Pollard v. State

32 Citing cases

  1. Wiseman v. State

    249 Ga. 559 (Ga. 1982)   Cited 16 times
    In Wiseman v. State, 249 Ga. 559, 292 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1982), the court held that it was error not to give instructions similar to the one at issue in this case.

    The failure to charge the language requested, even if that language is perfect, is not reversible error. Pollard v. State, 236 Ga. 587 ( 224 S.E.2d 420) (1976). Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110 ( 205 S.E.2d 231) (1972).

  2. Godfrey v. State

    248 Ga. 616 (Ga. 1981)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that where the Supreme Court had reversed defendant's death penalty sentence on the grounds it was a standardless and unchannelled imposition, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude reimposition of death penalty on remand because the reversal was for trial error, not insufficiency of the evidence

    The trial court adequately charged as to Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142 ( 240 S.E.2d 37) (1977); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327 ( 240 S.E.2d 833) (1978). The trial court charged in substance appellant's requests 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9, and a failure to instruct in the exact language requested is not error. Dick v. State, supra; Pollard v.State, 236 Ga. 587 ( 224 S.E.2d 420) (1976). Appellant's fifth request to charge, to wit: "The crime of murder, in terms of law, is completed upon the death of the victim," under the facts of this case is an incorrect statement of law, and the trial court did not err in refusing to so charge. Gilreath v. State, supra; Hance v. State, supra.

  3. Caffo v. State

    247 Ga. 751 (Ga. 1981)   Cited 77 times

    Information provided by police officers, arising out of an official investigation, may be used to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Pollard v. State, 236 Ga. 587 ( 224 S.E.2d 420) (1976). See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 ( 85 S.C. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684) (1964).

  4. Dick v. State

    246 Ga. 697 (Ga. 1980)   Cited 83 times

    Failure to instruct in the exact language requested is not error. Pollard v. State, 236 Ga. 587 ( 224 S.E.2d 420) (1976). Appellant's sixth request to charge, to wit: "Aggravating circumstances must be outrageously and wantonly vile in that they involve torture to the victim and depravity of mind on the part of the defendant" is an incorrect statement of law, and the court did not err in refusing to so charge.

  5. Bullock v. Bullock

    261 S.E.2d 331 (Ga. 1979)   Cited 10 times

    This principle of law was covered by the juror's oath as well as by the general charge given by the trial court and was not required to be given in the exact language requested. Pollard v. State, 236 Ga. 587, 589 ( 224 S.E.2d 420) (1976). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

  6. Hill v. State

    237 Ga. 523 (Ga. 1976)   Cited 37 times
    In Hill, the holding was again concerned with trial tactics and involved an undisclosed affirmative defense which was asserted by the defendant at a later time.

    The trial court did not charge on alibi and they contend this failure was error guaranteeing them a new trial. It is, of course, the duty of the trial court, whether requested or not, to give the jury appropriate instructions on every substantial issue in the case which is raised by the evidence and this is true as to the defense of alibi where it is the sole defense. Pollard v. State, 236 Ga. 587 ( 224 S.E.2d 420) (1976). However, the state contends that the above principle of law is inapposite here for the reason that if there was error by the trial court, it was induced by the action of the defense counsel.

  7. State v. Wells

    332 Ga. App. 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    ”) (footnote omitted); Lewis v. State, 234 Ga.App. 873, 876(1)(b), 508 S.E.2d 218 (1998) ( “Observations by fellow officers of government engaged in a common investigation are a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); Pollard v. State, 236 Ga. 587, 589(2), 224 S.E.2d 420 (1976) (“[L]ocal law enforcement officials participating in common investigation are reliable informants and their information may be relied on to establish probable cause for the issuance of search warrants.”). Because the information relayed from one officer to the officer presenting the affidavit is deemed reliable, the trial court erred by excluding the information in the search warrant affidavit on the sole basis that the averments were hearsay communicated from Pitts to Price. 2. The affidavit submitted by Price related, among other things, that four named officers including Pitts responded to the relevant address based on a narcotics sales complaint; that they observed two known drug users in the driveway; that Wells, the leaseholder, stated that he was on probation for trafficking in cocaine and that he had a bag of marijuana in his bedroom; that Wells became visibly nervous as he walked Pitts to the bedroom to retrieve the marijuana; and that Wells acted as

  8. Patterson v. State

    328 Ga. App. 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 10 times
    Reversing conviction for possession of hydrocodone

    We note that even prior to the implementation of the plain error test in Kelly, Georgia's appellate courts found that trial courts committed reversible error in failing to charge on a defendant's sole defense, even in the absence of a request for such a charge, where, as here, a question of fact is presented on that defense. See, e.g., Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606, 409 S.E.2d 513 (1991) (failure to give charge on defendant's sole defense of justification was reversible error); Pollard v. State, 236 Ga. 587, 589(4), 224 S.E.2d 420 (1976) (failure to give charge on sole defense of alibi was reversible error even in the absence of a request for such a charge); Cadle v. State, 271 Ga.App. 595, 596(1), 610 S.E.2d 574 (2005) (“It is well settled in this State that the failure to give a charge on a defendant's sole defense in a criminal case, even without a request, constitutes reversible error if there is some evidence to support the charge.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Bryan v. State, 157 Ga.App. 635, 636(3), 278 S.E.2d 177 (1981) (reversal required where trial court failed to charge on specific exemption to OCGA § 16–13–30(a) where defendant presented sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact on the issue of whether he had a prescription for the controlled substance).

  9. York v. State

    242 Ga. App. 281 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 37 times

    Further, "[i]nformation provided by police officers, arising out of an official investigation, may be used to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Pollard v. State, 236 Ga. 587, 589 ( 224 S.E.2d 420) (1976). See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 ( 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684) (1964).

  10. Butler v. State

    323 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 23 times

    Byers v. State, 236 Ga. 599, 600 (2) ( 225 S.E.2d 26); Wynn v. State, 152 Ga. App. 479 (2) ( 263 S.E.2d 258); Goodrum v. State, 158 Ga. App. 602 (5) ( 281 S.E.2d 254). The evidence in the instant case, that the Mercedes was stolen in Atlanta on the evening of January 22nd and defendant was arrested in the same car on the following morning in North Carolina, is sufficient to support a charge on "flight." 5. The trial court's charge was complete and fair. It presented the contentions of the defense and adequately covered all issues. It was not error to refuse the requested charges of the defense as they were covered in those instructions given. Pollard v. State, 236 Ga. 587, 589 ( 224 S.E.2d 420); Leutner v. State, 235 Ga. 77, 81 ( 218 S.E.2d 820). The charge on recent possession of stolen goods complies with the law extant. Carpenter v. State, 140 Ga. App. 368 (2) ( 231 S.E.2d 97); Byrd v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 248, 250 ( 215 S.E.2d 251). The defendant's requests to charge on the differences between the definitions of theft by taking and theft by receiving stolen property were not adjusted to the evidence.