Opinion
01-21-00258-CV
08-23-2022
POLO MEADOW TRUST, TIFFANY ASTON AS TRUSTEE, Appellant v. WALDEN ON LAKE HOUSTON COMMUNITY SERVICES ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 270th Judicial District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2018-70226
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly and Landau.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sarah Beth Landau, Justice
A homeowner's association, Walden on Lake Houston Community Services Association, Inc., sued an entity it believed to be the owner, Polo Meadow Trust, for past due maintenance assessments, interest, and other charges it assessed to a property. The HOA moved for summary judgment which the trial court granted. Because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse and render.
I. Background
Timothy and Sabrina Odom purchased the property in 2005. The Odoms later divorced, and Timothy Odom became the sole owner of the property and responsible for all its debts. The HOA filed a lien against the property for unpaid assessments in 2013, then filed suit against Odom in 2015, resulting in a default judgment. Odom then sold the property to R. Aguilar in 2016. After the sale, Odom tried to deed the property to the Trust. In 2018, the HOA again filed a lien against the property for unpaid assessments. That same year, the HOA filed this lawsuit. In 2019, Aguilar deeded the property to the Trust.
The record does not reveal the relationship between Odom, Aguilar, and the Trust.
The HOA sued the Trust to collect past due maintenance assessments, interest, and other charges. In response to the HOA's motion for summary judgment, the Trust filed a response and a plea to the jurisdiction contending that it had no ownership interest in the property when the HOA filed suit, so the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The trial court denied the plea to jurisdiction and granted the motion for summary judgment. The Trust appealed, challenging the trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction and granting of summary judgment.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review and Law
We review a question of standing de novo. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004). Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction which "is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case." Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Without standing, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case. Id. Because standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal. W. Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 583 (Tex. 2003).
"A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the court's authority to decide a case." Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 149 (Tex. 2012) (citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000)). "The burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction." Id. at 150. When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we must determine whether the pleader has alleged sufficient facts to establish that the court has jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446).
When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction, we begin with the live pleadings. See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife, 133 S.W.3d at 226. We may also consider evidence submitted to negate the existence of jurisdiction, and we must consider it when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 555. We construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor and look to the pleader's intent. Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). If the pleadings fail to establish the trial court's jurisdiction but do not show incurable defects in jurisdiction, it is an issue of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should have a chance to amend. Id. But if the pleadings negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing an opportunity to amend. Id.
B. Discussion
"In Texas, the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court." Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154. The test for standing under Texas law parallels federal law. Id. Under Texas law, the standing inquiry requires (1) that the plaintiff must be personally injured; (2) that the plaintiff's alleged injury be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct; and (3) that the alleged injury will likely be redressed by the relief requested. Id. at 154-55. The plaintiff must establish standing for each form of relief sought. Id.
1. Injury
First, we look at the plaintiff's alleged injury. The plaintiff must be personally injured, meaning they must plead facts that show they, not a third party, suffered an injury. Id. at 155; see Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. The injury "must be concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, [and] not hypothetical." DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304-05 (citations omitted).
The HOA claims that it is owed past due maintenance assessments, interest, and other charges by the owner of the property. The property at issue is subject to assessments authorized in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Walden on Lake Houston. The HOA provided an affidavit from its property manager for the amount owed, and records documenting the amount owed. The Trust does not dispute that the HOA has been injured.
The injury reflects an invasion of a legally protected interest that is actual, concrete, and particularized. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 157. The HOA has therefore pleaded sufficient facts to establish that when the lawsuit was filed it had suffered an injury. It has satisfied its burden of pleading injury.
2. Traceability
Second, we must look at whether the alleged injury is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct. Id. at 155. This requirement is so that a court only redresses an injury that can be traced to the action of the defendant. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). The HOA contends that the Trust has injured it by not paying assessments and other charges. The HOA relies on the restrictive covenant that allows for it to charge the owner of the property. At the time the HOA filed suit in October 2018, Aguilar was the property owner. Aguilar did not transfer the property to the Trust until over six months later, in April 2019.
The HOA makes two arguments. First, that the Trust is conflating standing with capacity. Second, that because the Trust was the owner when the answer was filed and the owner when judgment was entered, the Trust is the proper defendant.
The HOA contends that standing is about who is the correct plaintiff to bring suit, not whether the correct defendant has been sued. A plaintiff has standing when it has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit to have a justiciable interest in the result, no matter if it is acting with legal authority to sue. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005) (citing Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996)). But as mentioned above, part of the standing analysis requires evaluating whether the alleged injury can be traced to the defendant named in the lawsuit. Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, LTD., 548 S.W.3d 477, 485 (Tex. 2018) (citing Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154). A plaintiff has capacity when it has the legal authority to pursue a lawsuit, whether or not it has a justiciable interest in the result. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d at 848-49 (citing Nootsie, Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 661). So capacity is not at issue, standing is.
If the plaintiff lacked standing to assert the claim when it was filed, then the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over that claim and must dismiss it. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154. The Trust was not the owner of the property when the HOA filed suit. Because the HOA did not plead sufficient facts to trace the injury to the Trust when the lawsuit was filed, it has not met the second requirement for standing. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 157. Since the HOA lacked standing at the outset of the litigation, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. For this reason, the trial court's denial of the Trust's plea to the jurisdiction and grant of summary judgment in the HOA's favor was error.
III. Conclusion
We reverse and render judgment dismissing the HOA's claims.