Pollard v. Speer

6 Citing cases

  1. Sterling v. Ferguson

    122 Tex. 122 (Tex. 1932)   Cited 74 times
    Finding case moot when entitlement to relief sought could not be determined by final judgment in time for certification to the county clerks to post challenger's name as a nominee before the ballots were ordered printed

    This conclusion of the Attorney General seems to be in fair accord with our own conception of the law. 13 The courts generally follow the rule that where no date when the authority of a court or other body for exercising a special jurisdiction shall cease, then that it does cease when any judgment which might be entered by the court would become moot, — that is to say, when any right which might be determined by the judicial tribunal could not be effectuated in the manner provided by law. Hill v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App. 91, 292 P. 662; Ford v. Beckwith, 28 Colo. 95, 62 P. 843; Pollard v. Speer, 207 S.W. 620. The case of Hill v. Superior Court, 292 P. 662, illustrates the proper application of the rule.

  2. Holcombe v. Fowler

    118 Tex. 42 (Tex. 1928)   Cited 37 times
    Agreeing with plaintiffs that Dow's mandamus petitions "are moot because this Court can never give Dow Chemical the relief it seeks" and stating that "we will not issue mandamus ‘if for any reason it would be useless or unavailing’ "

    The rule is an elementary one that a writ of mandamus will not issue if for any reason it would be useless or unavailing. Pollard v. Speer, 207 S.W. 620; Lacoste v. Duffy, 49 Tex. 767, 30 Am. Rep., 122; Wagner v. Garrett, 114 Tex. 362, 269 S.W. 1030; Testard v. Brooks, 70 S.W. 240; Fuller v. Brown, 10 Texas Civ. App. 64[ 10 Tex. Civ. App. 64], 30 S.W. 506; High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies (2d Ed.), Sec. 14; 38 Corpus Juris, p. 614, Sec. 94. Under this rule it is obvious we would decline to issue the mandamus were we to hear the case. Since the writ would not issue upon hearing, our practice is not to permit the filing of the petition.

  3. Nachant v. Montieth

    117 Tex. 214 (Tex. 1927)   Cited 8 times

    mith v. McDaniel, 170 S.W. 1070; Crowdus v. Turner, 270 S.W. 1041; Jirou v. Jirou, 136 S.W. 493; Hickman v. Swain, 210 S.W. 548; Kruegel v. Porter, 136 S.W. 801; Vardeman v. Edwards, 21 Tex. 737; Merrill v. Roberts, 78 Tex. 28; Robbie v. Upson, 153 S.W. 406; Rogers v. Dickson, 176 S.W. 865; Browning v. Pumprey, 81 Tex. 163; White v. Homes, 129 S.W. 872; Glidden Stores v. Boyd, 287 S.W. 1093; Nevitt v. Wilson, 285 S.W. 1079; Pierce v. Watkins, 114 Tex. 153; Green v. Green, 288 S.W. 406; State v. Bigham, 280 S.W. 1062; Glenn v. Milam, 263 S.W. 900; Jefferson v. Scott, 135 S.W. 705; McDaniel v. Hightower, 111 Tex. 585; Farmers Gas Co. v. Calame, 262 S.W. 546; Peckham v. Clark, 294 S.W. 278; McCord-Collins Co. v. Stern, 61 S.W. 341; Wright v. Swayne, 104 Tex. 440; Cleveland v. Ward, 285 S.W. 1063; Orange Grocery Co. v. Leverett, 282 S.W. 625; Tinsley v. Corbett, 66 S.W. 910; Wolf v. Sahm, 120 S.W. 1114; Laurine v. Ashe, 109 Tex. 69, 191 S.W. 563; Texas Farm Bureau v. Lennox, 296 S.W. 325; Pollard v. Speer, 207 S.W. 620; Robertson v. Work, 207 S.W. 1117; Smith v. Conner, 98 Tex. 434, 84 S.W. 815; Townes v. Lattimore, 114 Tex. 511, 272 S.W. 435; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 138 S.W. 205. MR. PRESIDING JUDGE HARVEY delivered the opinion of the Commission of Appeals, Section A.

  4. Robertson v. Work, Dist. Judge

    270 S.W. 1006 (Tex. 1925)   Cited 6 times

    I. Mandamus is the proper remedy. Articles 1526 and 1528, Revised Statutes; Lloyd v. Brink, 35 Tex. 1, 6, 10; Kleiber v. McManus, 66 Tex. 48; G.C. S.F. Ry. Co. v. Muse, 109 Tex. 352, 363; Pierce v. Watkins, 263 S.W. 905; Warren v. Scarbrough, 241 S.W. 551; Allen v. Woodward, 239 S.W. 602; Pollard v. Spear, 207 S.W. 620; Cooney v. Isaacs, 173 S.W. 901; In Re Grossmayer, 177 U.S. 48; 18 R.C.L., 243. (1) No appeal lies from the order refusing the entry of judgments by default or the order refusing to proceed to trial.

  5. Walker v. Lindsey

    298 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)   Cited 6 times

    It is not for this court, in an attempted supervisory capacity, to tell him how to proceed with the trial of his docket of cases. See Lucid v. McDowell, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W. 203; Pollard v. Speer, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W. 620. We are unable to hold that Judge Lindsey's actions amount to a refusal to try the plea of privilege case, so as to bring the matter within the purview of Article 1824, supra.

  6. Cox, Inc. v. Knight

    50 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)   Cited 3 times

    Article 3992 (3962) (2540) (2461), R.S. 1925, provides that, "the judgment of the county court finally disposing of the cause shall be conclusive of the litigation, and no further appeal shall be allowed, except where the judgment shall be for damages in an amount exceeding one hundred dollars." Also see Rose v. Skiles (Tex.Civ.App.) 245 S.W. 127; Stricklin v. Joslin (Tex.Civ.App.) 7 S.W.2d 165. Being without jurisdiction of the case, this court is powerless to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment of the county court. See Pollard v. Speer (Tex.Civ.App.) 207 S.W. 620; Coffman v. National, etc., Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 26 S.W.2d 921; Elliott v. Williams (Tex.Civ.App.) 9 S.W.2d 483. To grant appellant's prayer and enjoin the execution of the judgment of the county court would be, in effect, to permit an appeal in violation of the statute.