 23-24. ". . . what the board of reps did, two thirds vote, that doesn't have anything to do with me." Return of Record #42, page 36. "I was taken by surprise that I got this appeal of my decision quite honestly because it had been before every single board . . ." Return of Record #42, page 36-37. "I had everything I needed I had all board approvals." Return of Record #42, page 42. The ZBA's Return of Record is sufficient for this court to conclude that there was substantial evidence before the ZBA that the Planning Board had approved this project and the Board of Representatives had approved this project by more than a 2/3 vote.

(2) "The language of Charter Sec. C6-30-13 does not apply to this project on city owned land that will continue to be used for the same park/recreation purpose."

The project did not involve the "location, acceptance, widening, narrowing, or extension of streets, bridges, parkways and other public ways." It involved adjustments to an existing parking lot, its repair, installing cross-walks, handicap parking, restriping and change of the interior configuration of traffic within an existing parking lot. The existing or proposed parking lot is not a "street, bridge, parkway or other public way." The reconfiguration and repaving of this existing parking lot does not involve "the location, acceptance, widening, narrowing or extension." From the plain language of Sec. C6-30-13, that Charter section is not applicable to the parking lot improvements.

The court finds that the two athletic fields are "parks, playgrounds and other municipally-owned properties." This project did not involve the "location, relocation, acquisition of land for, abandonment, sale or lease of airports, parks, playgrounds or other municipally owned properties." It involved two existing grass soccer fields and the improvement of these two grass fields with artificial turf. The location of the two artificial turf fields were in the same location as the two grass fields. There was no relocation of the athletic fields. No land or property had to be acquired by the City of Stamford for this project. No park land was sold, leased, or otherwise conveyed or proposed to be sold, leased, or otherwise conveyed. The City of Stamford owned these two athletic fields and parking lot and the City of Stamford would continue to own these two athletic fields and parking lot after the project was completed. The two existing athletic fields were not abandoned. Their prior use was continued. Return of Record #33 and #34. From the plain language of Sec. C6-30-13, that Charter section is not applicable to the turf replacement of two existing athletic fields.

(3) "A Coastal Management Act application is to be filed with only one agency, the Zoning Board, by statute and regulation."

The Coastal Management (CAM) statute requires that "Coastal municipalities shall undertake coastal site plan reviews in accordance with the requirements of this chapter."

Gen. Stat. § 22a-105(a). The CAM review is not contemplated to be a public hearing and is to be conducted simultaneously with other zoning site plan reviews. The Coastal Management Act, Sections 22a-90 through 22a-111 of the General Statutes, "envisages a single review process, during which proposals for development within the coastal boundary will simultaneously be reviewed for compliance with local zoning requirements and for consistency with the policies of planned coastal management." Vartuli v. Sotire, 192 Conn. 353, 358 (1984); (Stamford CAM application); Dean v. Norwalk Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk of Stamford, Docket Number CV03-0193760 S (November 4, 2004, Radcliffe, J.).

Municipalities may adopt their own coastal management program. Gen. Stat. § 22a-104. Stamford has done so in Section 7.T, Stamford Zoning Regulations, Coastal Area Management Regulations, pages 7-14 to 7-16. Supplement Return of Record #116.00. Under its General Procedures 6; "The Zoning Board may at its discretion hold a public hearing on any application for coastal site plan approval." The Stamford Planning Board has no zoning site plan review authority and is not mentioned in Section 7.T of the Stamford Zoning Regulations as a reviewing board for a CAM application. Only the Zoning Board is designated by the Stamford CAM regulations as the reviewing agency. The CAM statutes contemplated that one review will occur. "The board or commission reviewing the coastal site plan shall . . ." Gen. Stat. § 22a-105(e). Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13 was adopted in 1953 decades before the adoption of the CAM review procedures. When CAM was approved the Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13 was not amended to include CAM review by the Planning Board. By state statutes and Stamford Zoning Regulations only one CAM review is required and that review is to be conducted by one agency, the Stamford Zoning Board, not the Stamford Planning Board. Vartuli v. Sotire, supra, 192 Conn. 358.

(4) "The Planning Board referral or report is directory, not mandatory."

The rules of statutory construction apply to municipal regulations and charter provisions." Arminio v. Butler, 183 Conn. 211, 217 (1981). The plaintiffs argue that Charter Sec. C6-30-13 commences with a negative term, "no Action" and the use of the word "shall," all of which combined make the charter provision mandatory. The defendants disagree and state that not all provisions of statutes that contain the word "shall" are construed as mandatory. Discover Bank v. Mayer, 127 Conn.App. 813, 817 (2011). The defendants also argue that the test for directory/mandatory has been considered and reaffirmed by a recent Appellate Court case. Weinstein, et al. v. Inland Wetlands Agency of the Town of Madison, et al., 124 Conn.App. 50 (2010). Weinstein was a consolidated appeal, in which the defendants including the Madison Inland Wetlands Agency and the property owner claim that the trial court erred in sustaining the abutting landowners appeal "on the ground that the agency's decisions were invalidated by its alleged failure to comply with the reporting requirements of Gen. Stat. § 8-26 and § 11.5 of the Madison inland wetlands regulations." Id. 52. The owner wished to subdivide his property, which required Planning and Zoning Commission approval. Two wetlands activities were proposed. The Madison Inland Wetlands Agency held a hearing on the application, approved the two wetlands activities but failed to issue a report to the Planning and Zoning Commission. Gen. Stat. § 8-26(e) contains a reporting requirement. "The commission shall not render a decision until the inland wetlands agency has submitted a report with its final decision to the commission." Section 11-5 of the Madison Inland Wetlands Regulations also contains a reporting requirement.

"If an activity authorized by the inland wetland permit also involves an activity which requires zoning or subdivision approval, a special zoning permit, variance or special exception, a copy of the decision and report on the application shall be filed by the [i]nland [w]etlands [e]nforcement [o]fficer with the . . . [c]ommission, and/or [z]oning [b]oard of [a]ppeals within fifteen days of the date of decision." This regulation requires the inland wetlands enforcement officer (officer) to file "the decision and report" with the commission within fifteen days of the agency's decision. It does not, however, mandate that the decision of the agency is rendered invalid if the officer does not adhere strictly to this time frame.

Weinstein, et al. v. Inland Wetlands Agency of the Town of Madison, et al., supra, 124 Conn.App. 56.

The Weinstein court reversed the trial court. "It is also patently clear that the time provision is designed to secure order, system and dispatch . . . Accordingly, we conclude that pursuant to the express statutory and regulatory language at issue, the agency's decisions were not invalid solely because the officer did not timely file the `decision and report.'" Id. 57.

Weinstein restated the following test:

The test to be applied in determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to a matter of substance or a matter of convenience . . . If it is a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory. If, however, the legislative provision is designed to secure order, system and dispatch in the proceedings, it is generally held to be directory, especially where the requirement is stated in affirmative terms unaccompanied by negative words . . . Such a statutory provision is one which prescribes what shall be done but does not invalidate action upon a failure to comply . . . A reliable guide in determining whether a statutory provision is directory or mandatory is whether the provision is accompanied by language that expressly invalidates any action taken after noncompliance with the provision.

Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 246 Conn. 251, 262 (1998).

Each of the Connecticut cases cited by the plaintiffs predate the 1998 Lauer v. Zoning Commission decision. None of the cited cases conduct an analysis of why Gen. Stat. § 8-24 under the facts of that case are mandatory. The Lauer case involved a special permit issued by the Redding zoning commission. Section 5.1.2 of the Redding Zoning regulations required that a copy of the application together with all maps, plans and reports be referred by the Commission to four municipal agencies for a report: Board of Selectmen, Conservation Commission, Health Department and Planning Department. It appears that no such referrals were made nor any reports issued by these four agencies. The Appellate Court found Section 5.1.2 directory and not mandatory, it pertained to order, system and dispatch and contained no invalidation language. The court held that the Commission was the one agency designated to determine if the special permit complied with the regulations and the factors contained therein.

The plaintiffs argue that a state statute contains parallel requirements to Charter Sec. C6-30-13; Gen. Stat. § 8-24. In a discussion of the effect of a referral under Gen. Stat § 8-24 together with a CAM application, our Supreme Court has held that "The report issued by the commission therefore has no binding effect on the municipality." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Planning and Zoning Commission of New London, 266 Conn. 338, 348 (2003). The Fort Trumbull court also stated that the legislative intent of a CAM application is one review, not multiple CAM reviews. "If the legislature had intended that each of the applications and referrals listed in § 22a-105(b) trigger a separate coastal site plan review, it would not have included within the definition of coastal site plan each of the types of planning or zoning applications and referrals listed in §§ 22a-105(b) and 22a-93(13). Moreover, if the legislature's intent had been to require a separate coastal site plan review, it likely would have incorporated into the act specific provisions tailored to site plan approval similar to these found in General Statutes § 8-3(g), which governs site plan review generally." Id. 351. "The legislature therefore intended the coastal site plan review to be part of the planning or zoning application or § 8-24 referral and not a separate review." Id. 353.

By its terms Gen. Stat. § 8-24 is not applicable to this project. The parking lot is not "any street, bridge, parkway or other public way." Gen. Stat. § 8-24(1). The project did not "locate, relocate, substantially improve, acquire land for, abandon, sell or lease any airport, park, playground or other municipally owned property or public building." Gen. Stat. § 8-24(2). The existing athletic fields remain in the same location for the same use as already in existence. None of the other subsections of Gen. Stat. § 8-24 are applicable. The court finds that the cases cited by the plaintiffs under the authority of Gen. Stat. § 8-24 not persuasive.

Applying the Lauer test to Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13 the court finds: (1) there is no language expressly invalidating any action after noncompliance with the Planning Board's referral and/or reporting procedures; (2) there is affirmative language that expressly provides that if the Planning Board fails to report within sixty days after the date of official submission to it that shall be taken as approval of the proposal; (3) there is specific affirmative language that the Board of Representatives can approve a proposal after being disapproved by the Planning Board by a super majority vote of two-thirds by the Board of Representatives; (4) the Board of Representatives approved this project by more than a two-thirds vote (5) Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13 is designed to secure order, system and dispatch in the proceedings; (6) Stamford Charter Section C6-30-13 does not involve a matter of substance; (7) Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13 is directory, not mandatory and; (8) the failure of the City of Stamford to refer the project to the Planning Board for a review under Charter Section C6-30-13 does not invalidate the zoning permit issued by the Zoning Enforcement Officer, the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals in dismissing the appeal from the Zoning Enforcement Officer nor the Zoning Board's approval of the CAM application.

Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it . . . Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action . . . It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged . . . Although related, the court's authority to act pursuant to a statute is different from its subject matter jurisdiction. The power of the court to hear and determine, which is implicit in jurisdiction, is not to be confused with the way in which that power must be exercised in order to comply with the terms of the statute. (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)

Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 727-8 (1999).

[W]e often have recognized a distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and the proper exercise of authority to act under a particular statute . . . Whereas [s]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . the authority to act refers to the way in which that power [to hear and to determine the controversy] must be exercised in order to comply with the terms of the statute, . . . We have maintained that [a] court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it . . . and, [o]nce it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)

O'Connell v. Doody, 124 Conn.App. 1, 6, n. 9 (2010).

On the one hand, a challenge may allege that a tribunal's action exceeds its statutory authority. Such a challenge raises a jurisdictional claim. On the other hand, a challenge may allege that a tribunal's action misconstrues its statutory authority. Such a challenge raises a claim of statutory construction that is not jurisdiction.

Cantoni v. Xerox Corporation, 251 Conn. 153, 162 (1999).

The above quotes are applicable to the Zoning Enforcement Officer's authority and the Zoning Board of Appeal's authority. Koskoff v. Planning Zoning Commission, 27 Conn.App. 443, 446 (1992). The plaintiff's claims of a Charter violation do not impact subject matter jurisdiction.

"The zoning board of appeals shall have the following powers and duties: (1) To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there is an error in any order, requirement or decision made by the official charged with the enforcement of this chapter or any bylaw, ordinance or regulation adopted under the provision of this chapter . . ." Gen. Stat. §§ 8-6(a)(1) and 8-7; Stamford City Charter Section C6-50-1. The only jurisdiction issue is: Does the Zoning Board of Appeals have the power to hear appeals from decisions of the Zoning Enforcement Officer? The plaintiffs have addressed the "way in which that power must be exercised in order to comply with the terms of the statute." Amodio v. Amodio, supra, 247 Conn. 728. That is not a jurisdiction issue and the way in which that power must be exercised does not impact subject matter jurisdiction. O'Connell, Flaherty Attmore, LLC v. Doody, supra, 124 Conn.App. 7, fn.9; In re Matthew F., 297 Conn. 673, 688-89 (2010). The court finds that the Zoning Board of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer.

The Zoning Enforcement Officer's duty is to enforce the zoning regulations and issue zoning permits. Stamford City Charter Section C6-40-19. The plaintiffs' concede these facts in their Appeal Schedule A paragraph 7, Return of Record #1. The Zoning Enforcement Officer reviewed the project, the zoning regulations and determined that the project met the zoning regulations. Stamford Zoning Regulations, P (Park District) Sections 4-8.1, 4-8.2 and 4-8.3 and the Master Plan designated as Open Space-Public Park. The Zoning Enforcement Officer determined that the project is located in West Beach Park, is zoned P (Park District) and is located in the Master Plan as "Open Space-Public Parks. The plaintiffs do not dispute those facts. The Zoning Enforcement Officer determined that the permitted uses in the zoning regulations for a P (Park District) are "uses and structures intended for active and passive recreational purposes." Stamford Zoning Regulations Section 4-8.3. The plaintiffs do not dispute that fact. The Zoning Enforcement Officer determined that the grass athletic fields and the adjacent parking lot conformed to the permitted uses in the P (Park District) Zone. The plaintiffs' briefs, oral argument and documents filed by the plaintiffs in the Return of Record do not dispute that fact. The Zoning Enforcement Officer determined that the same athletic fields proposed to be converted to artificial turf athletic fields along with the reconstruction and repairing of the existing adjacent parking lot conformed to the permitted uses in the P zone. This court cannot find any meaningful objection made by the plaintiffs in the Return of Record, briefs, trial testimony, trial exhibits and oral argument to that determination by the Zoning Enforcement Officer. The nature of the plaintiffs' objections are: Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13 was not complied with, the building permit process contained incomplete documents, the zoning permit process contained incomplete documents, the Environmental Protection Board did not review or approve the project and the proper person or entity did not sign the building permit or zoning permit applications. None of these arguments address the inherent jurisdiction of the Zoning Enforcement Officer. The plaintiff's arguments have addressed the "way in which that power must be exercised in order to comply with the terms of the statute." Amodio v. Amodio, supra, 247 Conn. 728. These are not jurisdiction issues and the way in which that power must be exercised does not impact subject matter jurisdiction.

The Stamford Coastal Area Management Regulation 7.T General Procedures 7 states: "Where approval is required pursuant to this Section no zoning permit shall be issued by the Zoning Enforcement Officer except upon approval of the coastal site plan by the reviewing board as set forth by these regulations and then only in conformity with the approved coastal site plan." Supplemental Return of Record #116.00. The Zoning Board gave Coastal Area Management approval to this project on September 15, 2008. After being advised of the Zoning Board's CAM approval, the Zoning Enforcement Officer issued the zoning permit. The Zoning Enforcement Officer's September 19, 2008 zoning permit complied with General Procedures 7 of the Stamford CAM Regulation 7.T.

The Zoning Enforcement Officer's duties in issuing a zoning permit are mentioned by statute. "No building permit or certificate of occupancy shall be issued for a building, use or structure subject to the zoning regulations of a municipality without certification in writing by the official charged with the enforcement of such regulations that such building, use or structure is in conformity with such regulations or is a valid nonconforming use under such regulations." Gen. Stat. § 8-3(f). The Zoning Enforcement Officer complied with that statute.

The Zoning Enforcement Officer's duties in issuing zoning permits are also contained in the Stamford City Charter. "The provisions of the General Statutes, as amended, pertaining to the duties of the Zoning Enforcement Officer shall apply to Stamford." Charter Section C6-40-19. "The Zoning Enforcement Officer shall: (a) enforce all planning and zoning ordinances and regulations; (b) review building construction and development plans to assure that there are no violations of prescribed conditions set by the Commission prior to issuance of building permits . . ." Charter Section C6-40-19(a) and (b).

The court finds that the Zoning Enforcement Officer had subject matter jurisdiction to determine if the project's improvements conformed to the Stamford Zoning Regulations.

The plaintiffs must prove the allegations of their complaint. Bridge Street Associates v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 15 Conn.App. 140, 143-44 (1988). Paragraph 12(a) and (b) require the plaintiffs to prove that the Planning Board was not referred this project and the Planning Board did not issue a report. This court recognized that this requires the plaintiffs to prove a negative. Charter Sec. C6-30-13 states: . . . until it has been referred to Planning Board for a report." It is not the defendants' burden to prove that the project was referred to the Planning Board under Charter Sec. C6-30-13 and that the Planning Board issued a report, it is the plaintiffs' burden of proof to show these events did not occur. Northeast Enterprises v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 26 Conn.App. 540, 543 (1992). The court finds from a review of the court file, the Return of Record in this ZBA administrative appeal and the trial evidence before this court that the plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof that this project was not "referred to Planning Board for a report." Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13.

For the reasons stated the plaintiffs cannot prevail on its paragraph 12(a) and 12(b) allegations.

(c) The City's application for the zoning permit was incomplete, and therefore, the Zoning Enforcement Officer was required to deny the application for the permit;

The plaintiffs offered no evidence at trial on these claims and did not comment on these claims in oral argument. The Return of Record barely touches on this subject. The transcript of the November 5, 2008 hearing does not contain a discussion of this issue. The court treats the reasons in paragraph 12(c) as abandoned. The plaintiffs cannot prevail on paragraph 12(c). Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 634-35 (2005).

In the event the court is in error on the abandonment of the arguments contained in paragraph 12(c) the court will consider the above for claims of incompleteness. The plaintiffs' 80-page Appeal to the Zoning Board of Appeals contains thirteen documents. Return of Record 1 through 13. In paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of Return of Record #1 Schedule A the plaintiffs appear to allege the following as to incompleteness: (a) the Application for Building Permit together with a Departmental Approval for Building Permit was materially incomplete; (b) the Affidavit portion of the Application for Building Permit was not completed; (c) the Application for Building Permit was not made nor signed by the proper person or entity; (d) the request for the Zoning Permit was not made by the proper person or entity; (e) the Environmental Protection Board did not review nor approve the project as required before the Zoning Enforcement officer issued the Zoning Permit and (f) the Zoning Permit process itself was incomplete. The court will discuss each of these six claims by letter reference.

(a) "The Application for Building Permit together with a Departmental Approval for Building Permit was materially incomplete."

The plaintiffs attached to its 80-page Appeal copies of three documents: the front and back of an Application for Building Permit, a form entitled Departmental Approval for Building Permit and Building Permit BP-2008-0811. Return of Record #3 and #4. The plaintiffs note that the front of the Application for Building Permit states: "Owner of Land: City of Stamford, CT," and "Applicant: Engineering Bureau City of Stamford, CT" "Signature of Owner"; and "Signature of Applicant" are on the bottom of the front page each with a signature and handwritten office address of the City at 888 Washington Boulevard, Stamford, CT. The back of the Application states "Owner: City of Stamford" "Contractor: DeRosa" and a preprinted two paragraph Affidavit form not completed, signed nor acknowledged by a Notary Public. Paragraph 1 of the Affidavit states: "I am the agent of the Owner-Lease of the building or structure Licensed Engineer — Architect — employed in connection with the proposed work — all set forth in the Application for Building permit." Paragraph 2 of the Affidavit states: "The proposed work is authorized by the owner in fee and the undersigned is authorized by the owner in fee to make the Application for Building Permit." The court finds from the plain language of this two paragraph Affidavit that it is not directed to the owner who applies for a building permit and must only be completed when an agent for the owner applies for a building permit.

No authority was furnished to this court that invalidated a building permit when the affidavit form found on the rear of the Application for Building Permit is blank. In this case the City of Stamford is and was the owner of the property. The City requested the building permit and the city's agents, its Engineering Bureau, prepared and signed the Application for Building Permit. The owner of real property is entitled to apply for, be issued and receive a building permit. "No permit shall be issued except upon application of the owner of the premises affected or the owner's authorized agent." Gen. Stat. § 29-263(a). The building permit application may also be signed by the licensed contractor but that does not make it mandatory that the contractor sign the application for a building permit. Gen. Stat. § 20-338b. The court finds that the Application for Building Permit was complete.

The Departmental Approval for Building Permit was materially incomplete is a further claim made under (a). There are two such forms in Return of Record #3: one dated in June 2008 for soil remediation and the other dated September 19, 2008 for the synthetic turf and parking lot project. The court will only address the September 19, 2008 Departmental Approval for Building Permit. Return of Record #3 contains a photocopy of this September 19, 2008 form, which form states the following: "Owner's Name: City of Stamford"; "Gen. Contractor: DeRosa Tennis Contractors"; and "Job Location: West Beach Park." Every line and every box appears to be filled out. It is signed by the City of Stamford, Engineer's Office. The City of Stamford is the property owner and its Engineering Office is a proper agent of the City in such matters. Four agencies are identified as "Required" with a check mark. Each of the four check marked lines contains signatures under the line; "No Building Permit will be issued until the following signatures are obtained with reference to the above mentioned project:" "Zoning: 9/19/08"; "Coastal Management: 9/19/08 CSPR-838"; "Envir. Prot: 9/18/08"; and "W.P.C.A." The last category, W.P.C.A., contains a signature but no date. The Building Permit number BP-2008-081 has been added in ink to the upper right of this one-page form. The court can find no incompleteness in this Departmental Approval for Building Permit dated September 19, 2008. No description of its incompleteness was noted in the plaintiffs' 80-page Appeal, the Return of Record, the plaintiffs' briefs and plaintiffs' oral arguments at the conclusion of the trial.

Building Permit BP-2008-0811 is also part of Return of Record #3. It is a one-page preprinted form with typed answers in each line. The Building Permit describes the "Owner City of Stamford West Beach" and "By Contractor: DEROSA TENNIS COM." The Building Permit also contains a line "Applicant: DEROSA TENNIS COM." Building Permit BP-2008-0811 is complete with every line and box filled in.

Any defect in the Building Permit Application is an issue for the Building Official not the Zoning Enforcement Officer. Gen. Stat. § 29-261(b) (Building Official's duties); Gen. Stat. § 8-2h(b) (Building Official's duties); Gen. Stat. § 8-3(f) (Zoning Enforcement Officer's duties); Gen. Stat. § 8-6(a)(1) (Zoning Enforcement Officer's decision may be appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals.); Gen. Stat. § 29-263(a) (Application to be filed with and building permit issued by Building Official); Gen. Stat. § 20-338b (Building Official to issue building permit).

". . . The owner's consent is not necessary even though the form used by the commission has a space designated for a signature `owners authorization.'" Connecticut Practice, Volume 9, Land Use Law and Practice, Fuller, page 350: "It is well settled that the legal owner of real property, his lessee, or his authorized agent, has a sufficient interest in the control of his property to entitle him to apply for a building permit even in the absence of a statute or ordinance providing that an application is to be made by the owner or his agent." Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 420-21 (1978).

Finally, the court is not satisfied that the documents attached to the plaintiffs' in Appeal Return of Record #3 and #4 were the actual Building Permit Application documents in this case. The plaintiffs have the burden of proof to show either in the Return of Record of the Zoning Board of Appeals hearing or at trial before this court that Return of Record #3 and #4 were the final Application for Building Permit documents. The plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proof that Return of Record #3 and #4 are the final Application for Building Permit, Departmental Approval for Building Permit and the actual Building Permit upon which Building Permit BP2008-0811 was issued.

(b) "The Affidavit portion of the Application for Building Permit was not completed."

The facts on this claim were discussed in the previous section (a). A plain reading of the affidavit demonstrates that the affidavit need not be completed when the property owner has requested the building permit and the owner signed the Application for Building Permit. There is no need for a property owner to affirm in the affidavit that the "proposed work is authorized by the owner in fee" when the owner themselves prepared, filled out and signed the Application for Building Permit.

No authority was furnished to the court and the court could find no statute, case law or section of the State Building Code that requires all Applications for Building Permit must be submitted under oath or acknowledged by a Notary Public and all affidavits must be completed even if the owner in fee has prepared, signed and submitted the Application for Building Permit.

(c) "The Application for Building Permit was not made nor signed by the proper person or entity."

As already found, the Application for Building Permit was signed by the duly authorized agents and employees of the City of Stamford on behalf of the City of Stamford as the property owner. The property owner is entitled by statute to apply for and obtain the issuance of a building permit. Gen. Stat. § 29-263(a). The contractor could also have applied for and obtained the issuance of a building permit. Gen. Stat. § 29-263(a). The statute is in the alternative "or." The contractor is DeRosa Tennis Contractors, Inc. Their involvement as the contractor for this project was noted in the Application for Building Permit and in the Departmental Approval for Building Permit. All printed lines on both forms that required the name of the "Contractor" or "Gen. Contractor" and/or "General Contractor were filled out either "DeRosa Tennis Contractors" or "DeRosa." DeRosa appears twice in the Application for Building Permit, once in the Departmental Approval for Building Permit and twice in Building Permit #BB-2008-0811.

The plaintiffs' claim seems to state that since DeRosa Tennis Contractors, Inc. was awarded the contract for this project by the City of Stamford Board of Representatives, it and it alone must apply for the Building Permit. The plaintiffs make this argument in the face of Gen. Stat. § 29-263(a) that permit either the contractor or the owner to apply for the Building Permit. The plaintiffs point to the Request for Proposal (RFP) issued by the Board of Representatives that requested the contractor to obtain the building permit. The RFP is in the Return of Record #32 in the ZBA administrative appeal. It is also quoted in plaintiffs' brief in this case at #104.20, page 21-22. The original RFP is in bold type. "THE CONTRACTOR IS MADE AWARE THAT HE/SHE WILL BE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN ANY AND ALL REQUIRED BUILDING AND REGULATORY PERMITS PRIOR TO START OF THE CONSTRUCTION. THESE INCLUDE BUT MAY NOT BE LIMITED TO BUILDING PERMITS FOR RETAINING WALLS, BLEACHERS, WATER SERVICES, ELECTRICAL, STREET USE AND STREET OPENING. THE CONTRACTOR WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED TO RESEARCH THE POSSIBILITY THAT A COASTAL AREA MANAGEMENT (CAM) PERMIT IS REQUIRED AND IF SO, COMPLETE ALL REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THE CAM PERMIT. ALL CITY PERMIT FEES WILL BE WAIVED, HOWEVER, IT IS THE CONTRACTOR'S RESPONSIBILITY TO SECURE ALL REQUIRED PERMITS."

Neither the Board of Representatives in approving the funding for this project nor the Purchasing Department of the City of Stamford in issuing the above RFP have authority to circumvent the statutory right of a property owner to obtain a building permit. Gen. Stat. § 29-263(a). The court finds that DeRosa Tennis Contractors, Inc. was not required to sign the Building Permit. The court finds that DeRosa Tennis Contractors, Inc. was bound by the RFP to secure all required permits and it did so when Building Permit BP-2008-0811 was issued directly to the City of Stamford at the direct request by the City of Stamford and when CAM approval was issued by the Zoning Board on September 15, 2008 also directly to the City of Stamford.

The court finds that the Application for Building Permit was signed by the proper entity, the City of Stamford acting by its agent, the Engineering Bureau. The court finds that the contractor, DeRosa Tennis Contractors, Inc. did not have to sign the Application for Building Permit since the proper owner, the City of Stamford, signed.

(d) "The request for the Zoning Permit was not made by the proper person or entity."

The plaintiff claims that the request for the issuance of a zoning permit by the Stamford Zoning Enforcement Officer was not made by the "real party in interest." "The critical inquiry is whether the applicant is a real party in interest with respect to the subject property." Michel v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 28 Conn.App. 314, 324 (1992). Where an application is not properly presented by the real party interest, the Board lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear it. Lupinacci v. City of Stamford, 48 Conn.Sup. 1, 7 (2002). The owner of real property is the real party in interest to file a zoning application. Richards v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 170 Conn. 318, 321, 327 (1976). The plaintiffs concede: "The property on which the project in this case was proposed is owned by the City of Stamford, the `real party in interest.'" (#104.20, page 21.)

The plaintiffs then argue that the City acts through its agents and may appoint its agents. Rick Taubum Associates v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 236 Conn. 613, 619 (1996); McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 10.46 (3d Ed.). The plaintiffs further argue that "a city council may authorize others to do things which it might properly but cannot understandingly or advantageously do." Finally the plaintiffs point to the City of Stamford's Board of Representatives approvals for this project and the RFP that was approved. Thus the plaintiffs conclude that DeRosa Tennis Contractors, Inc. is the only authorized agent of the City of Stamford. It is DeRosa Tennis Contractors, Inc. that must request the issuance of the zoning permit by the Zoning Enforcement Officer, is the conclusion reached by the plaintiffs. "Because the only agent duly authorized by the real party in interest to pursue the zoning permit — DeRosa — did not present it, the Zoning Board of Appeals should have sustained the plaintiffs appeal from the issuance of the permit." #104.20, page 22.

This court has discussed this subject in detail in section (c) of this portion of the Memorandum of Decision. The court concludes that neither the Board of Representatives in approving the funding for this project nor the Purchasing Department of the City of Stamford in issuing the above RFP have authority to circumvent the right of a property owner to obtain a building permit under Gen. Stat. § 29-263(a) or any of the preliminary steps needed to obtain such a building permit. The Zoning Permit issued by the Zoning Enforcement Officer is such a preliminary step in the City of Stamford as the property owner in obtaining a building permit for this project. The court finds that DeRosa Tennis Contractors, Inc. was not required to request the Zoning Enforcement Officer to issue a zoning permit. The court finds that DeRosa Tennis Contractors, Inc. was bound by the RFP to secure all required permits and it did so when the zoning permit was issued by the Zoning Enforcement Officer at the direct request of the City of Stamford and the CAM application was approved by the Zoning Board at the direct request of the City of Stamford, the property owner of West Beach Park.

(e) "The Environmental Protection Board did not review nor approve the project as required before the Zoning Enforcement Officer issued the Zoning Permit."

The Departmental Approval for Building Permit contains the signed approval of the "Environ. Prot." dated September 19, 2008. Return of Record #24 "Environ. Prot" is the Environmental Protection Board and the Board signed off and reviewed this project on September 19, 2008, before the Zoning Enforcement Officer issued the zoning permit. David M. Emerson wrote a September 24, 2008 letter that stated: "Please know that no aspect of this project falls within the jurisdiction or regulatory purview of the Environmental Protection Board. Accordingly, no permit or other approval by the EPB is required or necessary." Return of Record #7. The court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof for reason (e).

(f) "The Zoning Permit process itself was incomplete."

The fifth document in Return of Record #24 was submitted to the ZBA by Mr. Lunney. It is a preprinted form entitled Application for Zoning Approval, City of Stamford." The "Application for permission to:" section contains this handwritten response: "Install Synthetic turf soccer fields, drainage system, landscaping, parking lot, bleachers and chain link fence." Each line of this Application for Zoning Approval has been filled in. The section for multi-family and Commercial Buildings only has been crossed out. The form contains the following in preprinted and handwritten form: "Location of Premises: West Beach Park Shippan Ave." "Owner of Premises, City of Stamford, Ct." "Tenant: Parks Department, City of Stamford, CT." There is no preprinted line or space for Contractor or Builder. The name, DeRosa Tennis Contractors, Inc., is not on the form. The form was signed by Jeff Brown who identified himself as a Construction Manager, City of Stamford, Engineering Bureau, 7th floor 888 Washington Boulevard, Stamford, CT." That address is the Government Center, The City of Stamford's Administrative office building. This Application for Zoning Approval, City of Stamford is dated September 19, 2008.

There is no separate document in the Return of Record called a Zoning Permit. Mr. Lunney signed the preprinted form entitled Departmental Approval for Building Permit after the preprinted line; "Zoning." His signature is dated September 19, 2008. Return of Record #17 and #24. The plaintiffs allege that the Zoning Enforcement Officer issued his zoning permit on September 19, 2008. It is noted that the Zoning Board issued its CAM approval on September 15, 2008. The plaintiffs attached a confirming e-mail letter from Mr. Lunney. The e-mail is dated September 29, 2008 and states "The zoning permit for the above-mentioned project was issued by my office on September 19, 2008." Return of Record #10. All parties agree that Mr. Lunney issued a zoning permit for this project on September 19, 2008. The plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof that the zoning permit process was incomplete. The court finds that Mr. Lunney's signature on the zoning line on the Departmental Approval for Building Permit is the September 19, 2008 zoning permit.

The Zoning Enforcement Officer furnished a written presentation to the Zoning Board of Appeals, addressing each of the 18 numbered paragraphs of Schedule A of the plaintiffs' Appeal. His five-page October 29, 2008 Memorandum is Return of Record #21. That written presentation supports this court's findings on the incompleteness issues raised by the plaintiffs.

The court, for the reasons stated, finds that the plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof on the paragraph 12(c) claims of incompleteness.

(d) The requirements of the Stamford Zoning Regulations had not been and were not being met by the City when it applied for the zoning permit;

West Beach Park is in the P-Park zone. Section 4-8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 of the Planning and Zoning Regulations discusses parks. The grass athletic fields and its supporting adjacent parking lot are in conformity with park uses: "uses and structures for active and passive recreational purposes." Planning and Zoning Regulations of the City of Stamford 4-8.2. The conversion of the two existing grass athletic fields to two artificial turf athletic fields does not change their use. Both forms of turf are authorized park uses under Stamford zoning.

The Zoning Map designates all of West Beach Park as being in the P-zone. Return of Record #14. The Master Plan map shows West Beach Park as "Open-Space-Public Park." Return of Record #14. The current P-zone is consistent with the Master Plan. The two athletic fields, both existing and proposed, with and without the turf change are consistent with zoning and the Master Plan.

The Zoning Enforcement officer duties are to enforce the zoning regulations and determine if a project is in conformity with the zoning regulations. Gen. Stat. § 8-3(f); Gen. Stat. § 8-7; Stamford Charter Sec. C6-40-19. The Zoning Enforcement Officer's written presentation to the Zoning Board of Appeals refuting the 18 paragraphs of the plaintiffs' Schedule A support this court's findings. Return of Record #21.

The plaintiffs have not furnished this court with any further arguments on the claim that the "Zoning Regulations had not been and were not being met by the City when it applied for the Zoning Permit" either in their briefs, at trial or at oral argument. The court finds that the requirements of the Stamford Zoning Regulations were met by the City. The plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proof on paragraph 12(d).

(e) The application for the zoning permit by the City had contained false material statements or omissions;

[W]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failing to brief the issue properly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Turner v. American Car Rental, Inc., 92 Conn.App. 123, 130, 884 A.2d 7 (2005). "[F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited . . . [A]ssignments of error which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court . . . Where the parties cite no law and provide no analysis of their claims, we do not review such claims." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 634-35, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924, 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005). Briefs submitted to this court require rigorous research and analyze the facts in support of a claim or argument when it has not been briefed adequately. For this reason, we decline to review the claim.

Mundell v. Mundell, 110 Conn.App. 466, 478 (2008).

This rule of abandonment applies to trial courts in administrative appeals. Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Department of Public Utility, 266 Conn. 108, 120-21 (2003). These issues raised in paragraph 12(e) may have been discussed in paragraph 12(c) on the subject of the incompleteness of the documents discussed therein.

The plaintiff offered no additional evidence on this subject at trial, made no oral argument at trial and failed to include any additional arguments in their briefs. The court therefore treats this claim as abandoned. The plaintiffs cannot prevail on paragraph 12(e).

(f) The Board and Zoning Enforcement Officer exceeded their authority, and failed to respect required procedures and those required by law.

This claim appears to be a restatement of the following claims already advanced by the plaintiffs: Stamford Charter Sec. C6-30-13 was not complied with, the building permit application process contained incomplete documents, the zoning permit process contained incomplete documents, the Environmental Protection Board did not review or approve this project, the proper person or entity did not sign the building permit application and the zoning permit application, and the zoning regulations were violated by both the Zoning Enforcement Officer and the Zoning Board of Appeals. The court has already addressed each of the above claims. The plaintiffs have neither briefed nor argued any other facts that would support its claim in paragraph 12(f) that the Zoning Board of Appeals and the Zoning Enforcement Officer exceeded their authority. The plaintiffs cannot prevail on paragraph 12(f).

(g) The findings and decision of the Board were not supported by sufficient evidence.

The plaintiffs have invoked the substantial evidence rule. If the zoning authority's decision is reasonably supported by the evidence in the record, the reviewing court is not able to disturb that decision on appeal. Bora v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Norwalk, 161 Conn. 297, 299-300 (1971). It is the role of the Superior Court, when an appeal is taken, to review the record to determine whether the zoning board acted properly in the exercise of its functions and not to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the zoning authority. DeMaria v. Planning Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 534, 540 (1970). A court's review of a zoning decision is based on the record, which properly includes knowledge which zoning board members gain through personal observation of the site or personal knowledge of the area involved. Oakwood Development Corporation v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 20 Conn.App. 458, 460, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 808 (1990); Feinson v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 421, 425 (1980).

"In reviewing a decision of a zoning board, a reviewing court is bound by the substantial evidence rule, according to which, [c]onclusions reached by [a zoning board] must be upheld by the trial court if they are reasonably supported by the record. The credibility of the witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters solely within the province of the [board] . . . The question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the [board] supports the decision reached . . . If a trial court finds that there is substantial evidence to support a zoning board's findings, it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the board . . . If there is conflicting evidence in support of the zoning [board's] stated rationale, the reviewing court . . . cannot substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the [board] . . . The [board's] decision must be sustained if an examination of the record discloses evidence that supports any one of the reasons given." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Municipal Funding, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 270 Conn. 447, 453, (2004); "Evidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred." Jaser v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 43 Conn.App. 545, 548 (1996).

"[F]ollowing an appeal from the action of a zoning enforcement officer to a zoning board of appeals, a court reviewing the decision of the zoning board of appeals must focus, not on the decision of the zoning enforcement officer, but on the decision of the board and the record before the board." Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 226 Conn. 80, 82 (1993). "[T]he proper focus of a reviewing court is on the decision of the zoning agency and, with regard to its factual determinations, on the evidence before it that supports, rather than contradicts, its decision. The conclusion that this scope of review applies upon judicial review is not undermined by the fact that . . . the zoning agency was a zoning board of appeals reviewing the decision of a zoning enforcement officer in an appeal from that decision pursuant to [the General Statutes] . . . [I]t is clear from both the entire statutory scheme and our zoning case law that the zoning board hears and decides such an appeal de novo, and that the action of the zoning enforcement officer that is the subject of the appeal is entitled to no special deference by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 226 Conn. 87-89.

The plaintiffs must demonstrate that substantial evidence does not exist to justify the agency's decision. Feinson v. Conservation Commission, supra, 180 Conn. 425. "A board is endowed with a liberal discretion, and its [actions are] subject to review by the courts only to determine whether [they were] unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francini v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 228 Conn. 785, 791 (1994). "Where a zoning board of appeals does not formally state the reasons for its decision . . . the trial court must search the record for a basis for the board's decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moon v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 291 Conn. 16, 25 (2009).

The minutes of the Zoning Board of Appeals of its November 19, 2008 meeting state: "Vote on Application 089-08-Denied-Vote to uphold the ZEO's decision Friedlander, White, Sedlak, Hoch, Nemec Uphold ZEO's Decision 4 votes in favor; 1 opposed." Return Record #37. There are five signatures on Application #089-18 on the Vote on Application form under the column "Uphold ZEO's Decision" and no signatures under the column "Do not uphold ZEO's Decision." Return Record #38. The Return of Record #43 transcript verifies that the vote on November 19, 2008 was unanimous to uphold the Zoning Enforcement Officer's decision and to deny the plaintiffs appeal. The Legal Notice states in its entirety: "DENIED — Application 089-08 of Karen A. Murphy and William F. Polotaye Appealing the Decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer regarding West Beach Park. The Zoning Board of Appeals voted to uphold the Zoning Enforcement Officer's Decision." Return of Record #39. The Certificate of Decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals on Appeal 089-08 states that "the following is a statement of its findings and approval or rejection." "THE BOARD FINDS: The Zoning Enforcement Officer acted appropriately in issuing a Zoning Permit for work performed at West Beach Park." The Board UPHOLDS THE ZONING ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS DECISION regarding West Beach Park." Return of Record #41.

The comments of the members of the ZBA at the November 19, 2008 public hearing confirm the reasons for the decision upholding the issuance of the zoning permit by the Zoning Enforcement Officer.

MR. SEDLAK: The Zoning Enforcement Officer's job is to enforce the Planning and Zoning regulations. He cannot get involved in the operations of all the boards or many of the boards of the city to see whether or not they have acted properly. It would be a never ending — he would be bogged down trying to investigate what the various boards have been doing before — so that's not his job.

Perhaps the Zoning Board and other agencies of the city acted improperly, perhaps, but it is not the Zoning Enforcement Officer's role to investigate the operations of these various boards and agencies. He is charged with enforcing the zoning regulations and I believe he has done so properly in this case.

MS. FRIEDLANDER: Okay, I concur with the four members of the board in terms of the Zoning Enforcement Officer doing his proper duty on this application. He has limited power and he didn't go beyond that power.

MR. MATARASSO: We are going to vote to uphold the zoning officer's decision?

(Whereupon, all board members concurred.)

MS. FRIEDLANDER: Correct. The Zoning Board of Appeals upholds the decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer by a vote of five to zero and that was application 089-08."

Return of Record #43, pages 3 and 4.

The Zoning Board of Appeals had before it a five-page Memorandum dated October 29, 2008 addressed to Members of the Zoning Board of Appeals prepared and submitted by James J. Lunney, III, Zoning Enforcement Officer. Return of Record #21. This memo addressed number by number the plaintiffs' 18 paragraph Appeal. Schedule A. Return of Record #1. The court finds that the Zoning Board of Appeals had substantial evidence in the record upholding the Zoning Enforcement Officer's decision in issuing the Zoning Permit for this project. In making this finding the court only considered the Return of Record in this case and not the Return of Record in the companion Zoning Board administrative appeal, FST CV 08-4015041 S.

The plaintiffs claim in paragraph 12(g) is rejected.

(h) The Board acted contrary to fact and law.

This issue was neither briefed nor argued by the plaintiffs. No evidence was offered at trial on this subject. In effect this argument merely restates the other claims in paragraph 12 that the court has already rejected. The plaintiffs' claims in paragraph 12(h) are rejected.

The Zoning Board of Appeals administrative appeal filed by the plaintiffs is hereby dismissed.