Opinion
June 1817.
The State of North Carolina, after the Cession Act, had no power to issue grants for lands within the ceded territory, except to perfect an incipient right. [Acc. 9 Cr. 87; ante, 160.]
If therefore a grant were issued by North Carolina after the cession, it would be competent to inquire whether there was an entry previous to the cession, or whether the warrant was a forgery. [Acc. 9 Cr. 87; 5 Wheat. 293.]
Entries and grants are void, and may be resisted in a trial in ejectment, whenever there is a want of property in the grantor, or want of power in the officers appointed by the government to receive the entries or issue the grants. [Acc. Crutchfield v. Hammock, 4 Hum. 204, citing this case; Curie v. Barrell, 2 Sn. 66; Neal v. E. T. College, 6 Y. 197, citing this case; 5 Wheat. 293. But see 1 Tenn. 111 and 230, and cases cited. See also Polk v. Hill, ante, 118.]
But the facts necessary to avoid the grant must be ascertained by legal evidence, which would be, it seems, such evidence as would be competent on a scire facias hy the State to repeal the grant, or in equity. [But see 6 Y. 197; 2 Sneed, 66, where, after citing this case, it is said that in a collateral proceeding, not between the parties to the grant, the grant, being matter of record, cannot in general be impeached except by some matter of record, some evidence of the same grade as the grant itself, or by facts apparent on the face of the grant.]
Copies of warrants of the same numbers as those upon which the grant is based, are not admissible for the purpose. [Overruled by Supreme Court of United States on writ of error. 5 Wheat. 293, 311.]
Nor is parol evidence of the contents of an entry taker's books, which were lost, when it appears that an abstract of those books was taken, which is in existence. [See 5 Wheat. 311.]
On the trial of this cause the plaintiff's counsel offered in evidence forty copies of warrants having the same numbers with those referred to in the grant to Sevier for 25,000 acres, certified by the secretary of North Carolina to be the same warrants on which Sevier's grant issued. And also certified copies of other warrants of the same numbers, previously issued, some for the same, some for other quantities, upon which grants issued to other persons, and previously to the date of Sevier's grant.
This evidence was offered for the purpose of showing that Sevier's grant had no legal foundation; not that it would directly prove it, but furnish facts from which the jury might draw such an inference, or that there never were any entries, and that the warrants were forgeries.
This evidence was objected to on the ground that it was not the best of which the nature of the case is susceptible; that, as it was admitted on the other side that the entry taker's books of Washington county, whilst a part of North Carolina, were lost, or no longer in existence, the next best evidence was the production of the warrants which had been lodged in the secretary's office of North Carolina. If they could not be had, the next best evidence would be the inspection of those warrants in the secretary's office by some respectable man acquainted with the writing of the entry taker, Carter. If the first could not be had, the latter might, and no reason is given why either is not produced. And because no pertinent inference could be drawn from the evidence proposed, if received, it would tend only to mislead and inveigle the jury, and put to hazard the landed interest of the country, which ought to rest on certain, known, and fixed principles. The practice or manner in which the entry taker's office of Washington county was kept or conducted is well known. The Court will take notice of that practice; and, to show that practice, a certificate annexed to an abstract from the clerk of the board of commissioners of land claims for East Tennessee was referred to, from which it appeared that it had been the practice of the Washington entry taker's office to make a great many entries, from the opening to the closing of the office, of the same numbers, and that nothing can be collected from that source in relation to the genuineness of the warrants on which Sevier's grant issued.
The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that the State of North Carolina had no power, after the cession, to issue grants for lands within the ceded territory, unless where some incipient right previously existed. In this cause, then, it would be competent to inquire whether there was an entry previous to the cession, or whether the warrant was a forgery. But this must be ascertained by legal evidence; what would be competent evidence on a scire facias by the State to repeal a grant, or in equity, might be receivable here. But the evidence offered, in my opinion, is neither relevant or competent. Suppose this were an indictment for the alleged forgery. The original books, if under the control of the Court, ought to be produced. They might be produced on a subpoena duces tecum to the secretary. It is true, as has been argued, that every forgery includes a fraud, but it is not true e converso There are but a few excepted cases in which we can go beyond the grant for the purpose of avoiding it. And where forgery is recognized as one, it is that offence, technically speaking. To infer it, from the fact that different warrants were to be found in the secretary's office of the same number, would be dangerous in the extreme; that he would not permit the jury to infer it, and considering the practice of making entries in Carter's or Washington county entry taker's office, no such inference could be drawn from the copies proposed, if received.
The question now presented to the view of the Court is, whether parol evidence shall be received to prove that there were no such entries in the entry taker's books as those by virtue of which the warrants in question purport to have been issued. The original books are admitted to be lost. It appears, as well from the law as the evidence offered which has been rejected, that an abstract of these books was taken. The extract of that abstract has been rejected because it was not a complete copy. The object is to prove that no such entries ever existed on the books; how can this appear when neither the books nor a complete copy of them are produced? There is better evidence of the fact attempted to be proved. The abstract is certainly better evidence, and therefore parol testimony must be rejected.
I concur with Judge Todd in the rejection of this evidence. I do not think it relevant. It might be different, if evidence were first introduced to show that the warrants were not in the handwriting of the entry taker; irreparable injury might result to society if the principle were once established that because two warrants were of the same number, the inference might be drawn that one of them was therefore a forgery.
The plaintiff's counsel then offered to read in evidence a certified copy of part of a paper, abstract, or book referred to in the twelfth section of the Act of 1807, c. 2, so far as respects the numbers of warrants on which Sevier's grant issued. The abstract (that being the most proper appellation of such a paper) is stated in that section as a book procured from the office of the secretary of State of the United States. It was alleged that agreeably to that abstract there was but one entry for each of those numbers; and, if admitted, would show by other evidence that Sevier's grant could not have issued on the entries referred to in that paper. But the Court rejected the evidence because the copy produced was only of a part of that abstract.
Parol proof was then offered to show circumstances respecting the loss of the entry books of Washington county about the year 1800; and also to establish the proposition that no such entries as those referred to in Sevier's grant ever were on those books. Several other attempts were made to produce parol proof to various points as stated, all of which evidence was offered with a view to annul or destroy the validity of Sevier's grant.
An attempt is now made to prove by parol evidence that certain entries which are presumed to exist never had an existence. This, in my opinion, cannot be done. If, by the ravages of war, fire, or other casualty, the entry books, which are considered as public records, should be destroyed, and parol evidence could be received to show either the contents of the entries, or that none such ever existed, with a view of destroying the validity of a State grant or patent, what would be the situation of society? whose rights would be safe? The precedent would be of most dangerous tendency, and ought not to be established. This evidence must be rejected.
The jury found a verdict for the defendant. In the course of the trial the counsel for the plaintiff filed a bill of exceptions to the opinion of the Court, with a view, as stated, of carrying up the cause by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States.
NOTE. — The facts of this case will more fully appear ante, page 118. — ED.