Opinion
Case No. 5:99CV1186.
September 25, 2000
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Defendant's Motion) (Doc. No. 53). Plaintiff Carolyn Claxton Polley filed the above-captioned case alleging that her former employer, Summa Health System ("Summa"), discriminated against her because of her race in violation of Title VII and Ohio Revised Code § 4112. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and dismisses the Complaint in its entirety.
I. FACTS
In December 1990, Plaintiff began working for Summa as a full-time x-ray technician at its St. Thomas facility. She remained in that position until 1995, when she took a leave of absence to enroll in a radiation therapy program at University Hospital. (Doc. No. 60, p. 2). After completing the one-year training program and obtaining board certification as a radiation therapist, Plaintiff returned to Summa as an x-ray technician, this time at the Akron City Hospital facility. Id.
Several months later, Plaintiff applied for a part-time position as a radiation therapist within the Summa system. Id. Defendant subsequently offered Plaintiff the position and she accepted with the understanding that she would be subject to a 90-day probationary period. (Polley Dep. at 119-120). Plaintiffs probationary period began on February 10, 1997. (Doc. No. 53, p. 3). During the probationary period, Plaintiff improperly administered radiation therapy on at least three occasions. (Doc. No. 60, p. 6). Plaintiff also admits that she had some difficulty reading charts and doing necessary calculations by hand. (Polley Dep. at 151-152, 164).
On April 15, 1997 — approximately two months into Plaintiffs three-month probationary period — Defendant demoted Plaintiff to her previous position as an x-ray technician. (Doc. No. 53, p. 6). On May 5, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court alleging that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ohio Revised Code § 4112 by demoting her because of her race. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to provide her with the same training and supervision as it provided to Caucasian employees, and that Caucasian employees were treated more favorably when they made mistakes.Id.
Defendant filed the subject Motion for Summary Judgment on July 21, 2000. (Doc. No. 53). In it, Defendant argues that it should be awarded summary judgment as to the entire Complaint because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that even if Plaintiff could, it would be irrelevant because Defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for removing Plaintiff from the position.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The court is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The court views the evidence of record and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1993).
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial does not establish an essential element of its case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248. In order for there to be a genuine issue for trial, there must be sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 249.
As stated by the Supreme Court:
. . . . Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." [Citations omitted.] . . . Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Title VII Claim
In order to order to sustain her claim that she was demoted in violation of Title VII, Plaintiff must establish that: 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she was subject to an adverse employment action; 3) she was qualified for the job; and 4) she was treated differently than employees outside the protected class who engaged in the same or similar conduct. See e.g. Jones v. Delphi Elec. Sys., unreported, 208 F.3d 213, **1 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)); Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992). If Plaintiff satisfies each of these four prongs, the burden shifts to Defendant, which must then assert a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action it took against Plaintiff. If Defendant articulates a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiffs demotion, Plaintiff must then establish that the stated reasons for her demotion were in fact pretextual. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804-5 (1973).
The key questions in this case are whether Plaintiff was qualified for the position from which she was demoted and whether she was treated differently than employees outside the protected class. In order to establish that she was qualified for her position, Plaintiff must present evidence that she was performing her job "at the level which met [her] employer's legitimate expectations." McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 932 F.2d 1155, 1160 (6th Cir. 1990) (guoting, Huhn v. Koehring, 718 F.2d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1983)). Plaintiff cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact merely by challenging the judgment of her supervisors. Id. ("[T]he aim is not to review bad business decisions or question the soundness of an employer's judgment."); See also, Jones v. Delphi Elec. Sys., unreported, 208 F.3d 213 at **1 ("[Plaintiff must] show that she was performing to her employer's satisfaction.") (emphasis added).
Plaintiff argues that the Court should apply a less exacting standard to her case because she was a probationary employee who had not yet completed her probationary period. (Doc. No. 60, p. 9). She further argues that at this early stage in the proceedings, Plaintiffs own assertion that she was qualified should be sufficient to satisfy the qualified prong of her prima facie case. Id. Plaintiff is unable to cite to any Sixth Circuit case law in support of either proposition. In fact, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed summary judgment awards in cases involving employers that discharged employees during a probationary period. See, e.g., Layne v. Internal Revenue Service, 62 F.3d 1417 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment where discharged employee was unable to establish that he was qualified for the position for which he had been training); Warfield v. Lebanon Correctional Institution, 181 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer where discharged probationary employee did not perform according to employer's expectations during probationary period). Moreover, the case law suggests that, if anything, an employer's decision to discharge an employee during a probationary period should be accorded even greater deference than might be the case in a situation involving a long-term employee. See, e.g., Booher v. United States Postal Service, 843 F.2d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that probationary federal employees are not entitled to same rights of judicial review of agency actions as non-probationary employees); National Labor Relations Board v. Health Care Logistics, Inc., 784 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that employer committed unfair labor practice by discharging two employees engaged in protected union activity but did not engage in unfair employment practice when it discharged similarly active employee who performed poorly during his probationary period).
In this case, Defendant presented an affidavit from Plaintiffs supervisor indicating that Plaintiff was removed from her radiation therapy position not simply because she made several errors misadministering radiation therapy, but "because she did not understand the reason for the misadministrations or demonstrate the ability to perform fundamental therapeutic techniques." (Doc. No. 53, Ex. 2). Rather than presenting evidence that would rebut Defendant's evidence, Plaintiff simply blames her repeated errors upon inadequate training. (Doc. No. 60, p. 6). She then contends that given her lack of training, she was qualified for the position despite her employer's dissatisfaction with her performance. Id. at 10. Plaintiffs assertion is contrary to Sixth Circuit case law which clearly states that if an employer is legitimately dissatisfied with the performance of an employee, that employee is not a "qualified" employee for purposes of Title VII. Warfield v. Lebanon Correctional Institution, 181 F.3d at 729. Moreover, Plaintiff presents no evidence supporting her assertions that the purpose of the probationary period was to provide her with training. In fact, deposition testimony from Plaintiffs supervisors indicates that the purpose of the probationary period was not to train employees, but rather to evaluate their performance. (Doc. No. 61, p. 4). Because Plaintiff failed to present any evidence indicating that she was meeting her employer's legitimate expectations, she cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Plaintiff also fails to present sufficient evidence to create a triable issue on whether she was treated less favorably than other employees. To establish that she was treated less favorably, Plaintiff must present evidence that she was treated differently than similarly situated nonminority employees. Jones v. Delphi Elec. Sys., unreported, 208 F.3d 213 at **3. According to Sixth Circuit case law:
To be similarly situated, "the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/her treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it."Smith v. Leggett Wire Company, 220 F.3d 752, 762 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998)).
The only evidence that Plaintiff offers in support of her claim that she was treated differently than other employees is deposition testimony from Plaintiffs supervisors indicating that other employees who misadministered radiation therapy may not have been terminated and testimony from one of Plaintiffs supervisors stating that another African American probationary employee had once been terminated. (Doc. No. 60, p. 12). The fact that other employees may not have been terminated for misadministering radiation treatments is of little consequence because the stated reason for Plaintiffs demotion was not simply the errors she made on the job, but her difficulty understanding why she had made mistakes in the first place. (Doc. No. 53, Ex. 2). In addition, there is no evidence that would suggest that the employees who were not demoted for misadministrations were probationary employees. Non-probationary employees are not similarly situated to probationary employees such as Plaintiff. Plaintiffs reference to the termination of another African American probationary employee who was terminated is also without merit. Plaintiff offers no evidence concerning the reasons for that employee's dismissal. The mere fact that another African American employee was terminated during the probationary period does not establish that non-minority probationary employees were treated differently.
Finally, even if Plaintiff were able to establish that she was qualified for her position and that she was treated differently than similarly situated employees outside the protected class, she must still establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the stated reason for her demotion was in fact pretext for impermissible discrimination.McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804-5. The only evidence that Plaintiff offers to support her contention that the stated reasons for her firing were mere pretext is the deposition testimony of another African American employee who claims that one of the departmental supervisors joked that her job had been created for her or that she was a favorite of the human resources department and that another supervisor spoke to her about a mistake but may not have spoken to a Caucasian employee about a mistake. (Doc. No. 60, p. 14). Neither of these alleged occurrences involved Plaintiff and even if they had, they would not satisfy Plaintiffs burden of establishing that the stated reasons for her demotion were pretextual. See. e.g., Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Assn., 78 F.3d 1079, 1096 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that ambiguous remark by supervisor was insufficient to establish improper motive with regard to employer's adverse employment decision); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 1992) (coworkers' statements to plaintiff that others were not discharged after engaging in behavior similar to the plaintiffs were "nothing more than rumors, conclusory allegations, and subjective beliefs which are wholly insufficient evidence to establish a claim of discrimination as a matter of law.").
As the preceding analysis reveals, Plaintiff has failed to meet her evidentiary burden under Federal Civil Rule 56(c). Because no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Plaintiff was qualified for her position, whether Plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated non-minority employees, and whether Plaintiffs demotion was based upon discriminatory purposes, summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiffs Title VII claims.
B. State Law Claim
Plaintiffs evidentiary burden for sustaining a claim of discrimination under Ohio Revised Code § 4112 is virtually identical to that which she has under Title VII. See e.g., Plumbers Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 196, 421 N.E.2d 128, 131 (1981) (applying McDonnell Douglas formula to race discrimination claim under R.C. § 4112); Hollowell v. Society Bank Trust, 78 Ohio App.3d 574, 581, 605 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ohio App. 1992) ("Federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is applicable in determining whether certain alleged employment practices are discriminatory and violate R.C. Chapter 4112."). Because Ohio courts rely upon the McDonnell Douglas formula for determining the validity of racial discrimination claims under Ohio Revised Code § 4112, the preceding analysis also applies to Plaintiffs state law claims. Accordingly, summary judgment is also appropriate as to Plaintiffs state law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant Summa Health System's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiffs claims (Doc. No. 53).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
This Court, having filed its Memorandum of Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 53), hereby enters judgment in favor of defendant, Summa Health System, and against the plaintiff, Carolyn Claxton Polley. Accordingly, this action is hereby terminated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
IT IS SO ORDERED.